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I ask you to stop and think what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so 
many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, 
responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would 
be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance for 
effective disarmament.    
 John F. Kennedy, 1963. In Glenn Seaborg, 1987: 57. 	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CHAPTER	  1: 
Introduction	  
Contemporary	  Importance	  –	  Historiographical	  Negligence	  
 
 
A curse fell on the whole future of mankind when the atomic bomb fell.1 
Alva Myrdal, Swedish Ambassador to Disarmament (1962-1973) 
 
1.1	  The	  Nuclear	  Non-­Proliferation	  Regime	  	  
When the American President, Harry S. Truman, authorized the drop of nuclear bombs 
over the two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945 he changed the face of 
international politics forever: the world was introduced to a weapon of devilish capacity, 
which effectively brought about Japan’s capitulation and the conclusion of the Second World 
War.2 Consequently, other states found themselves compelled to acquire this newfound 
weapon technology for national security purposes. The Soviet Union was first to follow suit 
in 1949, and during the next fifteen years the United Kingdom, France and China also 
demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities.3  
The political responses to the discovery and usage of nuclear weapon technology have 
occupied historians ever since the first nuclear bomb was dropped, for apparent reasons. 
During the Cold War, fear of nuclear annihilation was an inherent component of the every-
day life until the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, 
made a retreat in a superpower nuclear confrontation.4 The Cold War is generally used to 
label the ideological conflict between the communist East-bloc led by the Soviet Union and 
the capitalist West-bloc led by the United States. Illustratively, how to manage nuclear 
weapons was an every-day challenge for all political leaders in the post-war world. 
Consequently, modern world history touches on the subject of nuclear politics in one way or 
another; without it the history of the post-war world is incomplete.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Seaborg 1987: 71 
2 Reed and Stillman 2009: 25 
3 United Kingdom 1952; France 1960; China 1964. 
4 It is clear that the fear of nuclear annihilation has varied greatly, both in scope and geography, and is perhaps 
best documented the United States, where it was an important motive in much American prose literature from 
the Cold War period, documented by Daniel Cordle (2006).  
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Yet, one dimension of nuclear politics remains largely understudied, despite being of 
great historical relevance. Diplomatic efforts to control nuclear arms and the establishment of 
an international non-proliferation regime have only recently received the attention of 
historians.5  This regime was established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, more commonly labeled the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968.6 Its 
normative guideline is that while the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology should remain 
accessible to all, the spread of nuclear weapons is perceived as a serious danger to 
international security that should be prevented. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, hereafter only 
referred to as the NPT, restricts the number of legitimate nuclear weapon states to the five 
states that had tested nuclear explosives prior to January 1967. Under the treaty these states 
are obligated not to transfer nuclear weapons or associated technology to non-nuclear weapon 
states. Non-nuclear weapon states on the other hand, commit to forgo a nuclear defense and 
allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct inspections of their nuclear 
energy facilities. Inevitably, the output of any peaceful nuclear power reactors, plutonium, is 
the input of nuclear weapons.7 The normative guideline of the non-proliferation regime is 
therefore fundamentally contradictory, and as a consequence, a system of institutions, treaties 
and national legislation has been designed to restrict nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.  
According to the American historian Francis J. Gavin, the NPT has made “…nuclear 
non-proliferation a shared value of the international community in the same way human 
rights, anti-terrorism, and maintaining a stable economic order have come to be seen as 
globally shared interests”.8 The aim of this research project is to contribute to the knowledge 
of the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm by examining the first Review 
Conference of the NPT. According to a stipulation in the NPT, five years after the treaty 
entered into force, a conference to review the operation of the treaty was organized in 
Geneva. The conference set the precedent for a periodic review system of the NPT, and as 
such it was a continuation of the process of stepwise build-up of national commitments to 
nuclear arms control. The periodic review system established an unprecedented enforcement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Regime is hereby understood as an authoritative arrangement among states that facilitates the accomplishments 
of specific goals through a process involving coordination of expectations and modifications of certain 
behavioral patterns. This broad definition is borrowed from, McMorris Tate 1990: 402.  
6 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), GA Res. 2373 (XXII), 12 June 1968. GAOR, 22nd 
Sess, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6716/Add. 1), pp. 5-7. (Attached in the appendix)  
7 Plutonium is central to the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, inevitably; it is an output 
of the first and an input of the second. When uranium is bombarded with neutrons in a fission energy reactor, 
some of the neutrons are captured by the atom. Because the neutron is divisible, it will split and part of it will 
add to the atom as a negatively charged electron, another part as a positive proton. The element is thereby 
changed and forms instead of Uranium (92) Plutonium 94 (or Neptonium 93). See Moss 1981: 24.   
8 Gavin 2010: 415 
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mechanism for international law.9 Its main function is to focus public and diplomatic attention 
on the operation of a treaty, relying on the idea that world opinion is the chief sanction behind 
compliance with international law. According to the political scientist John Simpson, the 
periodic review currently functions as a core governance institution in the international 
system of nuclear technology governance.10 Consequently, this research may also have great 
current explanatory value. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to give reasons for why and how this 
historical research of the first Review Conference of the NPT is conducted. To serve this 
purpose the chapter commences with a presentation of the historiography of the non-
proliferation regime that constitutes a substantial part of this introductory chapter for two 
good reasons. First, by presenting existing literature, I intend to limit the field of research. 
Second, and more importantly, by explaining how the institutionalization of a non-
proliferation norm is explain in the existing literature, it will become apparent how this 
particular research may contribute towards expanding knowledge of the non-proliferation 
regime. After presenting the historiography, the chapter continues with a presentation of the 
research question, periodization and actor demarcation. Thereafter, the source selection is 
presented and discussed. Finally, an outline of the thesis is included.  
	  
1.2	  Historiography	  –	  A	  Narrative	  of	  Lost	  Opportunities	  
This presentation of the historiography of nuclear arms control is partly intended to 
limit the field of research, but more importantly to position this research project according to 
existing literature, which hereunder been divided into two subcategories: Cold War history 
and institutional history. As stated, despite broad interest in nuclear history, the history of 
nuclear arms control remains largely understudied. Historians have only recently begun to 
explain the stepwise build-up of national commitment to nuclear arms control. Instead, 
historians have been preoccupied with explaining why nuclear disarmament efforts have 
failed. Consequently, a narrative of “lost opportunities” that overlooks the obvious 
accomplishments of nuclear diplomacy dominates most of its history. Recent research is 
contributing to the gradual transformation of this narrative; however, it still dominates the 
current plot of the first Review Conference of the NPT.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Carnahan 1987: 229 
10 Simpson 2004: 7. The periodic review system is still functioning. The previous Review Conference was held 
in New York in 2010; the next is set to 2015. 
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1.2.1	  Cold	  War	  History	  
Nuclear politics and efforts to control nuclear weapons is a central theme in Cold War 
history. According to the Norwegian Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad, the Cold War 
may be broadly defined as “…the period in which the global conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 
1991”11. Thus, history that somehow attempts to explain this conflict may be characterized as 
Cold War history. This is most definitely so in the case of nuclear weapons which have been 
regarded as both a cause and a means of the militarization of the ideological conflict between 
the two ideological adversaries.12  
Cold War historiography is largely influenced by the simple fact that most Cold War 
history was written during the process that is analyzed. As a consequence, Cold War history 
has to a great extent focused on blame and responsibility for the Cold War conflict.13 As a 
part of Cold War history, the historiography of nuclear arms control largely mirror that of 
general Cold War history; according to the European historian, Susanna Schrafstetter, “[t]he 
need to explain why the international community failed to establish a nuclear-free world has 
exercised Cold War historians for many years”14.  
Three schools have done so in different ways, and according to the Norwegian Cold 
War historian Geir Lundestad, each has proven “disappointingly subjective and 
‘presentist’.”15 The orthodox school, which Lundestad characterizes as a product of the early 
American Cold War climate, places responsibility for both the conflict and the arms race with 
the Soviet Union. According to Schrafstetter, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union made 
inspections, which were integral in all disarmament plans, impossible.16 Soviet Union 
proposals to ban nuclear weapons, on the other hand, were regarded as ruses “…designed to 
delay proceedings in the UN until Moscow had acquired nuclear weapons.”17 As a reaction to 
the Vietnam War, a revisionist school emerged to challenge the pro-American orthodoxy. The 
real barrier, the revisionists argued, was not the monolithic nature of the USSR, but “the 
intransigence of the United States”.18 US proposals to abolish nuclear weapons are rejected by 
the revisionists as being attempts to manipulate world opinion. The third position represents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Westad 2007: 3 
12 Gaddis 2005: 25-27 
13 Lundestad 2000: 70. It should not be ruled out that there are other schools that are non-Western. However, in 
the East bloc the field of history was censured, thus the historiography is predominantly Western.  
14 Schrafstetter 2004: 204 
15 Lundestad 2000: 66 
16 Schrafstetter 2004: 204 
17 Schrafstetter 2004: 204 
18 Schrafstetter 2004: 205 
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the middle ground. The post-revisionist school apportions blame to both superpowers, and 
according to Lundestad the position is a reflection of the contemporary policy of détente.19  
The Cold War history that has been produced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
collectively labeled New Cold War history, has attempted to shift focus from blame to change. 
This new approach, combined with access to previously closed East bloc archives, as well as 
a number of additional West bloc archives, has contributed towards slowly transforming 
depiction of the Cold War.20 Both Odd Arne Westad and Geir Lundestad are representatives 
of this new approach in Cold War history. The same development has occurred in the history 
of nuclear diplomacy. During the last twenty years, both Cold War historians and political 
scientists have shown greater interest in the development of a non-proliferation regime. 
Representatives of this relatively recent trend in nuclear arms control history are 
scholars like Thomas Risse21, Vojtech Mastny, Susanna Schrafstetter and Leopoldo Nuti. 
Risse and Mastny have separately analyzed the proceedings of the Partial Test Ban Treaty22 
(PTBT) negotiations from a British and Soviet perspective, respectively. These negotiations 
were the first concrete nuclear arms negotiations between the Cold War adversaries, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and resulted in a treaty that prohibits nuclear explosives 
tests in the atmosphere, signed in 1963. However, the treaty allows underground tests and 
therefore did not contribute towards reducing the total number of nuclear tests or the 
development of more advanced nuclear weapons technology, though it may have contributed 
towards raising the threshold to join the nuclear club.  
While previous scholars had approached the test ban negotiations with an aim to 
explain why the superpowers failed to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty which was 
hailed as the ambition of these negotiations, Risse and Mastny made it their focus instead to 
explain what instigated these negotiations, and to explain their outcome. Mastny analyze the 
role of the political leadership in the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev.23 Risse stresses 
the importance of the special Anglo-American relationship.24 According to his analysis, the 
negotiations were instigated because of close cooperation between American and British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Lundestad 2000: 66. The policy of détente was a relaxation of tension between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The policy will be explained in more detail in chapter two, when the interests of the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the review of the NPT are analyzed.  
20 Westad 2000: 5 
21 Thomas Risse has previously been published as Thomas Risse-Kappen. In the text, I will only refer to him by 
his current name, however, in the footnotes and bibliography, I use the name that he himself has been using in 
the given publication.  
22 Note that the Partial Test Ban Treaty is also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which is most common in 
the United States. 
23 Mastny 2008: 24 
24 Risse-Kappen 1995: 105  
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researchers and bureaucracy. While the researchers were imperative for putting a nuclear test 
ban on the political agenda in the wake of the 1954 Castel Bravo accident25, the bureaucracy 
was imperative for getting the negotiations going.  
 Equally, the two European Cold War historians, Susanne Schrafstetter and Leopoldo 
Nuti, have examined and explained the origins of the NPT. According to Nuti, the Chinese 
nuclear test explosion in 1964 is generally perceived as the event that laid the foundations for 
the NPT.26 Prior to the Chinese nuclear test explosion, the United States was deeply 
entrenched in NATO plans for a multilateral nuclear force. However, the sudden horizontal 
spread of nuclear weapons to China caused a change in the priorities of the American 
administration. In the wake of the Chinese test, the United States decided to pursue a non-
proliferation treaty, and in order to see this policy through, they agreed to Soviet demands to 
forbid all types of nuclear sharing, including sharing within defensive alliances. The Soviet 
Union was opposed to any arrangement that would provide the Federal Republic of Germany, 
hereafter referred to as West Germany, with nuclear weapons, in the light of the multiple 
historical conflicts between the two near-neighbors.  
Thus, according to both Schrafstetter and Nuti, the position of West Germany is 
significant in order to explain the NPT. The importance of the West-German signature is 
confirmed by the special concessions made to West Germany over the issue of inspections. A 
special arrangement was negotiated between the IAEA and the European Atomic 
Community27, hereafter referred to by its acronym Euratom, in response to West-German 
fears about industrial espionage. According to Schrafstetter, the United Kingdom played an 
important role as a mediator in securing this outcome, motivated by British interests to join 
the European Community28 and ambitions of past great power glory. 
Another factor that supports West-German significance for the NPT was the lack of 
concern for other near-nuclear weapon states. Schrafstetter, who has based her analysis on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Castel Bravo was the code name of an American test of a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb on the Bikini atoll in 
the Pacific on 1 March 1954. Fallout from the test poisoned the islanders, as well was a crew on a Japanese 
fishing boat, and created international concerns about atmospheric nuclear testing. 
26 Nuti 2010: 91 
27 The Europan Atmoic Energy Community, more commonly known by its acronym Euratom, is a regional 
organization that was established on 25 March 1957 along with the European Economic Community, by the 
Treaty of Rome. The purposes of Euratom was to create a specialist market for nuclear power and distribute it 
through the Community and to develop nuclear energy and sell surplus to non-community states. It was being 
taken over by the executive institutions of the European Economic Community in 1967, after the Merger Treaty, 
however, it was, and still is legally distinct from the European Union, which was established by the Maastricht 
Treaty of the European Union that replaced the Merger Treaty in 1992. See Bache and Geroge 2006: 602 
28 Originally, the integration of Europe was in three communities, the European Steel and Coal Community 
(ESCE), Euorpean Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In April 
1965, a Merger Treaty was signed agreeing to merge the three institutions. See Bache and Geroge 2006: 596 
 	   7	  
both West-German and British sources, emphasizes how Indian demands for positive security 
guarantees, meaning that the nuclear weapon states would intervene on behalf of non-nuclear 
weapon states party to the NPT if the latter were exposed to nuclear blackmail or nuclear 
attack, were dismissed by the superpowers.29 This was a concern for the United Kingdom, 
because the former British colony India had remained an important member of the British 
Commonwealth after gaining its independence. India’s demands for positive security 
guarantees were largely motivated by India’s strained relationship with its northern neighbor, 
China, as a result of the unresolved Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962.30  
However, the superpowers did not meet the demands of India. Instead of offering 
positive security guarantees in the NPT, which were primarily in the interests of the countries 
outside of the Cold War alliance system,31 a security guarantee was offered by a United 
Nations Security Council resolution.32 However, this resolution was considered worthless by 
most states, particularly after China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations, thereby becoming 
a permanent member of the Security Council in 1971,33 because the resolution could be 
vetoed by any member of the council. India consequently decided not to sign the NPT, 
denouncing it as an inherently discriminatory treaty, as did both France and China, the other 
two legitimate nuclear weapon states according to the NPT.34  
  
1.2.2	  Institutional	  History	  
The Cold War is an important conceptual framework for understanding nuclear arms 
control efforts. However, the Cold War is not the only conceptual framework through which 
attempts have been made to explain nuclear arms control. As Westad puts it, the intention to 
operate with a broad Cold-War definition is not to say that everything during this time period 
was caused by the Cold War; the Cold War “…is a separate, identifiable part of a much richer 
spectrum of late twentieth century history, but one that gave shape to an international 
system.”35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Schrafstetter 2004: 168  
30 Seaborg 1987: 117-118 
31 Gavin 2010: 412 
32 Security assurances are provided for by the Security Council Resolution 255. See for instance Epstein 1976: 
244 
33 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of October 1971 recognized the representatives of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations".  
34 The French decision to not sign the NPT, and to insist to remain unassociated from nuclear weapons talks 
cannot be fully understood without regards to the political leadership in France under Charles de Gaulle at the 
time of the NPT-negotiations, and the French departure from NATO in 1966.  
35 Westad 2007: 4 
 	   8	  
Nuclear arms control has also been explained from the perspective of the post-war 
world order. The efforts made to ensure that nuclear technology would only be used for 
peaceful purposes have been of a distinct global character, typical of the world order that was 
instituted after the Second World War. Originally designed to reintegrate the defeated Axis 
states36 and the victorious Allied states37 into a unified international system,38 the post-war 
world order instituted a deep-rooted logic of “shared authority over the global system”39. The 
relegation of Germany and American isolationism in the wake of the First World War was 
largely considered to have caused the second. The establishment of the United Nations (UN) 
was a prime symbol of the new norm of global governance, and the UN regarded it as being 
its task to use universal treaty regulations for address challenges to international security.  
Institutional history explains nuclear arms control from the perspective of the UN. 
According to its representatives, such as the political scientist Josef Goldbaltz, the NPT 
derived from a change in the United Nations approach to disarmament.40 Recognizing in the 
mid-1950s that the abolition of nuclear weapons was not tenable due to the ideological rivalry 
between the United States and Soviet Union, general and comprehensive disarmament 
proposals were replaced by gradual disarmament schemes that aimed to control and halt 
nuclear proliferation.41 The new disarmament approach was instituted through the passing of 
the Irish Resolution42 in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1961. The 
resolution called on all states, and nuclear states in particular, to “use their best endeavors to 
secure the conclusion of an international agreement” halting horizontal nuclear proliferation.43 
An Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was set up to see the task through. 
The composition of the ENDC reflected the contemporary composition of the UNGA: 
Canada, France,44 Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States represented the Western 
bloc; Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia represented the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Germany and Italy 
37 The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States 
38 Ikenberry 2008: 24 
39 Ikenberry 2008: 30  
40 Goldblatz 1994: 77 
41 Schrafstetter 2005: 206 
42 The Irish Resolution if 1961 was the fourth in a line; the first Irish resolution was presented to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1958. According to Glenn Seaborg, with each of the superpowers unable or 
unwilling to come forward with ideas that had the chance of being accepted by the other, the initiative was 
passed over to Ireland, whose Foreign Minister, Fred Aiken, had adopted non-proliferation as a personal 
specialty. However, it was not simply the personal commitment of Aiken that enabled Ireland to present the 
resolution that established the ENDC. Irish neutrality, neither a member of the NATO nor the Non-Aligned 
Movement, was an important factor why Ireland, on the fourth go, succeeded in presenting a resolution that was 
approved by both superpowers. See Seaborg 1987: 78 
43 Seaborg 1987: 79 
44 As mentioned, France denounced the notion of a non-proliferation treaty as inherently discriminatory, and 
therefore never participated in the negotiations of a non-proliferation treaty on behalf of NATO in the ENDC.  
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Eastern-bloc; Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden represented 
the neutral states.  
 
1.2.3	  Explanation	  Models	  –	  Towards	  Mutual	  Casualty	  of	  Agency	  and	  Structure	  
The presentation above illustrates how historians have approached nuclear arms 
control differently. In general they have wavered between privileging material and ideational 
factors, power or norms, in their explanation models. Orthodox and revisionist Cold War 
history have largely privileged ideational factors, by attributing the historical development to 
the ideology of the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc, respectively. Institutional history has 
also privileged ideational factors. The institutionalization of nuclear diplomacy is explained as 
a result of cooperation and global governance, while political conflict is largely absent in the 
explanation models of institutional history.  
Cold War post-revisionists on the other hand have privileged martial factors. Post-
revisionists have explained the stability of the Cold War as a result of a bipolar international 
system. This emphasis on bipolarity was not unique to the field of history, but influenced by 
the contemporary trends in international relations, which have studied the same subjects with 
an aim to develop and test general theories. According to political scientist and historian 
Richard Ned Lebow, political science neither made change its principle focus during the Cold 
War conflict: “For international relations scholars inn the 1980s, the preeminent problem in 
the security subfield was ‘the long peace’ between the superpowers”.45 Similar to the post-
revisionists, the bipolar world system was given much explanatory power by the international 
relations community. The dominant theory was structural realism.46  
The sudden and unforeseen fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent conclusion of 
the Cold War brought about new conceptualization to both history and international relations. 
“In the aftermath of the Cold War, during which a bipolar material structure appeared to 
explain so much of international politics,” political scientist Douglas J. Macdonald explains, 
“… scholars are becoming more interested in ideational causation.”47 Thus, the pendel has 
returned to ideational factors. This is illustrated by Vojtech Mastny and Thomas Risse’s 
contributions to New Cold War history. Both Mastny and Risse put great emphasis on the 
ideology and rationality of agency in their explanations. For instance, in Risse’s analysis of 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty, change is presented as a result of transnational cooperation. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Lebow 2000: 105 
46 Structural realism advocates that national interests and the international balance of power determine global 
politics and that an international community is a fiction. See Amstutz 2008: 17. 
47 Macdonald 2000: 181 
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conceptualization was explicitly intended by Risse as a criticism of the international relations 
theory of structural realism, which was considered to have failed by not predicting the end of 
the Cold War.48 As a political scientist, Risse is a representative of another international 
relations theory usually referred to as constructivism.49 Constructivist theory advocate that 
human beings are the major actors in the international community, and that state behavior 
reflects self-recognition of a national elite. Depending on such self-recognition, every state 
may behave alike, or completely differently.50  
History however is not a generalizing but a synthesizing science that rejects the 
general application of theory, arguing that historical explanations are unique because of the 
changing historical context. Although historical explanations may give priority to either 
norms or power, the two are not regarded as conflicting explanation factors, but 
complementary. According to Karl Marx’s famous maxim, individuals attempt to decide 
history through their own efforts, but they do not do so in the situations of their own 
choosing; social and political structures restrict and present occasions for human behavior.51 
The task of the historian is therefore to explain the mutual causality of agency and structure, 
of both ideational and material factors.  
The most recent contributions to the historiography of nuclear arms control have 
attempted to explain the mutual causality of agency and structure. Leopoldo Nuti stresses how 
international politics has a certain logic that can only be understood “… by looking at both the 
domestic and the foreign policy sides of the story and analyzing their connections with each 
other.”52 Thus, in his analysis of the origin of the NPT, he puts much emphasis on both West 
German interests and the transformation from bipolarity to polycentrism. In contrast to post-
revisionists, both Nuti and Susanna Schrafstetter regard the balance of power as much more 
delicate, and therefore as a source of change. According to the Cold War historian, John 
Lewis Gaddis, post-revisionists calculated power almost entirely on monodimensional terms, 
focusing only on military indices and not economic power, ideological power or cultural 
power, and Gaddis suggest that this was the reason why post-revisionist failed to foresee the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.53  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Risse-Kappen 1995: 145  
49 Amstutz 2008: 16 
50 According to constructivist theory, the “...international community is not an ideal to be pursued but a reality 
that is expressed in the increasing role played by international institutions and structuring international 
relations.” See Amstutz 2008: 17 
51 Macdonald 2000: 180 
52 Trachtenberg 2003: ix 
53 Gaddis 1998: 284 
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Several authors agree with Nuti and Schrafstetter that the emergence of a multi-polar 
world system that laid the ground for change. For instance, political scientists Robert H. 
Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, who have analyzed continuity and change in the foreign 
policy of Russia in the twentieth century, argue that the international balance of power is an 
essential factor for explaining foreign policy behavior. Donaldson and Nogee agree that it is 
impossible to make a formula that predicts foreign policy: 
The factors that shape foreign policy behavior are multiple. Some are internal, such as government and 
its political elites, the culture, economy geography, and democracy of a country. Others are external, 
such as foreign threats, political vacuums, and the changes in the balance of power. These different 
factors are always changing in substance and weight, thus making it impossible to come up with a 
formula or model to explain or predict foreign policy. In short, foreign policy, like all politics, is 
dynamic.54 
Thus, although institutional history has rightfully identified the United Nations as an 
important component in order to institutionalize an international non-proliferation norm, by 
creating an arena for negotiations and a channel for multilateral pressure, in order to properly 
explain the institutionalization of an international non-proliferation norm historians must also 
examining the interests of the negotiating parties, the state actors. This has been demonstrated 
by the research of both Nuti and Schrafstetter, who represent a relative new trend in nuclear 
history. Their research is gradually contributing to remove the narrative of lost opportunities 
that has been dominant in history of nuclear arms control. However, the first Review 
Conference of the NPT remains a more or less white canvas to historians. 
 
1.3	  Research	  Question	  and	  Demarcation	  	  
1.3.1	  Research	  Question 
As stated, the aim of this research is to contribute to broaden the knowledge of the 
institutionalization of a non-proliferation norm by examining the first Review Conference of 
the NPT. The outline of the nuclear arms control historiography above has served both to 
confirm that the first Review Conference is an appropriate research subject, and to inspire 
how a research of the Review Conference may be structured. The research of Leopoldo Nuti 
and Susanna Schrafstetter have demonstrated how it is necessary to examine both national 
interests and the dynamics of the multilateral negotiations in order to best explain the 
institutionalization of the non-proliferation norm. An approach that neglects to include 
national interests and political conflicts may risk overlooking material factors, while purely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 3 
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focusing on political conflict may risk overlooking the ideational factors. Thus, in order to 
explain how the first Review Conference contributed towards the international 
institutionalization of a non-proliferation norm, this research aims to answer the following 
research questions:    
 
Which roles and rationales of the parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the negotiations of the first Review 
Conference of the Treaty, 1973-1975? 
 
By uncovering what roles the different actors played in the negotiations of the Review 
Conference, and what rationales that motivated and enabled these states to play such roles, 
this research aims to explain how a stipulation in the NPT, for a conference to review the 
operation of the treaty five years after its entry into force, resulted in the establishment of an 
entirely new mechanism of international law enforcement that has served to institutionalize 
nuclear non-proliferation as an international norm. 
 
1.3.2	  Periodization	  
 In order to answer the research question above, the analysis stretches over a two-year 
period, from the summer of 1973 until the spring of 1975. The summer of 1973 marks the 
starting point for the analysis because this was approximately when the United Kingdom and 
the United States began to share concrete plans on how to set up a Preparatory Committee for 
the review. This Preparatory Committee negotiated the Rule of Procedure for the Review 
Conference. Consequently, in order to properly examine the interests that were decisive for 
the Review Conference Rule of Procedure, the analysis must include this process. The 
conclusion of the Review Conference on 30 May 1975 marks the conclusion of the 
periodization.   
 
1.3.3	  Actors	   
The actors in this analysis are the parties to the NPT, meaning states that had both 
signed and ratified the NPT, because only parties were allowed to take part in the decision-
making in the review negotiations. Consequently, several powerful states are excluded from 
the list of actors; as either signatory states or non-parties they only influenced the review 
negotiations indirectly depending on how their attitudes toward the NPT influenced the 
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actors. Thus, non-parties such as France, China and India do not appear as actors, however, 
their nuclear status certainly presents highly relevant contextual factors.  
When the Review Conference was convened in Geneva on 5 May 1975, the group of 
parties was comprised of almost one hundred members. However, a much smaller number 
took an active part in the negotiations. A total of 58 NPT parties participated in the first 
Review Conference,55 and of these, the following played a prominent role. First, the list of 
actors includes the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, who were the 
depositary powers of the Treaty because the NPT was opened for signature in their respective 
capitals. Second, their close allies in the Western and Eastern blocs showed an interest in the 
review. From the latter group, Poland was most predominant, while from the Western bloc, 
Canada, Australia and the members of the European Community: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany, stood out. Of these European states, 
Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany only deposited their 
ratifications of the Treaty on 2 May 1975, just in time for the Review Conference, which 
opened on 5 May. Thus, throughout the preparatory negotiations, these states were signatory 
states and were only able to influence the negotiations indirectly. Finally, Sweden, Mexico, 
Yugoslavia and Nigeria showed much interest in the review negotiations and acted as the 
representatives of the group of non-aligned states whose members generally remained in the 
background.  
The decision to use states as main actors in this analysis is primarily methodical. The 
level of analysis has been made necessary by the extensive list of actors in the negotiations, 
the time available for this research, and the fact that the Review Conference has not been 
subjected to any previous historical research. Due to these factors, an in depth analysis of how 
state positions in the review negotiations were products of individual initiative has not been 
given priority. As explained when introducing the research question, I am giving priority to 
analyzing the dynamics between the states, expecting this approach to offer both ideational 
and material explanations, because a purely interstate perspective may overlook the 
significance of conflict. However, I do not reject that an interstate perspective may add to the 
explanation put forth here. The research of Thomas Risse, presented in short in the previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Holy See, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq (attended only as an observer at its own request), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, 
Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire. 
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section, illustrates how states are not unitary; state interests are products of the interpretations 
of individuals that compose different domestic interest groups. However, in this research, I 
generally regard all the individuals, both diplomats and politicians, as representatives of the 
state. According to Norwegian sociologist Iver B. Neumann, diplomats do not experience 
negotiations as taking place on behalf of themselves, “…they see their role as that of 
incorporating the Minister, their Ministry, their government, their state.”56 Thus, I have not 
made my selection of sources based on an interest to explain how national foreign policies are 
the result of domestic group interests, and I have not approached the sources with this as an 
aim. However, when the sources have offered such explanations, it has not been my intention 
to exclude them from the analysis.  
There are a few disarmament politicians and diplomats that stand out in the analysis. 
These individuals will be briefly introduced here. Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson, both 
representing Sweden in the review negotiations, are individuals that stand out in my analysis. 
Alva Myrdal was appointed Swedish Ambassador to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament 
Committee (ENDC) when it was first set up in 1962, and continued to serve as Swedish 
Ambassador to Disarmament when the ENDC was enlarged and changed its name to the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Inga Thorsson succeeded Myrdal as 
Ambassador to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, hereafter only referred to 
as the CCD during the review negotiations, early in 1974. The Mexican CCD Ambassador, 
Alfonso Garcia Robles, and Victor Isrealyan, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Review 
Conference are also individuals that stand out in the analysis. Finally, due to my reliance on 
British sources, which I will turn to shortly, there are several British diplomats who stand out 
in the analysis, particularly the head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department and the British CCD Ambassador. The first position 
was held by David Summerhayes when the review negotiations commenced, however, before 
the Review Conference, Summerhayes was succeeded by John Christopher Edmonds. 
Equally, the ambassadorial position was first held by Henry Hainworth, who was succeeded 
by Mark Allen during the review negotiations. All other individuals will be properly 
introduced in the analysis when their introduction is called for.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Neumann 2008: 153 
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1.4	  Sources	  
In a field of modern international history, where there is an extensive number of 
actors, each with a strong tradition of producing written records, the availability of sources is 
overwhelming. Consequently, the main task for a historian in this field is not to retrieve 
material that may offer insight into a historical event or process, but to select the material that 
is considered to be most appropriate in order to produce new historical knowledge.  
To expand knowledge of the first Review Conference of the NPT, which is the broad 
objective of this research, I have primarily made use of the extensive British record of the 
review negotiations, as well as the official record from the Review Conference, and a broad 
selection of autobiographic accounts and literature. The following section presents the sources 
and the analytical risks connected with basing the analysis on British material primarily.    
 
1.4.1	  The	  British	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  –	  “Songs	  of	  Self-­Praise”57	  
It is the official British record from the Review Conference that creates the basis for 
the analysis presented in this thesis. The record derives from the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), because nuclear diplomacy and international nuclear arms 
control were part of the British diplomatic service which sorted under the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The FCO file consists of 
interdepartmental correspondence mainly, between the London office, the Geneva UN 
disarmament mission, the British IAEA delegation in Vienna, the New York UN mission and 
the main British embassies, for instance the British Embassy in Washington. Onto several of 
the machine-typed letters there are handwritten messages. This suggests that the documents 
are relatively informal, which is a likely result of their confidential status.  
The British record is absolutely adequate for answering the research question that 
steers this thesis. As the analysis shows, the United Kingdom was not only in a special 
position to be well informed of the interests that steered the review negotiations, being both a 
depositary power and a member of the European Community, but was also keen to play an 
active role and thus put much emphasis on wide consultations in the review negotiations. As a 
result, the British record includes many observations and assessments of other NPT parties 
and their intentions and interests in the negotiations, as well as letters and statements that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Arms Control and Disarmament Department during the 
Review Conference, John Christopher Edmonds, used this phrase to title a letter to Frederick Jackson, the British 
representative in IAEA, in which he denies the possibility of an Australian presidential draft initiative, and 
implicitly accredits the initiative to the United Kingdom. See FCO 66/738: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO 
ACDD, to Fredrick Jackson, the British Embassy in Vienna, 20 June 1975.  
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been written by representatives from other national delegations. Additionally, the record 
includes many official documents from the review negotiations, produced by the United 
Nations secretariat, as well as other UN documents and newspaper cuttings that were 
considered to have some sort of relevance for the Review Conference. Thus, the British 
record is considered to be very suitable for researching the first Review Conference of the 
NPT. 
However, this heavy reliance on the FCO file also presents a few analytical hazards. 
Inescapably, the selection of sources determines how a story will be told. The United 
Kingdom will naturally dominate sources of British origin. It is to be expected that the British 
diplomatic corps somewhat exaggerate its own role in its reports of the Review Conference, 
not intentionally, but due to its perspective. Thus, in analyzing these sources, it is necessary to 
be attentive to self-flattery. Illustratively, the inclusion of British sources in Cold War studies 
has, according to the Norwegian Cold War historian Geir Lundestad, reintroduced the 
perspective of three “superpowers”.58 Equally, the actors that are most prominent in this 
analysis are the actors that stand out as especially active on the British record, and had 
another national record been consulted the list of actors may have looked different. However, 
considering the role and position of the United Kingdom, it is reasonable to assume that they 
have not excluded important actors, though they might have included a few that were of 
particular importance to the United Kingdom, such as the members of the European 
Community.    
	  
1.4.2	  Biographical	  Accounts	  
In addition to the British official record there are two biographical accounts of the first 
Review Conference that will function as sources for this research. While historians largely 
neglected the field of nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War, participant saw it as their task 
to describe and explain the outcome of multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations.59 The 
first review of the NPT is covered in one chapter of William Epstein’s book about nuclear 
proliferation and arms control published in 1976, and in one chapter in Mohammed Shaker’s 
three-volume description of the whole non-proliferation negotiation process, published in 
1980. While William Epstein was a Canadian UN disarmament consultant during the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Lundestad 2000: 66 
59 E.g. William Epstein (1976) The Last Chance, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control; Alva Myrdal (1977) 
The Game of Disarmament, How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race; Mohammed I. Shaker (1980) 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979; Glenn Seaborg (1987) Stemming 
the Tide, Arms Control in the Johnson Years; Victor Israelyan (2003) On the Battlefields of the Cold War, a 
Soviet Ambassador’s Confession. 
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Review Conference of the NPT, who is on occasion mentioned on the British record, 
Mohammed Shaker was not directly associated with the review negotiations. As an Egyptian 
diplomat Shaker took part in the negotiations of the NPT; however, Egypt decided not to sign 
the Treaty and was therefore not an actor in the review.  
 
1.4.3	  Single-­Archival	  Research	  
The main reason for my single-archival approach is that Masters’ research is only a 
limited research project, with strict time constraints. Consequently, multi-archival research 
could run the risk of being largely cosmetic; the greater the source selection, the greater the 
methodological challenges. This was an evident risk when going into this particular Masters’ 
project, first because the first Review Conference was only described in brief in the accounts 
of Mohammed Shaker and William Epstein, and it was initially a time-consuming task to map 
out the order of events that together made up the negotiation process. Secondly, the British 
record that I have based my research on has only been made available during the last five to 
seven years, and to my knowledge not yet been extensively used. Therefore, simply sorting 
out the extensive material was a substantial part of my research. Due to these reasons, 
attempts to make a multi-archival analysis could run the risk of being unequally weighted, 
drawn primarily from one archive, while other archives would be incorporated only to test the 
findings from the first.  
However, a single-archival approach does not exclude other sources. Historians must 
consult different types of sources in order to secure their accounts. According to the 
Norwegian historian Knut Kjedstaldi, sources must be tested for external consistency.60 To 
test the external consistency of the British sources, the documents have been crosschecked 
with the published Final Document from the Review Conference, produced by the UN 
secretariat, which gives a short description of the conference, its general conduct, and a list of 
all the participants. As such, these documents have been helpful in associating individuals that 
have not been fully introduced by the British record. Some of these Review Conference 
documents are also included in the British record, as are some of the official documents from 
the Preparatory Committee, thereby suggesting the reliability of the British record. In addition 
to primary sources, much literature is excellent for testing outer consistency and for offering 
suggestions on the relevant international context of the review negotiations and the general 
positions and interests of the actors in the review negotiation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Kjeldstadli 1999: 181 
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1.5	  Structure	  of	  Thesis	  
In order to analyze the roles and rationales of the NPT parties in the review 
negotiations, this thesis is divided into five chapters: this introductory chapter, three analysis 
chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter two presents an analysis of the interests of the 
NPT parties in the NPT and its Review Conference. In doing so, the analysis serves to explain 
both the main divisions regarding issues of substance and the formal organization of the 
Review Conference, and which states were in position to play pivotal roles in the review. 
Thus, this chapter provides a necessary foundation for the analysis of the dynamics of the 
review negotiations in the following two chapters.  
Chapter three presents an analysis of how the roles and rationale of the NPT parties in 
the negotiations of the Rule of Procedure, which were conducted in the Preparatory 
Committee. Thus, the chapter commences with an analysis of how the Preparatory Committee 
was set up, and thereafter explains how the two major conflicting issues regarding the Rule of 
Procedure, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making, were settled. Chapter four 
presents an analysis of the roles and rationales of the NPT-parties in the negotiations in the 
Review Conference. These negotiations were primarily concerned with the formulation of a 
Final Document.  
The three analysis chapters are concluded with a short summary that highlights the 
main findings in each chapter. These summaries provide the basis for chapter five, which 
presents the conclusions of this research; how a vague and contested stipulation in the NPT 
resulted in the establishment of a periodic review system for the treaty. As the next chapter 
demonstrates, while the review negotiations were in a sense a continuation of the NPT 
negotiations the historical context was changed, and thus, the roles and rationales were 
altered.   
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CHAPTER	  2:	  
Revision	  or	  Reinforcement	  
Opposing	  Interests	  in	  the	  Non-­Proliferation	  Treaty	  Review	  Conference	  	  
 
 
…most Non-Nuclear Weapon States would argue that the treaty ought to have as much to do 
with “vertical proliferation” as with “horizontal proliferation”.61  
Henry Hainworth, British Ambassador to Disarmament, 5 October 1973. 
 
2.1	  Introduction	  
The broad objective of this research is to explain how a stipulation in the NPT, for a 
conference to review the operation of the Treaty five years after its entry into force, resulted 
in the establishment of an entirely new mechanism of international law enforcement that has 
served to institutionalize nuclear non-proliferation as an international norm. Virtually 
everything about the Review Conference, apart from its broad objective, found no regulation 
in the Treaty.62 As a result, both the organization and purpose of the conference were 
subjected to multilateral negotiations, both prior to, and during the Review Conference.  
In order to explain the outcome of these multilateral negotiations, knowledge of what 
motivates state behavior in multilateral negotiations is a precondition. Generally, state 
behavior is considered to be motivated by power potentials; states seek to increase their 
international influence and prevent one-ended dependency. However, as discussed in the 
introductory chapter, to serve this purpose states may choose from a variety of methods; 
power is not monodimensional. The purpose of this chapter is to explain what interests the 
parties to the NPT had in the review of the Treaty, and those factors that may account for 
these interests. In doing so, this chapter suggests which states were in positions to influence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control 
and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.  
62 Article VIII, paragraph 3 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reads: ”Five years after 
the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 
order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose of the Preamble and the 
provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the 
Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of 
further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty”62 
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the review negotiations, and it thereby provides a necessary foundation for the analysis of the 
dynamics of the review negotiations in the following two chapters. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: part one analyzes the interests of the large 
and heterogeneous group of non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT in the Review 
Conference. Part two analyzes the interests of the three nuclear weapon states party to the 
NPT, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The chapter concludes 
with a short summary of the chapter findings.  
 
2.2	  General	  and	  Comprehensive	  Disarmament	  	  
According to the Egyptian diplomat, Mohammed Shaker, a conference to review the 
operation of the NPT was first suggested in an American NPT draft dating back to 1965.63 
The suggestion was intended to curb the concern expressed by members of the of the 
Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee, where the NPT was negotiated, that the treaty did 
not properly secure the obligation of nuclear weapon states to take part in disarmament 
negotiations in “good faith”.64  As explained in chapter one, the ENDC derived from a change 
in the UN approach to disarmament.  William Epstein also agrees that the intention of the 
Review Conference was to ensure that the nuclear weapon states were fulfilling their 
commitments.65 While IAEA safeguards were a means of verifying that the non-nuclear 
parties were living up to their pledges not to go nuclear, the Treaty contained no means of 
verifying that the nuclear weapon states were abiding by their pledges to promote peaceful 
usage of nuclear energy and to halt nuclear testing and reverse the nuclear arms race.66 Thus, 
the non-nuclear weapon states regarded it to be the purpose of the Review Conference to 
ensure that the nuclear weapon states were fulfilling their treaty commitments by reaffirming 
their commitment to the NPT as a gradual disarmament scheme aimed towards general and 
comprehensive disarmament.67  
However, despite their shared interpretation of the broad purpose of the NPT and its 
Review Conference, the group on non-nuclear weapon states was heterogeneous, divided 
politically, economically and militarily. While the majority of the industrialized non-nuclear 
weapon states were members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and thereby protected by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Shaker 1980: 872 
64 Article VI, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
65 Epstein 1976: 244 
66 Epstein 1976: 244 
67 FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control 
and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.  
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the nuclear umbrella of their respective superpowers, the developing non-nuclear weapon 
states were loosely organized in the Non-Aligned Movement. Due to these differences, the 
non-nuclear weapon state did not approach the Review Conference in unison; their priorities 
in the review and their position to realize them varied greatly.   
 
2.2.1	  The	  Industrialized	  Alliances	  	  
The majority of the industrialized non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT were 
united by one common feature; they were organized in military alliances according to 
ideology. Consequently, maintaining amicable relations within these alliances, which were 
considered to guarantee the national security of each member, was of major importance to 
these non-nuclear weapon states. However, despite this one obvious similarity, little united 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two alliances were based on completely opposite systems 
of power. While the non-nuclear weapon states in the Warsaw Pact were Soviet satellites 
under authoritarian rule, whose foreign policies were largely formulated in Moscow, NATO 
was composed primarily of liberal democracies. Contrary to the Soviet Union, the United 
States could not dictate NATO’s foreign policy; NATO’s members were free to criticize the 
actions of the United States. Thus, they were also in a position to influence American actions. 
Therefore, in order to explain the outcome of the first Review Conference of the NPT, 
accounting for the actions of the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO is given priority; the 
actions of the Soviet satellites are generally covered in the analysis of the Soviet Union later 
in this chapter. 
 
Western	  Demands	  for	  Endorsement	  
The Western non-nuclear weapon states regarded it to be the purpose of the Review 
Conference to endorse the NPT as a means toward achieving general and comprehensive 
disarmament. This was expressed by Canada already during the preparations for the Review 
Conference, who warned that the disarmament commitment of the nuclear weapon states was 
an issue that could not be overlooked at the conference.68 Canada thereby signaled to her 
allies that she was inclined to take part in criticizing the disarmament efforts of the nuclear 
weapon states. There are several factors that may serve to explain why the Western non-
nuclear weapon states opted for this position. With regards to Canada, it should not be ruled 
out that Canada’s position as a significant uranium and nuclear technology supplier enabled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 FCO 66/590: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in the FCO, 22 January 
1974.  
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Canada to put pressure on the United States in respect of nuclear issues.69 Another reasonable 
assumption is that the independent position of Western Europe during the early 1970s 
encouraged the Western non-nuclear weapon states to test their powers opposite the United 
States in the review.  
 The relatively independent position of the Western European states in the early 1970s 
was partly a result of the NPT. Since the end of the Second World War, the relationship with 
America was of fundamental importance to the Europeans. According to the historian Marc 
Trachtenberg, the “…United States was the protectors of West Europe; the freedom of 
Europe, it was generally believed, depended on American military power.”70 The NPT 
however, transformed the relationship between the United States and Europe. As explained in 
the introductory chapter, the American decision in 1965 to give priority to a non-proliferation 
treaty, at the expense of NATO’s plans for nuclear sharing, was badly received in Western 
Europe.71 According to Leopoldo Nuti, this turn was regarded as a sign that Europe’s role in 
US foreign policy was decreasing. The Western European governments believed that the 
American motive for pursuing a non-proliferation treaty was to achieve an honorable peace in 
Vietnam. In the mid-1960s, the United States increased its involvement in the decolonization 
war in Indo-China to prevent the spread of communism in Asia. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union 
was threatening to assist the North Vietnamese communists. Thus, an honorable peace was 
only thought possible with the diplomatic help of the Soviet Union.72 A non-proliferation 
treaty was a means to this end, because one of the Soviet Union’s main goals was to prevent a 
revanchist West Germany armed with nuclear weapons.73  
Initially, the only Western European state that supported the NPT was the United 
Kingdom, whose nuclear weapon status was endorsed by the NPT. Reactions were 
particularly resentful in the states that had been defeated in the previous war, Italy and West 
Germany. West German politicians went as far as to characterize the NPT as “a Versailles of 
cosmic proportions”74, because it instituted West Germany as a secondary power. They found 
it especially difficult to accept the NPT because it forced them to come to terms with the 
partition of Germany.75 Prior to the NPT, West German politicians regarded the nuclear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Canada has large deposits of uranium; and was the world’s largest uranium exporter in 2008, according to the 
Canadian Nuclear Association. The significance of Canada as a nuclear supplier is illustrated by the inclusion of 
Canada in the exclusive Nuclear Supplier Group, see Wilmshurts 1984: 28.  
70 Trachtenberg 2003: vii 
71 Nuti 2010: 95 
72 Nuti 2010: 100 
73 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 95 
74 Nuti 2010: 96 
75 Nuti 2010: 97 
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option as leverage and a potential bargaining chip in order to achieve German reunification. 
The United States and the United Kingdom did eventually succeed in convincing their 
Western allies, including West Germany, of the political and economic significance of NPT 
membership; however, as explained in the introductory chapter, substantial concession were 
necessary in order to secure the European signatures.   
The Western European governments responded to the perceived downsizing of 
Europe’s role in US foreign policy by consolidating their position opposite the United States. 
First, regional integration was strengthened in 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the 
European Community.76 Second, West Germany adopted a conciliatory tone towards East 
Germany and the Soviet Union, known as the policy of Ostpolitik.77 These political efforts, 
combined with the strong position of the West German economy, may serve to explain why 
the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO decided to criticize the United States in the review.  
Additionally, domestic pressure may also serve as a possible explanation for the 
actions of NATO’s non-nuclear weapon states in the Review Conference. As liberal 
democracies, it is reasonable to assume that the elected governments within these states were 
exposed to both popular demands for nuclear disarmament and domestic political pressure to 
challenge the United States to signal discontent with American disregard of European 
politics.78  
However, the Western non-nuclear weapon states’ position opposite the United States 
should not be exaggerated. Their demand was that the Review Conference should reaffirm the 
political significance of the NPT and thereby legitimized the European decisions to sign the 
Treaty. However, the NATO states did not demand revision of the Treaty, accepting that 
provisions for amendments were covered in another paragraph in the NPT.79 This position 
was confirmed in a meeting of the European Community group at an early stage of the review 
negotiations. Thus, the European states stood by the Dutch position, that the purpose of the 
review was to reinforce, rather than to rectify the Treaty, expressed during a NATO 
disarmament meeting held back in October 1973.80 At the time, the Netherlands, West 
Germany, Luxemburg, Belgium and Italy had not yet ratified the NPT. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Dobson 1995: 140 
77 See for instance Michal Smith (1984) The Western Europe and the United States. The Uncertain Alliance. 
78 The analysis of the interests of the United Kingdom later in this chapter reveals that this was a case of concern 
for the strategists in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that 
other Western Allies were also influenced by such concerns.  
79 The procedure for amendements is covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons  
80 See FCO 66/469: NATO Disarmament Expert’s Meeting, 9-10 October 1973. 
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2.2.2	  The	  Non-­Aligned	  Movement	  	  
Contrary to the allied non-nuclear weapon states, the non-aligned non-nuclear weapon 
states demanded revision of the NPT in the Review Conference. These states were loosely 
organized in the Non-Aligned Movement, which was founded on a pledge of neutrality in the 
Cold War alliance system. This group was predominantly composed of former European 
colonies whose decision to pledge neutrality upon independence was motivated by a fear of 
neo-colonialism. Because the majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries, 
they were also known as the Group of 77. This name was first used in 1960, when 77 
developing countries came together in the United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Development.81 By the 1970s, this number had risen to over a 100, although they still retained 
the original label. These developing states considered it to be the fundamental purpose of the 
Review Conference to address, and correct, what they regarded as being inherently 
discriminatory character of the NPT. The following paragraphs discuss how the non-aligned 
states proposed to correct the NPT and how their actions in the review may be explained.  
To ensure that the nuclear weapon states kept their treaty commitments, to provide 
technical nuclear assistance and to engage in negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon 
tests, of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of the arms race, the non-aligned states 
proposed that the United Nations, as the body most representative for the whole world 
community, should organize the NPT review.82 This idea was raised back in 1973, at the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The vocal frontrunners of the non-
aligned group, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, suggested that the United Nations should 
establish an International Disarmament Organization with a mandate to monitor compliance 
with disarmament agreements, and as such function as a means for making major powers 
accountable to the international community. It was argued that if the organization of the 
review was left to the depositary governments, all of which were nuclear weapon states, the 
review would risk strengthening the discriminatory features inherent in the Treaty, when it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Epstein 1976: 248 
82 There are several references to the proposals for an International Disarmament Organization in the British 
record of the Review Conference. (E.g. FCO 66/468: Letter from Noël Marshall in the FCO ACDD, to Henry 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 15 August 1973; FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to 
Noël Marshall, FCO ACDD, 25 August 1973; FCO 66/470: Priority Telegram no. 101 from Henry Hainworth, 
UKDIS Geneva (in New York), to FCO, 30 October 1973.) According to these accounts, the proposal was 
originally Swedish, however, Sweden traditionally aligned with the developing states in disarmament issues, 
thus it is reasonable to count the International Disarmament Organization as a non-aligned proposal.  
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should instead contribute to “…get away from the precedent that had been established under 
the NPT of the Three Depositary Powers being the three nuclear weapons states.”83 
The motivation for the non-aligned group in suggesting that the review of the NPT 
should be organized by the United Nations seems fairly obvious. The non-aligned states had 
little leverage in international politics. Insisting on remaining neutral in the Cold War alliance 
system, yet hardly economically independent, the movement was not in any position to 
impose its will on the superpowers. However, they did have one major advantage. In the 
1970s, the non-aligned states constituted a majority in the United Nations. As a result of a 
wave of colonial independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the size of the Non-Aligned 
Movement had increased, and the balance of power in the United Nations had shifted to their 
advantage.84 Thus, the United Nations General Assembly was the one place in which the non-
aligned states actually enjoyed some power.  
However, the size of the non-aligned states did also pose a disadvantage. The large 
group was heterogeneous; the priorities of its members in the Review Conference were 
diverse. While a few non-aligned states had joined the NPT because of its promise of nuclear 
disarmament, others had signed the Treaty primarily because of its promises of technological 
assistance for nuclear energy. Most developing countries were interested in nuclear energy in 
order to promote their developing industries, and this interest was strengthened by the Arab 
oil embargo in 1973, which raised the price of oil by 70 percent. The embargo caused an 
international oil crisis, with serious implications for the economies of the developing 
countries.85 Consequently, most non-aligned states valued the NPT because it promised to 
remove their oil-dependency.  
There is a second reason that suggests that the confrontational demands expressed by 
the group’s few vocal frontrunners, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, were not necessarily 
representative of the entire non-aligned group. According to the historian Glenda Sluga, 
postcolonial states sought affirmation of their national independence through the offices of the 
United Nations and the treaties endorsed by the United Nations.86 Thus, it is possible that 
international recognition was a major motive for many developing states to sign the NPT, and 
that nuclear disarmament was secondary.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 According to the British record of the review of the NPT, the non-aligned proposal for an International 
Disarmament Organization was originally a Swedish proposal, raised by the Swedish Ambassador to the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in 1973. See FCO 66/469: Priority Telegram no. 90 
from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva (in New York), to FCO, 23 October 1973. 
84 Sluga 2010: 223 
85 Burman 1991: 135-136 
86 Sluga 2010: 224 
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While the non-aligned states were divided regarding their priorities of interests in the 
review negotiation, there is one non-aligned state that stands out because of strong incentives 
not to contribute to this division. The contradictory position of Sweden, as being both 
Western and neutral, suggests that Sweden had a special interest in the review to simply 
affirm its position among the non-aligned states. Sweden’s dual role as both an industrialized 
European and a non-NATO member was the reason why Sweden traditionally sided with the 
Non-Aligned Movement in matters regarding disarmament. In order to explain the position of 
Sweden in the field of nuclear diplomacy during the 1970s, it is essential to understand the 
unique logic of Swedish neutrality policy during the Cold War.  
 
Sweden	  –	  Neutral	  and	  Industrialized	  	  
Sweden was not the only industrialized and neutral non-nuclear weapon state in the 
Review Conference; several other industrialized non-nuclear weapon states were not official 
members of military alliances, including Australia, Austria, Finland and New Zealand. 
However, nuclear weapons and non-alignment played an essential role in Swedish neutrality 
policy, and as a result Sweden became a widely respected actor in the field of nuclear 
diplomacy, among both the non-aligned states and the nuclear weapon states.  
Swedish policy on neutrality has long traditions. Neutrality in military conflicts 
originated in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars in the early 19th century, when Sweden 
was transformed from a major power to a small state, and has been pursued by Sweden ever 
since.87 However, Swedish pursuit of militarily neutrality was not synonymous with 
ideological impartiality. As a Western style democracy, Sweden had an expressed preference 
for the Western political system during the Cold War and less sympathy for the governments 
of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in order to make military neutrality credible to the eyes of the 
outside world during the Cold War, Sweden declared itself as being non-aligned in peacetime 
and developed a strong military force.88 It was considered essential that the international 
community would be convinced of Sweden’s serious determination to defend her security by 
her own military means.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Sweden officially declared her intentions to remain neural in military conflicts in accordance with the Hague 
Convention of 1907 after the establishment of NATO in 1949. The only recognized exception to neutrality was 
that of taking part in sanctions decided by the United Nations Security Council. See Prawitz 1995: 3 
88 According to Jan Prawitz, contrary to the policy of neutrality, there existed Swedish plans to take sides with 
NATO if the Warsaw Pact attacked Sweden. Thus, the speculation that Sweden was in reality protected by the 
NATO nuclear shield have largely been confirmed, however, this was denied during the Cold War. It should not 
be ruled out that such a security guarantee made a difference in the Swedish decision to sign the NPT, however, 
it did not affect the neutrality strategy of Sweden, which was intended to convince outsiders that such an 
agreement was inexistent. See Prawitz 1995: 3-5.  
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According to Jan Prawitz, who served as an advisor in the Swedish disarmament 
delegation in Geneva from 1962 to 1992, it was from this rationale that the Swedish nuclear 
weapon option developed. Based on the assumption that Swedish security had no value to 
either bloc, but that control of Swedish territory might be of value for either bloc in support of 
its actions against the other, Sweden developed a sizable military defense, which included 
extensive nuclear weapon research. The Swedish decision to explore the nuclear weapon 
option was initially without special political meaning. According to Jan Prawitz, during the 
first decade of the Cold War, the Swedish decision-makers and the Swedish public simply 
considered nuclear weapons to be more powerful conventional weapons, and it was argued 
that Sweden, as a modern and developed country, should not be forced to fight with weapons 
inferior to those of an enemy. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, several political parties 
split over the issue, among them the Social Democratic Party which had been governing 
Sweden with a large majority since the end of the Second World War.  
The Swedish nuclear weapons research serves to explain why Sweden became a 
widely respected actor in the field of nuclear diplomacy, according to Jan Prawitz.89 The 
Swedish decision to research a nuclear weapon option produced extensive technical nuclear 
competencies which enabled Sweden to be a constructive party in international arms control 
negotiations. For instance, Swedish seismology competencies, partly acquired in order to 
make a Swedish underground nuclear weapon test possible, enabled Sweden to propose 
schemes for seismic verification for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The same 
technological competency also qualified Sweden to control compliance by the nuclear 
weapon states with existing arms control treaties. The Swedish ability to be both constructive 
and controlling enabled Sweden to adopt a leading position among the non-aligned states in 
arms control negotiations. The majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries 
that did not possess the technology to challenge the scientific arguments of the nuclear 
weapon states, thus they probably welcomed Swedish representation.   
It is also reasonable to assume that the political implications of the Swedish nuclear 
weapons research contributed towards making Sweden a significant actor in the field of 
nuclear diplomacy. The nuclear option was a subject of much political debate in Sweden, and 
consequently most Swedish politicians were both engaged and trained in nuclear weapons 
politics. The issue of nuclear non-proliferation particularly attracted Swedish women, and the 
Social Democratic Women’s Association was active in the national debate. This may serve to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Prawitz 1995: 28 
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explain why the first two Swedish ambassadors to Disarmament in Geneva were female. In 
order to indicate the political importance of nuclear diplomacy to Sweden, the Swedish CCD 
Ambassador was a political position. While serving in Geneva, Alva Myrdal was ranked as 
Minister of State, while Inga Thorsson was ranked as Secretary of State, junior to the 
Minister.90 Both these women had their political background from the Social Democratic 
Women’s Association, and as such, the mobilization against Swedish nuclear weapons partly 
contributed to pave the way for female participation in Swedish and international politics.91   
The Swedish decision to sign the NPT in 1968 was based on the assessment that 
Swedish security was best served without nuclear weapons. By 1968, Swedish acquisition of 
nuclear weapons was considered to put Swedish security at risk, instead of strengthening it. 
This decision marks a shift in the Swedish neutrality policy, from relying on hard power 
based on weapons, to soft power based on mediation.92 The nuclear option was no longer 
considered necessary for convincing the outside world that Sweden was militarily non-
aligned; Swedish research to this effect had enabled Sweden to accomplish its status as netral 
through the means of diplomacy.  
 
2.3	  A	  Pandora’s	  Box	  
The three nuclear weapon states had a very different interpretation of the Review 
Conference than that of the Non-Aligned Movement. Firstly, neither the superpowers nor the 
United Kingdom accepted that the NPT was discriminatory. David Ennals, the British 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, expressed this accordingly:  
HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] have never regarded the NPT as just a one-sided or ‘discriminatory’ 
treaty, since it surely goes without saying that the spread of nuclear weapons in the world poses an even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In conversation with Jan Prawitz during the fall 2010, I was told that the idea to make the Swedish 
Ambassador in Geneva a political position was adopted from the United Kingdom. The intent was to signal that 
the issue of disarmament carried considerable political weight to Sweden, and Alva Myrdal was thus made 
Minister of State, reporting directly under the Swedish Prime Minister, when she was appointed the Swedish 
representative to the ENDC in 1962. Inga Thorsson however, was only made Secretary of State, not because 
disarmament carried less political weight, but because contrary to Myrdal, Thorsson was largely active in 
domestic politics as well, and the Swedish Prime Minister at the time, Olof Palme, did not wish to give Thorsson 
an opportunity to take a seat in the Swedish parliament and meddle in domestic affairs. This is shortly referred in 
the Lars Lindskog’s biography of Inga Thorsson, Att förändra verkligheten: portratt av Inga Thorsson, 1990. 
91 See for instance Sondra R. Herman (1998) The Woman Inside the Negotiations: Alva Myrdal’s Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, 1961-1982, about her role as the sole female negotiator in multinational disarmament 
negotiations.   
92 The concepts of soft power and hard power were first presented by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2007) He defines soft 
power as “getting others to want the outcome that you want” though persuasion, instead of coercion.  
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greater threat, if anything, to non-nuclear weapon states than to those, like ourselves, which already 
have nuclear weapons.93  
The Soviet Union was equally categorical, expressing in a tripartite meeting with the 
two other depositary powers that “[t]he only weakness with the whole non-proliferation idea 
was that the NPT was not universal; the USSR did not accept that there were any loopholes in 
the Treaty.”94 Consequently, the purpose of the review, according to the nuclear weapon 
states, was not to review the Treaty, but to review the operation of the Treaty.95 The nuclear 
weapon states were united in their interests to keep the conference from amending the Treaty. 
The Americans argued that amendments were premature, and could weaken the Treaty.96 
Revision, however well intended, was regarded as opening a “Pandora’s box of unmanageable 
difficulties”97; in order to strengthen the Treaty, revisions would require unanimous 
supported.   
The nuclear weapon states were also opposed to the United Nations organizing the 
conference to review the NPT.98 Both the United States and the United Kingdom insisted that 
the conference was principally wholly independent of the United Nations, because the NPT 
was not a United Nations’ product. Although the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee 
was set up by the UN, it was an ad hoc organization. There are two factors that may serve to 
explain why the nuclear weapon states wished to keep the review independent of the United 
Nations. First, the formal association of the Review Conference with the United Nations 
could reduce the possibility for the nuclear weapon states to influence the terms of the review. 
As explained above, the recent numerical expansion of the United Nations had shifted the 
balance of power in the General Assembly in favor of the developing states. However, more 
importantly for the nuclear weapon states perhaps, a discussion of the Review Conference in 
the United Nations could result in unwanted confrontations with non-parties who would be 
able to express their opinions if the matter was raised in a United Nations setting. Both the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 FCO 66/597: Letter from D. Ennals, to N. A. Sims, London School of Economics and Political Science, 22 
July 1974. 
94 FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Consultations on the NPT Review Conference, held at FCO on 21-
22 April 1975. 
95 FCO 66/469: Letter from Freddy Jackson at the British Embassy in Vienna, to David Summerhayes in FCO 
Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 15 October 1973. 
96 FCO 66/468: Points Based on NPT Review Conference Position Paper, 21 August 1973. 
97 The general meaning of “opening Pandora's box” is to create evil that cannot be undone. FCO 66/469: Letter 
from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS 
Geneva, 19 September 1973.  
98 See for example the American position paper, FCO 66/468: Points Based on NPT Review Conference Position 
Paper, 21 August 1973, FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the 
FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973, or FCO 66/468: Letter from A. E. 
Montgomery in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department, 18 September 1973. 
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Soviet Union and the United States were also opposed to any follow-up mechanism of the 
review, and regarded it best if there was no further Review Conferences, although recognizing 
that this could prove difficult to avoid.99 The second part of paragraph 3 of Article VIII 
provides that the parties may meet at intervals of five years with the same objective to review 
the operation of the treaty, if a proposal to this effect is submitted by a majority of parties.100 
Despite general agreement on both purpose and organizational structure, the three 
nuclear weapon states approached the Review Conference rather differently. This became 
clear when the three nuclear weapon states attempted to align their positions just before the 
Review Conference was convened. The British records of these meetings serve as the basis 
for the analysis presented in the following sections.    
 
2.3.1	  The	  United	  States	  –	  Evasion	  
The aim of the United States in the review negotiations was to play down the political 
significance of the NPT and instead keep the focus on the technical provisions of the Treaty. 
There were multiple reasons why the United States wished to evade the political meaning of 
the NPT. First and perhaps foremost, the United States saw no reason to give into the 
demands of the non-nuclear weapon states for political measures, such as disarmament 
commitments or security guarantees, convinced that the signatory-states would ratify the 
Treaty before long, regardless of any actions undertaken by the nuclear weapon states.101 The 
US administration regarded the potential of the NPT as spent; the treaty was not considered to 
have any inhibiting effects on action by the non-parties. They were certain that disarmament 
would create a lively debate in the review, however, they were convinced that “…it was not 
likely that anyone would withdraw from the NPT because the best NWS [nuclear weapon 
states] could produce on this subject was not considered good enough.”102  
Recalling the assessment of the British Minister of State, David Ennals, the nuclear 
weapon states regarded the NPT to be more important for the non-nuclear weapon states than 
for themselves. There is little doubt the American administration under Richard Nixon, and 
later Gerald Ford shared this point of view.103 According to Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Conlsultations on the NPT Rview Conference, held at FCO on 21-
22 April 1975. 
100 Article VIII, paragraph 3, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
101 FCO 66/734: Letter from T. C. Orr, ACDD, FCO, to C. J. Makins, UK Embassy in Washington, 28 March 
1975, and enclosed reports. 
102 FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975.  
103  Richard Nixon became the President of the United States in 1969. During his second period, his Vice-
President Gerald Ford, replaced Nixon as president, when Nixon resigned as a consequnce of the the Watergate 
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Stillman’s contribution to the literature on nuclear proliferation, Richard Nixon spoke against 
American ratification of the NPT as a presidential candidate in 1968, and once in office he 
executed an internal national security decision memorandum instructing the bureaucracy to 
refrain from active support of the treaty.104 Equally, one of Nixon’s many biographers, Robert 
Dallek, has written that President Richard Nixon’s commitment to arms control was strategic, 
and carried no political or economic costs.105  
Second, keeping focus on the technical provisions of the NPT could prove 
advantageous because it could serve to split and weaken the non-nuclear weapon states. As 
explained in the section on the Non-Aligned Movement, the promise of technical assistance 
was the main motivation for many developing states to sign the Treaty. Thus, the American 
opening speech for the Review Conference was designed to present the NPT attractively in 
light of the recent energy crisis: “It would be designed to leave the impression that those who 
wished to get the best deal on energy should be members of the NPT.”106 In the speech, the 
United States proposed the establishment of regional or multi-national nuclear fuel cycle 
centers. The idea was that these regional plants could give non-nuclear weapon states the 
technology to reprocess plutonium or enrich uranium. Thus, the non-nuclear weapon states 
did not need to depend on the nuclear weapon states for nuclear fuel for their energy plants. 
However, the American offer did not stretch far beyond promises. The United States said that 
there remained a period of two or three years before such arrangements would be needed and 
that this would give time to discuss how a rational market could be developed to meet the 
proposal.  
However, it was not only consideration towards the NPT parties that was important in 
shaping US actions in the review negotiations. In order to explain the underlying reason why 
the United States wished to play down the significance of the NPT, it is essential to take into 
account the relative decline of American power in the world in the early 1970s.  
 
Détente	  -­	  Damage	  Limitation	  
The relative decline of American power in the 1970s was partly a result of the 
American commitments in Vietnam which had severely damaged America’s reputation as the 
protector of democracy both internationally and domestically and was partly the result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Scandal in 1973. Nixon was accused of having knowlegde about the break-in to the Democratic headquarter 
during the 1972 election, and in order to avoid trial, he resigned.   
104 Reed and Stillman 2009: 121 
105 Dallak 2007: 136 
106 FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.  
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general American economic decline.107 This economic decline was marked by several 
indicators; the share of US world trade was decreasing, as its rate of growth was below that of 
Japan and Western Europe.108 Furthermore, to add to the relative decline of American power, 
the Soviet Union had invested greatly in reaching nuclear parity with the United States after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and by 1970 the United States had lost its long-enjoyed advantage in 
respect of nuclear capacity.109  
 To cope with the situation, the American administration under President Richard 
Nixon and President Gerald Ford pursued a foreign policy usually referred to as détente, 
which is French for relaxation of political tension.110 The policy attempted to limit the 
damage caused by declining American power by relaxing tension between the Cold War 
adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was not in a position to 
afford superpower confrontation, thus their aim was to convince the Soviet Union that 
confrontation was unfavorable. The chief benefit of détente was to secure Soviet assistance in 
extricating the United States from the war in Vietnam under conditions that would not 
constitute a defeat.111 There had been previous signs of détente between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American President and 
Soviet Chairman installed a telephone line between their offices in order to enhance dialogue 
and prevent repetition of the previous event. However, it is particularly the disarmament 
negotiations of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) that began in 1969 and 
the Helsinki Accords in 1975 that are considered the mileposts of Soviet-American détente.  
As the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks suggest, nuclear diplomacy was an important 
component of the damage limitation policy of détente. In the field of nuclear arms control, the 
United States and the Soviet Union had shared interests that enabled them to engage in 
constructive dialogue. For instance, both superpowers had an economic interest in ending the 
arms race which consumed much of the national budget.112 However, contrary to the bilateral 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Americans saw no prospects of improving US 
relationships though the NPT review. Instead the US feared that the review negotiations could 
damage the superpower détente. First, the conference could damage the ongoing Strategic 
Arms Limitations Talks by forcing the superpowers to take hastened stands in disarmament 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Burman 1991: 132 
108 Burman 1991: 131 
109 Gavin 2010: 189 
110 Burman 1991: 138 
111 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 96 
112 According to estimates presented by Alva Myrdal (1977), upwards of $300 billion was spent each year in the 
armament race, of which the Warsaw Pact and NATO were responsible for 4/5. Ses Myrdal 1977: 4. 
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matters that were in the process of being negotiated bilaterally.113 Second, the United States 
feared that the Soviet Union would attempt to use the NPT negotiations to criticize China, in 
order to challenge China’s strong position opposite that of the Soviet Union. Another 
important component of détente was the United States’ relationship with China. After the 
official Sino-Soviet split in 1964, China had replaced the United States as the Soviet Union’s 
most threatening enemy, because China challenged Soviet leadership in the communist 
bloc.114 China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964 had further strengthened China’s 
position opposite that of the Soviet Union. Thus, in order to make superpower confrontation 
unfavorable for the Soviet Union, the United States actively pursued undermining Soviet 
power through a policy of Sino-American détente. Thus, going into the negotiations of the 
review of the NPT, US bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union and China were given 
great priority by the American administration.   
This US concern about containing disagreement with the Soviet Union about the 
Review Conference in order to prevent spill-over into other areas of importance for US 
relations with the Soviet Union was communicated to the British when the United Kingdom 
suggested the organization of a tripartite meeting to coordinate the positions of the three 
nuclear weapon states in advance of the fast approaching Review Conference. The US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, agreed to the British proposal on the condition that the 
United States and the United Kingdom met and aligned their positions in advance of the 
tripartite meeting, because he was anxious that the Soviet Union would attempt to use the 
tripartite meeting to press for the adoption of joint positions that could constitute pressure on 
China.115 As explained in the introductory chapter, China had decided not to sign the NPT for 
reasons of principle. Thus, it seems reasonable that in order not to put the Sino-American 
détente at risk, the US would oppose any endorsement of the Treaty which could potentially 
be considered offensive by the Chinese. The US had already hinted at this early on in the 
review preparations when they suggested that a final declaration should not attempt to anger 
or attack the Chinese.116 Considerations relating to Chinese attitudes may also serve as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 This argument is used in the rejection of the British proposal for a Quota Test Ban, which will be explained in 
more detail as this chapter turns to the Brtiish interests in the review. See both FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US 
consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 
1975, and FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR Conlsultations on the NPT Rview Conference, held at FCO 
on 21-22 April 1975. 
114 Small 1999: 100  
115 Kissinger’s reply was communicated by his deputy, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to the British Ambassador in 
Washington, Peter Ramsbotham: FCO 66/734: Priority FCO telegram nr. 854 of 8 March, into Moscow, routine 
UKDIS Geneva and Vienna. 
116 FCO 66/591: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes, FCO ACDD, 8 February 
1974. 
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explanation as to why the United States was opposed to discussing the NPT in the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
This interpretation of the importance of China to Kissinger is in accordance with the 
historian, Jeremi Suri’s analysis of Kissinger. According to Suri, China and the perception of 
polycentrism is a paradigm in any explanation of international politics in the 1970s because 
polycentrism was an essential component of the geopolitical vision of Henry Kissinger.117 
Suri explains how Henry Kissinger was inspired by the realpolitik of the late 19th century 
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. According to Kissinger, the German chancellor had 
correctly recognized that peace did not come from universal claims of authority, but emerged 
from coordination among diverse sovereigns. Kissinger made this the premise of his own 
foreign politics. Inspired by Bismarck’s realpolitik, Kissinger argued that bipolarity was not a 
source of strategic stability. He dismissed the argument, held by many of his contemporaries, 
that bipolarity was a source of stability because it created a set of shared interests for the two 
adversaries in preserving the status quo. Instead, he insisted that bipolarity “…encouraged 
risk taking by a leader who was convinced of his counterpart’s aversion to such behavior”.118 
To Kissinger, a case in point was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Instead of suggesting that 
bipolarity was the reason why the Cuban Missile Crisis did not result in nuclear war, 
Kissinger argued that bipolarity had caused the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
However, it was not only the triangular policy designed to deal with the Soviet Union 
and China that concerned the American administration. In Kissinger’s response to the British 
request for tripartite meetings, similar political considerations arose in respect of the French 
attitude towards the NPT. However, these were not motivated by détente. Considerations 
relating to France were given priority by the United States in the review of the NPT because 
France played a key role in the US non-proliferation strategy that was prompted by the Indian 
nuclear test in May 1974.119 The Indian nuclear test explosion was the biggest step towards 
nuclear proliferation since the signing of the NPT in 1968. Prior to the Indian nuclear test, no 
country had joined the nuclear club since China in 1964. The Indian government insisted that 
the test was of a purely peaceful nature, and that it was not the Indian intention to build a 
military nuclear program. However, these reassurances were of little value to the international 
community, and Pakistan in particular dismissed such guaranties.120 Regardless of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Suri 2010: 174-175 
118 Suri 2010: 180-181 
119 On May 18, 1974, India tested a nuclear device in the desert of Rajasthan.  
120 Pakistani reactions to the Indian nuclear test are recorded in FCO 66/604: Implications of Indian nuclear test 
for Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference 1975. 
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intentions, the Indian nuclear test explosion signaled a commencement on India’s part to 
strengthen its nuclear option. Inescapably, India’s newly acquired technology was leverage in 
the ongoing border disputes between the two neighboring countries.  
 
France	  and	  the	  Nuclear	  Supplier	  Group	   	  
Finally, considerations relating to France may also serve to explain why the United 
States attempted to play down the political significance of the NPT in the review negotiations. 
In the wake of the Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974, the United States commenced 
pursuing a policy designed to establish a uniform code for nuclear export behavior.121 The 
Indian nuclear test, which was codenamed “the Smiling Buddha”, had exposed the need for 
additional nuclear export regulations. The Indian test was not technically a breach of the 
system of control established by the NPT.122 The test was conducted with plutonium that had 
been produced in a reactor supplied by Canada for peaceful purposes.123 The conditions of 
supply imposed by the Canadians called for “peaceful use”. However, they did not specify 
against peaceful nuclear explosions which the Indians claimed to have conducted. The fuel, 
however, was of Indian origin and because India was not a party to the NPT, it was not 
subject to IAEA safeguards. Thus, in order to keep non-parties from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, it was necessary to make all nuclear exports subject to the control system that was 
at the time only applied to NPT parties. The United States made it a priority that new nuclear 
export regulations were applied uniformly, in order not to present a commercial 
disadvantage.124 It was precisely for this reason that France acquired a position to from which 
the country could influence the review. France was a major supplier of nuclear technology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The Nuclear Supplier Group is described by Michael. J. Wilmshurst, who was a British diplomat in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Energy Department during the first Review Conference of the NPT, in John 
Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (ed.) The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System, Challenges and 
Choices, The McMillan Press Ltd, Great Britain: 1984. In 1984, he was heading the British delegation to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  
122 Wilmshurst 1984: 24 
123 Wilmshurst 1984: 24 
124 The commercial interest in the Nuclear Supplier Group is confirmed by British interdepartmental document in 
preparations for the Review Conference. The British expected Swedes to demand that the safeguard (INFCIRC 
153) that applied to parties of the NPT should be required for all nuclear technology transfers, also to non-
parties. According to the British assessment, if the French were open to such persuasion the result would be very 
welcome, but if not, they would have to consider very carefully whether they could afford, commercially, to take 
action, which might divert all nuclear trade with non-parties to France. Such a result was considered to be 
unwelcomed on non-proliferation grounds as well as on commercial grounds. See for instance FCO 66/735: 
Draft Brief NPT Review Conference Article III: Safeguards; FCO 66/733: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference, Geneva May 1975, Brief No 6 Article III: Safeguards. FCO Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, 1 May 1975; FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975.  
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In the fall of 1974, the United States issued an invitation to attend a secret meeting of 
the major suppliers of nuclear technology, Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom. However, by the time the United States and the United 
Kingdom met in order to prepare for the tripartite meeting shortly in advance of the Review 
Conference, France had still not confirmed its intention to participate. France did not wish to 
be associated with formal non-proliferation talks. France, like China, had decided not to sign 
the NPT for reasons of principle. France considered it to be immoral to deny others the 
nuclear option, when having itself pursued this option. This was a major concern for the 
United States. In the negotiations with the British, the US referred to the French reluctance to 
participate in the planned Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) as a reason for playing down the 
political significance of the review. For instance, the United States warned against criticism of 
India’s actions, because such criticism could corner France into taking the line of the 
developing world which the Americans argued could be disastrous. The United States agreed 
that there was a need to raise some criticism against India in order to prevent the Indian 
peaceful nuclear explosion from becoming accepted and imitated by others. However, the US 
argued that such criticism should be voiced by the developing countries, and not “…pinned 
on the US or UK”125. According to the United States, any attempts to isolate India could 
backfire and isolate France along with the least developed countries.  
It is possible that France and the prospects of a Nuclear Supplier Group for securing 
non-proliferation were only substitute motives used by the United States in the negotiations 
with the British, and that their major concern was not French but Chinese reactions to 
criticism of India. One factor that supports this assessment is that the United Kingdom would 
be less convinced by considerations relating to China than considerations relating to France. 
The United Kingdom did not agree with the United States that a final declaration should not 
attempt to anger or attack the Chinese, as suggested by the United States early on in the 
review negotiations. This is clear from the British response to the US suggestion: “if we are 
faint-hearted about of own Treaty we are hardly likely to gain adherents.”126  
However, if French attitudes did influence the position of the United States, the 
position above give reason to expect that the United States handled the demands from the 
developing states with some care in the review negotiations. Still, this argument should not be 
exaggerated as it was in any case only valid for a short time period. Shortly after the bilateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.  
126 FCO 66/591: Letter from H. Hainworth UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, FCO ACDD, 8 February 1974.  
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consultations between the United States and the United Kingdom, France agreed to a meeting 
with the Nuclear Supplier Group and the meeting was hosted in London before the Review 
Conference commenced. Both the United States and the United Kingdom regarded the 
meeting a success and it is therefore probable that they did not pay much attention to France 
while the conference was being conducted.   
Regardless of whether the prospect of a Nuclear Supplier Group was only an 
American substitute motive to play down the political significance of the NPT in the first 
review of the Treaty, American claims to this affect in the negotiations with the United 
Kingdom prove that there was one final factor that influenced the actions of the United States: 
the opinions of the Western allies, in this case the United Kingdom. It was not in the United 
States’ interests to distance itself additionally from its ally, on whom it depended for 
containing disagreement with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union however, did not have to 
make any attempts to accommodate its allies in the Warsaw Pact; political protests in the 
Eastern bloc were quailed by military means. The most recent example of this during the 
review negotiations was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.127  
 
2.3.2	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  –	  Cooperation	  
The section above presented the pursuit of détente as a major underlying factor in 
accounting for American actions in the Review Conference. Equally, the pursuit of détente 
may also account for the actions of the Soviet Union in the Review Conference. According to 
Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet-American military parity and the 
stagnation of the Soviet economy necessitated a rethinking of Soviet foreign policy, and made 
the policy of superpower détente favorable to the Soviet Union. Yet, the most important 
condition for explaining the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the 1970s, according to 
Donaldson and Nogee, was the emerging global tripolarity, the growth of polycentrism in the 
international communist movement which resulted in China replacing the United States as the 
Soviet Union’s chief enemy. According to Donaldson and Nogee, “…no development so 
profoundly affected the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 
1980s as its conflict with China.”128  
In short, Donaldson and Nogee explain the Sino-Soviet split as a result of both a 
conflict of ideology and a personality clash between the leaders of the Soviet Union and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 In response to a period of political liberalization in the Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia, which began on 
January 5, with the election of the reformist government, the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact 
invaded Prague to halt the reforms on 21 of August 1968.  
128 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 6 and 92 
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China, Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. For instance, Mao was both disturbed by 
Khrushchev’s doctrinal revision and attack on Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist party in 1956, and disagreed with the Soviet decision to remain neutral in the 
escalating Sino-Indian border conflict.129 According to Donaldson and Nogee, by 1970 both 
parties regarded each other, and no longer the United States, as their chief security threat, and 
from the perspective of balance of power politics the logic of the situation called for both 
sides to turn to the United States for assistance against the other.  
Thus, during the 1970s substantial debates were taking place in the Warsaw Pact over 
the issues like the value of security through consultations, and more broadly, how far Soviet 
trade and diplomacy should cooperate with the capitalist world.130 It seems reasonable to 
assume that from this premise, the main interest of the Soviet Union in the Review 
Conference was to reaffirm its position as a superpower vis-à-vis China, and in order to do so, 
the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States, and the United Kingdom if 
necessary. This may have been the Soviet motive for engaging in tripartite meetings with the 
two other nuclear weapon states and why the Soviet Union in the Review Conference 
abandoned its traditional Kosygin formula of negative security assurances. According to 
William Epstein, during the NPT negotiations the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear 
weapons should not be used against non-nuclear weapons states. The United States however, 
had throughout the NPT negotiations opposed any pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons 
and in the review the Soviet Union changed its position in accordance with that of the United 
States.131  
 
2.3.3	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  –	  Reinforcement	  	  	  	  
Contrary to the United States, the third nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, the 
United Kingdom, did not want to play down the political significance of the NPT. Instead, the 
United Kingdom wished to “…dispel any impression that the depositary states were simply 
concerned to get through the Review Conference with the least possible political 
excitement.”132 The United Kingdom rejected the US interpretation of the NPT as a spent 
non-proliferation means and advocated that endorsement of the NPT could serve to reinforce 
the Treaty. The British argued that non-parties had relationships in many fields with parties to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 92 
130 Holden 1989: 98 
131 Epstein 1976: 250 
132 FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.  
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the NPT, and they might therefore feel that their broader interests would suffer if they took 
action in the nuclear field that was unwelcome to the parties. According to the United 
Kingdom, the fact that the latter constituted the majority of all countries in the world provided 
strong leverage which could cause those who made decisions “…in Delhi and elsewhere to 
reassess their positions”.133  
In order to explain why the United Kingdom opposed the US approach to the NPT 
review, it is important to recall that the United Kingdom’s premise in the review of the NPT 
was quite different from that of the two superpowers. Contrary to the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom was not the leader of an ideological and military bloc in 
the Cold War, but a former great power that was slowly adjusting to its lesser status in the 
bipolar post-colonial world.134 In the 1970s, the special Anglo-American relationship had 
reached an all-time low; in response to the US pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom had turned towards Europe and consolidated its position through partnership 
in the European Community. The fall of British significance in US foreign policy was 
particularly illustrated by the bilateral character of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. 
During the negotiations of both the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the United Kingdom had been able to play an active and influential role, and both treaties 
were opened for signature in London. However, the United Kingdoms was excluded from the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.  
There were at least three separate reasons why the British attempted to draw attention 
to the political provisions of the NPT. First, the United Kingdom had strong incentives for 
playing an active part in the review because the United Kingdom was under considerable 
pressure, both inside and outside the parliament, to do more than merely support agreements 
between the superpowers.135 It was in the interests of the United Kingdom to express 
sentiments close to those of the European Community and the Commonwealth members. As 
explained in a previous section, the Western European states approached the review with the 
objective of endorsing the NPT, in order to legitimize their decision to sign the Treaty. 
Second, the United Kingdom wished to reaffirm her position as a depositary power and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 11.15 AM on 20 March 1975.  
134 The position of the United Kingdom in the post-war world is well described by Alan P. Dobson (1995) 
Anglo-American Relation in the Twentieth Century. 
135 See FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held at 
FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975. The letter from Nicholas A. Sims, a lecturer of International 
Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, addressed to the Minister of State, David 
Ennals, on 20 June 1974, in which Sims comments on the British non-proliferation policy in the wake of the 
Indian nuclear test explosion, may be one example of such pressure. See Sims’ letter enclosed in FCO 66/597.  
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thereby a great power, and restore its relationship with the United States. Just like the 
continental Europe, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom was 
strained by the American pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. Thus, by attempting to 
convince the superpowers that they were underestimating pressure from the non-aligned states 
and the sophisticated countries like Sweden and Canada in the review,136 the United Kingdom 
was probably attempting to get in a position as an indispensible contributor to the strategy of 
the superpowers.  
This aim to be an indispensible partner in the Review Conference is closely related to 
the third separate reason why the United Kingdom wished to emphasize the political aspects 
of the NPT. Because the United Kingdom was excluded from the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks, the United Kingdom, despite having the smallest nuclear arsenal of the three depositary 
powers, was the only nuclear weapon state that had nothing to present during the review of 
the disarmament article. In order to get out of this position, which made the British 
particularly vulnerable to criticism, the British sought to propose a Quota Test Ban in the 
Review Conference.137 The superpowers, however, strongly objected to this idea, claiming 
that it placed an extra burden on the ongoing bilateral threshold negotiations.  
 
2.4	  Summary	  	  	   This chapter has presented an analysis of the interests of the parties to the NPT in the 
review of the Treaty. The analysis has shown that the interests of the NPT parties were largely 
divided. While one caucus, the non-aligned states, which were not shielded by the nuclear 
umbrella of either of the superpowers, demanded revision of the NPT, the nuclear weapon 
states and their allies considered revision to be off the table because it could open a Pandora’s 
Box of unmanageable difficulties. However, the conflicts of interests were not only limited to 
the outcome of the Review Conference; the parties to the NPT did also have largely diverting 
interests regarding the organization of the review. Going into the review, the non-aligned 
states demanded that the review should be organized by the United Nations, through the 
establishment of a new International Disarmament Organization. The nuclear weapon states 
and their non-nuclear allies however, were largely opposed to this suggestion because it 
would include non-parties who were highly critical of the Treaty.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 FCO 66/735: Letter from J. A. Thomson, to Weston, 25 April 1975.   
137 See both FCO 66/734: Record of UK/US consultations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
held at FCO, meeting at 3.00 PM on 20 March 1975, and FCO 66/735: Record of the UK/US/USSR 
consultations on the NTP Review Confernce, held at FCO on 21-22 April 1975. 
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Furthermore, this chapter has revealed how contrary to the interests regarding the 
conference outcome, the divisions regarding the process were not only between, but also 
within the caucuses. Among the nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom stands apart from 
the two superpowers, not because British interests regarding the outcome diverted, but 
because the United Kingdom wished to put emphasis on the political significance of the 
Review Conference. Contrary to the superpowers, the United Kingdom was insistent that the 
Review was an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty and not just a damage limitation operation 
as sought by the United States. It is suggested in this chapter that the motive behind this 
position was British interests to both contribute towards the American position in the review 
negotiations and to accommodate their partners in the European Community who were 
demanding that their nuclear weapon state allies should endorse the NPT. Thus, the United 
Kingdom had strong incentives simply to be an actor in the review negotiations, whereas the 
United States conversely wanted to play down the significance of the Review Conference and 
keep consultations to a minimum, in fear that it could upset the carefully orchestrated balance 
of détente.   
While the United Kingdom stands out compared to the United States and the Soviet 
Union, it is possible that the United Kingdom shared its interest in playing an active and 
conciliatory role in the Review Conference with one of the non-nuclear weapon states, 
namely Sweden. Sweden too had strong incentives to play an active and conciliatory role in 
the review negotiations, regardless of the outcome, because Sweden was an odd member of 
the neutrals. Sweden was relying on nuclear diplomacy as a means for confirming its ties with 
the Non-Aligned Movement, thus it is possible that this motivated Sweden to approach the 
review negotiations more actively and vocally than other non-nuclear weapon states.   
 The dynamics of the negotiations of the formal organization of the Review Conference 
are subjected to analysis in the next chapter.  
  
 	   42	  
 
CHAPTER	  3:	  
Access	  is	  Substance	  
Roles	  and	  Rationales	  in	  the	  Negotiations	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Procedure 
 
 
The most satisfactory solution might be for the depositaries to retain control of the preparation 
and organization of the Conference in their own hands, but such an oligarchic arrangement 
would be unacceptable to many states.138  
 
David Summerhayes, head of the FCO Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department, 27 September 1973. 
 
3.1	  Introduction	  	  
The previous chapter explained the compound interests of the NPT parties in the 
conference to review the NPT. The non-aligned states regarded the purpose of the review to 
hold the nuclear weapon states responsible to their disarmament commitments and therefore 
demanded revision of the Treaty. The nuclear weapon states, however, warned that revision 
would open a Pandora’s Box of unimaginable difficulty and that revision therefore was off the 
table. However, apart from wanting to prevent revision and contain criticism, the interests of 
the nuclear weapon states were largely diverting. While the United States wanted to play 
down the significance of the NPT, the United Kingdom in particular was eager to use the 
review to reaffirm her position as a depositary power of the Treaty.  
The purpose of the following two chapters is to explain how the conference to review 
the NPT was implemented. Despite largely opposing interests regarding the general purpose 
of the review and virtually no regulations in the Treaty, the parties to the NPT were able to 
organize a Review Conference that became a model for a periodic review of the NPT and as 
such an entirely new mechanism for international law enforcement. In order to explain how 
this was achieved, this chapter analyzes how the NPT parties overcame conflicting interests 
regarding the organization of the Review Conference. Thus, this chapter is limited to the 
negotiations of the Review Conference Rules of Procedure. These negotiations were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973.  
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conducted in a Preparatory Committee, composed of 26 NPT parties,139 which preceded the 
Review Conference. How the NPT parties overcame conflicts in the Review Conference is 
analyzed in the third and final analysis chapter.  
In the analysis in the following chapter, the focus of attention is on the two procedural 
rules that created considerable disagreement among the NPT parties in the Preparatory 
Committee, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making. This chapter will discuss why 
the negotiations of these two rules proved particularly demanding and explain how they were 
concluded. In doing so, this chapter suggests which states and which underlying interests 
were influential in producing a model for the periodic review system for the NPT. 
This chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one is a presentation of how the 
Review Conference Preparatory Committee was set up. Part two and part three present an 
analysis of those factors and actors that were influential in the negotiations of the Review 
Conference rule of access and rule of decision-making, respectively. Finally, the chapter is 
concluded by a short summary of the chapter findings.   
 
3.2	  The	  Preparatory	  Committee	  
The idea to establish a Preparatory Committee to set up the Review Conference of the 
NPT was originally an American one. Part of the motivation to set up a Preparatory 
Committee was to secure smooth sailing through the United Nations Plenary Session. Despite 
both American and British discontent with involving the United Nations in the review, the 
two depositaries found themselves compelled to use a United Nations General Assembly 
resolution to summon the Review Conference.140 There was one particular reason for this. 
Recalling paragraph 3 of Article VIII in the Treaty, Geneva was stipulated as the venue for 
the Review Conference, and in order to make the UN Secretariat in Geneva available for the 
conference, authorization from the General Assembly was considered necessary.141 The 
American suggestion was that a resolution to summon the Review Conference should also 
call upon a geographically and politically balanced Preparatory Committee to set up the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The following 26 states were qualified to participate in the Preparatory Committee: Australia, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, USSR, US, UK, and 
Yugoslavia. For the list, see FCO 66/595: United Nations Press Release M/90, 8 April 1974.  
140 FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the FCO Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973.  
141 FCO 66/469: Letter from Freddy Jackson at the British Embassy in Vienna, to David Summerhayes in FCO 
Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 15 October 1973.   
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review.142 If a consensus could be reached amongst the members of the NPT on the 
composition of the Preparatory Committee prior to the General Assembly, the Americans 
believed the resolution could be turned into a successful means for keeping questions on the 
scope and substance of the Review Conference out of the United Nations,143 and take some 
heat away from Alva Myrdal’s demands for an International Disarmament Organization, as 
presented in the previous chapter.144  
 In setting up a Preparatory Committee, the American objective was to create “…a 
manageable preparation commission, which could be controlled by the depositary powers 
without unduly alienating significant Non-Nuclear Weapon States such as Sweden and 
Mexico.”145 In order to secure this objective, they proposed that the Preparatory Committee 
ought to be based on a combination of parties to the NPT from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Board of Governors and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 
Geneva. With this membership formula both Sweden and Mexico qualified for membership 
of the Preparatory Committee. In addition, the signatory states in the European Community, 
Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany, would qualify for 
membership, if they ratified the NPT. Thus, the formula also addressed to American and 
British interests not to exclude their Western allies, and it could serve as an incentive for 
ratification. 
 
3.2.1	  Machiavellian	  Intentions	  
The United Kingdom objected to the American membership formula in bilateral 
consultations with the United States. The primary British argument against the American 
proposal was that the membership formula was arbitrary; there existed no constitutional basis 
for suggesting that the committee should be composed of members from the IAEA Board of 
Governors or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Thus, the 
membership formula gave non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT grounds for accusing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The British stressed how it was important that the committee included African countries, suggesting they 
would otherwise have ”trouble with black Africa at the conference itself.” See FCO 66/469: Immediate 
Telegram no. 628 from Laskey, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO and UKDIS Geneva (in New York), 24 
October 1973.  
143 Referred in both FCO 66/468:  Letter from W. J. A. Wilberforce at the British Embassy in Washington, to 
David Summerhayes, 20 September, 1973, and FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973. 
144 FCO 66/468: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall in the FCO Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department, 22 August 1973. 
145 FCO 66/468: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 19 
September 1973. 
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the depositaries of using their positions to shape the review to the detriment of the non-
nuclear weapon states.146  
Instead, the British insisted that all states member to the NPT should be regarded as 
members of a Preparatory Committee.147 Open membership, the British argued, was favorable 
because it would give no ground for criticism or protest, as it did not discriminate. The British 
recognized that the committee could prove hard for the depositaries to control,148 but they 
referred to how open membership had been successfully applied to create the IAEA safeguard 
committee in 1970 because only half of the members attended.149 According to British 
assessment, equally, only a limited number of states would want to have their say in the 
Preparatory Committee.150 The British stressed that open membership in any case was the 
fallback solution if the combination formula was not acceptable to the non-nuclear weapon 
states, and the British argued that if open membership would come about as the result of 
acrimonious debate, it would lay the ground for a far less manageable committee than if there 
had been open membership from the outset.151  
British objections to the American membership proposal support the analysis of the 
United Kingdom in the previous chapter. The previous chapter suggested how the British 
decision to oppose the Americans may be explained partly by British interests to play a 
contributory role in American policy in order to restore its special relationship with the United 
States and reaffirm its position as a depositary power, and partly because the United 
Kingdom, as a medium size state was more vulnerable to accusations of “Machiavellian 
intentions”152.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 In interdepartmental correspondence, David Summerhayes in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament 
Department, stressed how the “…depositary powers may have an obligation to initiate the Conference, but the 
text in no way empowers them to organize committees of parties to the Treaty on an arbitrary basis.” FCO 
66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973. 
147 FCO 66/469: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973. 
148 FCO 66/468: Letter from David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Henry 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, 27 September 1973. 
149 FCO 66/468: Priority Telegram no. 536 from Laskey, British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO, 3 September 1973. 
150 FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control 
and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973.  
151 FCO 66/469: Letter from Nick Fenn in the Industry, Science and Energy Department, to David Summerhayes 
in FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 26 September 1973. 
152 According to the FCO, the nuclear weapon states could be accused of “a breach of faith” or “Machiavellian 
intentions”. The latter formulation was used in connection with basing the formula for the membership to the 
Preparatory Committee on membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, in light 
of the recent enlargement of the Board. Five parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed to serve only one 
year on the Board, in order to ensure appropriate rotation, as result of behind the scenes urging by the 
Americans, and to a lesser degree the British. However, conflict on this particular issue was prevented as both 
current IAEA Board members and states that would become Board members in September 1974 were allowed to 
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3.2.2	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  
The American combination proposal won through in the bilateral negotiations between 
the United States and the United Kingdom. The Americans countered by arguing that the 
assumption that only a small number of states would attend the meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee was unfounded. Open membership, they claimed, would transform the intended 
preparatory committee into a full-scale conference.153 Neither did they believe the 
combination formula would cause any bitterness among members of the NPT; the problem of 
bitterness would rather be among non-parties.154  
Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly commenced in New York in 
October 1973, the American membership formula was included in the depositary draft 
resolution intended to summon the Review Conference. To reaffirm its position as a 
depositary power, the United Kingdom took on an active role to lobby for its support. The 
British first discussed the resolution with Mexico and Sweden, who both objected to the draft, 
but not on the grounds that the United Kingdom had predicted. The primary objection of the 
non-aligned states was that the depositary resolution presented the depositary governments as 
the rightful organizers of the review. The Mexican Ambassador to the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament, Alfonso Garcia Robles, stressed that it was for the General 
Assembly to establish a preparatory committee for the review. The Swedish delegation 
expressed that they would approve the depositary draft resolution as long as it made no 
special references to the depositaries. Thus, in response to an American suggestion, the 
reference to the depositaries was used as a bargaining chip to secure Swedish co-sponsorship 
for a resolution that called on the Preparatory Committee. The depositary states thereby 
succeeded in securing support for the proposed Preparatory Committee, first among the states 
party to the NPT, and thereafter in the General Assembly on December 18, 1973.155 As 
predicted, China voted against the resolution in the General Assembly and denounced the 
NPT as a conspiracy by the superpowers to maintain their nuclear hegemony.156 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
qualify for membership in the Preparatory Committee. FCO 66/469: Immediate Telegram no. 628 from Laskey, 
British Embassy in Vienna, to FCO and UKDIS Geneva (in New York), 24 October 1973. 
153 FCO 66/469: Letter from C. J. Makins at the British Embassy in Washington, to David Summerhayes in FCO 
Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 12 October 1973.  
154 FCO 66/469: Letter from Henry Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to David Summerhayes in FCO Arms Control 
and Disarmament Department, 5 October 1973. 
155 FCO 66/470: Routine Telegram no. 1687 from Maitland, UKMIS New York, to FCO, 18 December 1973. 
156 In the tripartite meeting between the US, the USSR and Great Britain on October 29, the USSR made an 
argument that it was useless to aim for a completely uncontentious resolution by providing as few opportunities 
as possible for the opposition to criticize the NPT, because according to the USSR, the Chinese would attack the 
resolution no matter what. See FCO 66/469: Letter from Duncan, UKDIS Geneva (in New York) to Noël 
Marshall, FCO ACDD, 29 October 1973. 
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The Preparatory Committee met three times in order to negotiate the Rule of 
Procedure for the Review Conference, first in April 1974, second in late August and early 
September the same year, and third in February 1975. The first session was only used to 
decide the procedural rules of the Preparatory Committee, such as when and where the 
committee would meet, which states that would chair each session, and that the committee 
would make its decisions based on consensus. During the first session, it was also decided 
that the Review Conference would be held in Geneva during the month of May.  
However, the session also served to expose the conflicting interests of the NPT parties 
relating to the purpose and procedure of the Review Conference. Already during the first 
couple of days of the first preparatory session, a pattern of antagonism emerged between the 
three nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia.157 
With Mexico as their frontrunner, the non-aligned states expressed that they regarded it as the 
purpose of the review to highlight the failure of the nuclear weapon states and that they would 
therefore make considerable efforts to press for the widest possible participation in the review 
conference, including non-governmental organizations, to suit this purpose.158 The nuclear 
weapon states, however, whose aim was to contain criticism and prevent revision, wanted the 
Review Conference to be for NPT parties only. Consequently, one of the British delegates 
reported to London from the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva on 3 April 
1974: “It is obvious that the question of participation in the RC [Review Conference] will 
prove one of the most difficult to resolve.”159 The following section suggests those factors 
that contributed towards settling this conflict.   
 
3.3	  The	  Rule	  of	  Access	  	  
The rule of access proved one of the most challenging matters in the Preparatory 
Committee negotiations because access was regarded as an issue of substance.160 The rule of 
access would send out signals about the purpose of the review. By accepting the non-aligned 
demands for wide access, the nuclear weapon states would implicitly approve of their 
interpretation of the purpose of the review, to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable to 
the world community.  The nuclear weapon states, however, whose interests were to contain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 FCO 66/595: Letter from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall, FCO, 2 April 1974. 
158 FCO 66/595: Letter from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to Noël Marshall, FCO, 2 April 1974. 
159 I. C. Sloane, British diplomat in Geneva, reporting from the first session of the Preparatory Committee. See 
FCO 66/595: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 April 1974. 
160 This is explicitly states in the British Steering Brief, prepared for the Second Preparatory session, see FCO 
66/598: ”NPT Review Conference - PC2 Steering Brief”. 
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criticism and prevent revision, insisted that the review of the NPT was not the concern of the 
entire international community, but only its parties. The United States, who wished to play 
down the political significance of the NPT, was particularly motivated to keep the review 
behind closed doors. Thus, the three nuclear weapon states insisted that participation should 
only be limited to parties to the Treaty insisting that they were the only rightful participants 
according to Article VIII which specifically called on the parties to the Treaty to organize a 
Review Conference.161  
 Yet despite the obvious conflict, the NPT parties managed to come to an agreement 
before the Review Conference. A combination of factors contributed to the untraditionally 
detailed final outcome. First, the depositary powers approached the negotiations with a 
concerted strategy. Second, Mexico moderated its position in the second session of the 
Preparatory Committee, and the Mexican draft proposal was positively received, both among 
the non-aligned states and several Western states.  
 
3.3.1	  From	  Depositary	  Division	  to	  Concerted	  Action	  	  
An important contributory factor to the outcome of the negotiations on the rule of 
access was the antagonism that evolved during the first meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee.  This antagonism served to align the positions of the three nuclear weapon states 
and lay the foundations for their concerted strategy in the second and third session.  
Efforts to coordinate the approach of the depositary states were initially British. In 
order to restore its position as a great power, yet remain accommodating to the interests of its 
Western allies, the United Kingdom consistently pushed for a concerted depositary approach 
based on widespread consultations with the non-nuclear weapon states throughout the review 
negotiations.162 However, prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee, they had 
limited success. As the conflict over the Preparatory Committee membership formula above 
illustrates, the United States was not especially receptive to the suggestions made by the 
United Kingdom prior to the first session of the Preparatory Committee.  
Nor did the Soviet Union approach the Review Conference with a cooperative attitude. 
The Soviet Union kept a low profile right up until the United Nations General Assembly and 
never brought any drafts to the negotiating table of the depositaries.163 After the General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 4 September 1974. 
162 FCO 66/597: Letter to Mr. Thomsen, ”Instruction on Washington visit”, from David Summerhayes, FCO, 15 
March 1974.	  
163 The Soviet delegation in Geneva received few instructions from Moscow during the first round of 
negotiations, and did not bring their own resolution draft for the tripartite drafting meeting. The USSR wanted to 
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Assembly, however, the Soviet Union became more involved, but continued to overlook the 
demands of the United Kingdom. In response to a British proposal to include the three non-
aligned states, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico in the process designed to summon the 
Preparatory Committee for its first session, both the Soviet Union and the United States were 
dismissive. According to the Soviet Union, it was only the depositary powers that had the 
right to take the necessary preparatory action; co-sponsorship of the UN resolution did not 
alter this position.164 Recalling the section above, Sweden was convinced to sign on as a co-
sponsor by the United Kingdom in order to attract the support of other states in the Non-
Aligned Movement. The US reactions were equally disapproving. According to the 
Americans, it was the United States’ interests to diminish Mexican, Swedish and Yugoslav 
status as senior partners in the conference, “…given their capacity for making trouble on 
substantive issues”.165  
The British strategy to advocate wide consultations and treaty reinforcement was not 
only criticized by the superpowers; In London, officials outside the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office also questioned the strategy. In March 1974, a month before the first 
session of the Preparatory Committee, F. Panton at the British Ministry of Defense 
commented that he increasingly saw “…the RC [Review Conference], and therefore the PC 
[Preparatory Committee], as no more than a necessary evil”166, and that he did not see any 
real prospect of persuading non-parties to join. Yet, having found no thoughts of this type 
reflected in UK policy and objectives, Panton was not surprised to note that the Americans 
had proved difficult to work with.  
After multiple exchanges over the issue, the United States decided, in response to 
upon Soviet Union insistence, that only the superpowers, rather than all three depositary 
powers, should summon the Preparatory Committee.167 Subsequently, the United Kingdom 
decided to underline to the members of the Preparatory Committee that the notification was 
not a three-power decision, and prepared to intervene “tactfully to smooth over hurt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
postpone the resolution one year, however, if the NPT review conference were to be included in the 1975 UN 
calendar of conferences, the resolution had to be passed in the 1973 General Assembly. The US and Great 
Britain that non-aligned action made it impudent to deal with NPT review immediately. See FCO 66/469. 
164 FCO 66/591: Immediate Telegram no. 168 from Garvey, British Embassy in Moscow, to FCO, 15 February 
1974. 
165 FCO 66/591: Routine Telegram no. 586 from Sykes, Washington, to FCO, 14 February 1974. 
166 FCO 66/594: Letter from F. Panton, ACSA (N) (British Ministry of Defense), sent in copy to A. E. 
Montgomery in the FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, March 21, 1974.  
167 FCO 66/591: Priority Telegram no. 395 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to Washington and UKMIS New York, 
13 February 1974. 
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feelings”168. Thus, early in the review process, British insistence on paying special attention to 
the non-aligned states did not serve to reaffirm the United Kingdom’s position as a depositary 
power; however, it did allow the United Kingdom to appear more accommodating towards the 
non-nuclear weapon states, compared to the United States and the Soviet Union.   
However, the antagonism in the first session served to transform the relationship 
between the nuclear weapon states. Shortly after the first session of the Preparatory 
Committee, the Soviet Union approached the United Kingdom with the aim of coordinating 
strategies for the second session. The British noted the Soviet invitation with both surprise 
and satisfaction; “[a]s far as our present delegation memory goes, it is some years since the 
Russians have been so punctilious in consulting us on tactics, and we should surely do our 
best to encourage this process.”169 Thus, the antagonism served to strengthen the position of 
the United Kingdom. From the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the British 
delegation in Geneva reported to London that both the American and the Soviet delegations 
were very cooperative and that there were no suggestions of the two of them operating 
bilaterally.170 This must have been considered as a great affirmation of the United Kingdom’s 
status as a valuable partner. According to the same British report, the superpowers were more 
than ready to receive and act on suggestions from the United Kingdom, and the superpowers 
were interested in continuing to cooperate.  	  
3.3.2	  The	  Mexican	  Proposal	  
As promised in the first session of the Preparatory Committee, the Mexican 
Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, readdressed the issue of participation when the 
Preparatory Committee convened for its second session in Geneva in late August 1974.171 
During the second week of the session, Garcia Robles tabled a draft proposing that special 
rights of attendance in the Review Conference should be given to the five following 
categories: 1) signatory states, 2) non-parties, 3) the IAEA and the UN Secretary General, 4) 
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean172 
and UN specialized agencies, and 5) non-governmental organizations that had consultative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 FCO 66/591: Priority Telegram no. 395 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to Washington and UKMIS New York, 
13 February 1974. 
169 FCO 66/596: Letter to Barbara Richards, FCO, from Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, 15 May 1974. 
170 FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 8 September 1974. 
171 The second session of the Preparatory Committee opened on August 27, 1974, under the chairmanship of 
Eugeniuez Wyzner from Poland. Ethiopia, Lebanon, Gabon and Costa Rica were absent. See FCO 66/598: Letter 
from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 10 April 1974.27 August 1974. 
172 OPANAL (from el Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe) 
was created as a result of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ratified in 1969, and forbids its signatory nations from use, 
storage, or transport of nuclear weapons. 
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status at the United Nations and were recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).173  
The Mexican draft was presented as a basis for negotiation, and was not complete in 
all its formulations. It asked that signatory states be allowed to participate in the deliberations 
in the Review Conference, but not to take part in decisions, and that non-parties and 
international organizations should have the right to submit their views and comments in 
writing.  
The draft received a wide measure of support in the Preparatory Committee. The Non-
Aligned Movement endorsed the proposal, with Yugoslavia, Sweden, Romania and Sudan 
signing on as co-sponsors.174 Several Western non-nuclear weapon states also supported the 
Mexican call for the widest participation possible, among them Canada and Australia.175 
Canada had already indicated that it was flexible on the issue of participation during the 
debates in the first session of the Preparatory Committee.176 This Canadian behavior may 
have been one of the reasons why the Soviet Union approached the United Kingdom after the 
first session. It seems fair to suggest that the Soviet motive for approaching the United 
Kingdom was to quell controversial demands. The Soviet Union was perhaps under the 
impression that the United Kingdom could be talked into convincing its allies to fall into line 
with the positions of the nuclear weapon states.  
However, there were also objections among the non-nuclear weapon states to the 
tabled draft. Several delegations asked to postpone the decision to the third session of the 
Preparatory Committee, for various reasons. Nigeria objected to the draft because it did not 
include the participation of liberation movements.177 The motivation behind the Nigerian 
objection is explained by Nigeria’s postcolonial status. As explained in chapter two, the 
postcolonial states sought the affirmation of their national independence through the office 
and protocols of the United Nations.178  
Denmark and Ireland also asked for postponement, expressing that they lacked 
instructions on the issue.179 However, there is good reason to believe that they acted partly on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 The Mexican Working Paper ”…containing the text suggested for section X of the draft rules of procedure”: 
NPT /PC.11/15 3 September 1974. (In FCO 66/598) 
174 FCO 66/598: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, 11 September 1974. 
175 FCO 66/598: Letter from A. White, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 4 September 1974. 
176 FCO 66/595: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 3 April 1974. 
177 FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 5 September 
1974. 
178 Sluga 2010: 224 
179 FCO 66/598: Letter from I. C. Sloane, UKDIS Geneva, to A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, 5 September 
1974. 
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the instructions of the United Kingdom which had invested in close consultations with 
Denmark and Ireland in advance of the session in order to get them more involved in the work 
of the Preparatory Committee.180 Denmark and Ireland were the only two other participants in 
the Preparatory Committee from the European Community, and the United Kingdom 
therefore considered it appropriate to approach the two with an aim of getting them more 
involved on behalf of the interests of the European Community. Why did the United Kingdom 
convince Ireland and Denmark to demand postponing a decision on the matter of access?   
 
3.3.3	  The	  American	  Stalling	  Strategy	  	  
The British decision to postpone agreement on the matter of access was part of an 
American strategy of stalling. Actually, all the three nuclear weapon states considered the 
Mexican draft far more reasonable than they had expected.181 However, the United States 
considered the position of the depositary states best served by not making any concessions 
until the end of the third preparatory session. If the depositaries accepted the Mexican 
proposal before other important issues were resolved, they would not be in a position to use 
access as a bargaining chip for resolving other issues that constituted a greater challenge to 
the Americans, for instance the division of costs. Recalling chapter two, the negotiations of 
the Review Conference were conducted in the wake of a economic crisis, and the non-aligned 
states demanded that the nuclear weapon states should cover the conference financially, 
insisting that the purpose of the conference was to hold the nuclear weapon states responsible 
for their disarmament obligations. The United States could not accept this, partly because it 
would be tantamount to approving the non-aligned states’ interpretation of the purpose of the 
conference, and partly because the United States also suffered severely from the economic 
crisis. Thus, the United States refused to go beyond its traditional United Nations scale.  
The idea to link access with other contagious issues in a “package agreement”182 was 
put forth by the American Ambassador, J. Owen Zurhellen, at a tripartite meeting with the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during the second preparatory session. The Soviet 
Union responded to the American proposal with great hesitation. According to the Soviet 
Ambassador, Roshchin, the Soviet Union considered it important to meet the demands of the 
non-nuclear weapon states in respect of this issue and avoid postponement if possible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 FCO 66/597: Letter from D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, to I. T. M. Lucas, UK Embassy Copenhagen, 1 
July 1974. 
181 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
182 FCO 66/598: “Record of a meeting in the secretariat on Monday 2 September”. 
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Roshchin explained that he was detecting a spirit of compromise in the committee, and if no 
gesture was made by the nuclear weapon states then the uncooperative attitude of the nuclear 
weapon states might degenerate into a spirit of division that could affect the United Nations 
General Assembly debate later that fall.183 As a matter of tactics, therefore, the Soviet Union 
was prepared to be firm, but if it seemed tactically worthwhile, they would also be prepared to 
give way, Roshchin said.184 It should not be rule out the Soviet behavior was motivated by an 
interest to put pressure on the United States in the review negotiations.  
External pressure may also have made it favorable for the United Kingdom to signal 
its approval of the Mexican proposal. Just like the Soviet Union, the British did not have any 
substantial objections to the Mexican proposal as long as non-parties were not permitted to 
take the floor or to take part in decisions.185 However, it was not only the United Nations 
General Assembly that put pressure on the United Kingdom to signal its approval of the 
Mexican proposal. In the wake of the Indian nuclear test explosion only a few months before 
the United Kingdom had come under considerable pressure from its European partners, 
thereby presenting the United Kingdom with a strong incentive to be responsive to the 
demands of the non-nuclear weapon states. According to the United Kingdom, the 
implications of the Indian test should have served to convert those concerned to the need to 
pay greater attention to the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states in the Preparatory 
Committee and the Review Conference.186  
The Indian nuclear test shook the framework of the newly established non-
proliferation regime, not only because it exposed the limitations of the NPT as a means to 
prevent nuclear proliferation, but also because it questioned the validity of the NPT. The NPT 
only recognized two categories of states, legitimate nuclear weapon states that had tested 
nuclear explosives prior to 1 January 1967, and non-nuclear weapon states. The initial 
reaction of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to not allow the event to pass 
by default because such could seriously reduce the deterrent to future proliferation.187 
However, this idea was moderated, and the official British response was mild in its character. 
The response did not meet the expectations of the Western European states, with West 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 FCO 66/598: “Record of a meeting in the secretariat on Monday 2 September”. 
184 FCO 66/595: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, ACDD, FCO, 11 April 1974. 
185 For the British assessment, see FCO 66/595: Letter from J. G. Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to B. Richards, 
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187 FCO 66/604: Draft, Letter from D. Summerhayes, ”Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India’s Nuclear Test” 
FCO ACDD, to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Cole, 6 June 1974.  
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Germany suggesting that the United Kingdom, in its capacity as a depositary of the treaty, 
should condemn India’s actions.188 	  
As previously explained, there may be multiple reasons why the nuclear weapon states 
attempted to play down the significance of the Indian test. The United States did not want to 
criticize India because such criticism could have damaged their plans for a Nuclear Supplier 
Group. It was for much of the same reason that the United Kingdom did not denounce the 
Indian test. According to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, “…the view that the 
nuclear test had shattered the restraining effect of the N.P.T. and that it has dealt a mortal 
blow to the efforts already made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons [was] too 
pessimistic.”189 The United Kingdom considered it favorable to preserve good relations with 
India in order to incorporate India into the Nuclear Supplier Group at a later stage.190 India 
could not commit to non-proliferation by signing the NPT unless the Treaty was revised, or 
unless an additional means for non-proliferation was set up, such as the Nuclear Supplier 
Group.  
Another British motive that comes across on the British record is that the interests 
involved in building a close working relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union 
for the Review Conference affected the British decision not to denounce India’s actions, as 
well as close historical, cultural and economic ties with India as a member of the British 
Commonwealth. Interest involved in cooperating closely with the United States may also 
serve to explain why the Soviet Union did not protest the Indian action. Another possible 
reason, suggested by the Indians themselves, was that the Soviet Union was relieved to see 
China challenged by a nuclear power on her southern border.191 
The nuclear weapon states’ treatment of the Indian nuclear test explosion as a “fait 
accompli”192 and their attempts to play down the significance of the incident produced nearly 
the opposite result in Europe. While West Germany told the British Ambassador in Bonn that 
they believed that the whole concept of non-proliferation was “…on the verge of being 
destroyed by the Indian action”,193 the Italian government stated that they were reconsidering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 For the reactions to the Indian nuclear tests explosion, see FCO 66/604:”Implications of Indian Test for NPT 
Review Conference” for instance: Letter from D. Summerhayes, ”Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India’s 
Nuclear Test” FCO ACDD, to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Cole, 6 June 1974.  
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FCO 66/604: ”Implications of Indian Test For NPT Review Conference.”  
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Italian accession to the NPT as a result of the Indian nuclear test.194 The Italian position 
threatened to postpone the ratification of all the other four states that were members of 
Euratom, Belgium, West Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, who were intending to 
ratify the treaty together. 
Signs that the Euratom states would not ratify in time for the Review Conference 
caused considerable concern at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. British interest 
in the review did not involve distancing itself from the other European Community members, 
but serving as a mediator between them and the superpowers. This was the reason why the 
United Kingdom, from the outset of the review negotiations, had put great emphasis on the 
need to reinforce the NPT through additional accessions. The British even used the Indian 
nuclear test explosion to legitimize this approach, claiming that if there were no new 
adherences, existing parties would gain the impression that the universal non-proliferation 
regime could be breached with impunity, and support for the implementation of the treaty and 
its safeguards system would decline. As a worst-case scenario, the British warned that the 
Review Conference might then “…merely perform the last Rites over the treaty and become 
the occasion for the proposals for radical and unacceptable revision of the Treaty.”195  
However, despite strong incentives to accept the Mexican proposal straight away, the 
British had two strong incentives for postponement. Firstly, this was the position advocated 
by the United States, with whom the United Kingdom wished to restore a special relationship, 
and perhaps more importantly, because the United Kingdom was not satisfied with the 
potential rule of decision-making that had been suggested during the second preparatory 
session. Nor did Mexico’s Garcia Robles object to postponing the matter of access, 
expressing that he had not expected the Preparatory Committee to make a decision during its 
second session.196 Thus, it was also tactically favorable for the Soviet Union not to give way, 
but to keep a firm position against wide access.   
Consequently, the three nuclear weapon states responded negatively to the Mexican 
proposal during the first round of negotiations on the matter. In the Preparatory Committee, 
the American Ambassador, J. Owen Zurhellen, expressed that the United States supported 
postponing a decision in the matter of access until right before the Review Conference, in 
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order to preserve the incentive for signatory states to ratify the NPT.197 This was the same 
argument that had been used to postpone discussion of the matter in the first session of the 
Preparatory Committee, then by the Soviet Union and Poland.198  
  
3.3.4	  Participatory	  Rights	  in	  Exchange	  for	  Openness	  	  
Throughout the fall, and right up until the third session of the Preparatory Committee 
in February 1975, efforts were made by the nuclear weapon states to moderate the Mexican 
draft on the rules of access. In doing so, their main aim was to restrict rights to participate in 
exchange for openness. In order to explain how attempts were made to exchange openness 
with participation rights, a short outline of the structure of the Review Conference may be 
helpful. What is presented here is the final structure; however, during the preparatory 
negotiations the number of main committees and their designated specific topics had not yet 
been settled. This was only settled, as were all other procedural issues, during the third 
session of the Preparatory Committee.  
 The work of the Review Conference was to be divided into a total of five committees. 
After the conclusion of a general plenary debate, negotiations on the provisions of the Treaty 
would be conducted in two main committees. Disarmament and security issues would be 
negotiated in Main Committee I; safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy would be 
negotiated in Main Committee II.  
Meanwhile, a General Committee, a Drafting Committee and a Credentials Committee 
would also meet in order to assist the conference in its work. Unlike the main committees, 
these three committees would have restricted membership. The Credentials Committee was 
smallest, both in size and in respect of political significance.199 Its function was purely of a 
formal nature.200 Its purpose, however, was more substantial. The General Committee was 
intended to assist the President of the conference in the conduct of the conference. The 
General Committee would thus be chaired by the Conference President, composed of the 
chairmen of the other four committees, as well as a number of vice-chairmen. Finally, the 
Drafting Committee would be composed of the same members, meaning states and not 
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necessarily individuals, as the General Committee. Its purpose, as the name suggests, was to 
draft language for the Review Conference Final Declaration.  
Openness was discussed at some length among the depositaries. The three nuclear 
weapon states knew that they would be subjected to heavy criticism in the Review 
Conference. Their initial preference was therefore to keep both the plenary session and the 
meeting of the committees private.201 However, during the fall, the three nuclear weapon 
states changed their positions. By November, the United States had dramatically moderated 
its stance, believing that it was perhaps necessary to agree to public attendance at both the 
plenary sessions of the Review Conference, and its main committees, in order to achieve 
better conditions in respect of other issues, such as participation rights.202   
Mexico agreed to make additional moderations regarding the right of non-parties and 
NGOs in exchange for openness in the main committees. Thus, when the third session of the 
Preparatory Committee was organized during the first two weeks of February 1975, the 
committee agreed that the plenary and main committee meetings would be held in public 
unless the body concerned decided otherwise, and that three sub-committees would meet in 
private.203 Furthermore, it was decided that the five categories of participants introduced in 
the first Mexican proposal, 1) signatory states, 2) no-parties, 3) the United Nations and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 4) other specialized agencies and regional 
intergovernmental organizations, and 5) non-governmental organizations, were allowed to 
participate in these open meetings, but with different rights.204 
According to the final rule of access, signatory states were entitled to participate in the 
deliberations of the conference, address the meetings, receive conference documents and to 
submit thier views in writing to the conference. Their views would then be considered as 
conference documents. However, they were not allowed to take any part in the adoption of 
decisions. Non-signatory states were allowed to apply for observer status, and their attendance 
would be subjected to a decision by the conference. As observers, non-parties would be 
entitled to appoint officials to attend open meetings, to receive conference documents and to 
submit documents to the conference participants.  
The UN and the IAEA constituted the third category of participants. Their 
representatives would be entitled to attend open meetings and to receive conference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See e.g. the British Steering Briefs produced for the second and third session, FCO 66/598 and FCO 66/730, 
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202 FCO 66/598: Record of the Meeting about the NPT Review in the UK Mission on Monday 4 November 
1974.  
203 FCO 66/730: NPT/CONF/3 Annex IV  
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documents, and to submit material both orally and in writing. Other specialized agencies and 
regional intergovernmental organizations were also allowed to apply for observer agency 
status to the Secretary-General of the conference. This included the Agency for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the European Commission and any 
specialized agencies of the United Nations. Similar to observer states, the status of observer 
agencies would be subjected to a decision by the conference. Finally, non-governmental 
organizations were also allowed special rights to attend the conference. Upon request, NGOs 
would be entitled to receive conference documents. None of the categories above were 
allowed to attend the private meetings, unless especially invited.  
The final rule of access was largely favorable to the United Kingdom. The Mexican 
category of regional and intergovernmental organizations would allow the European 
Commission to send representatives to the Review Conference. This was favorable to the 
British, both because the United Kingdom was a member of the European Community,205 and 
because it served as an additional assurance to the UK’s European allies that they would be 
well-represented if they did not complete the ratification process in time for the Review 
Conference. Equally, Euratom would be allowed access as a specialized agency, because it 
was in charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the European 
Community.  
Finally, the British were very interested in including the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. From the outset of the review preparations, the United Kingdom had planned that the 
IAEA should play an extensive role in the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.206 It was 
the IAEA that was in charge of the safeguard system designed to ensure that non-nuclear 
weapon states only used their nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. This specific and 
prescribed responsibility was explicitly placed with the Agency in the NPT. According to the 
British delegation in Vienna, the Review Conference without IAEA attendance would bear a 
close resemblance to Hamlet without his most trusted friend, Horatio.207  
Presumably, the underlying reason why the United Kingdom wanted the IAEA to be 
formally associated with the Review Conference was to draw attention to the technical, rather 
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than the political character of the Treaty in the review.208 Even though it was in the United 
Kingdom’s interests to emphasize the political significance of the NPT in order to 
accommodate its European allies and reaffirm its position as a great power, the United 
Kingdom wished to avoid criticism of its disarmament efforts and prevent revision of the 
NPT. A formal association of IAEA would serve this purpose because the Agency was 
responsible for the technical implementation of the Treaty. 
 
3.4	  The	  Rule	  of	  Decision-­Making	  
The second issue that created considerable disagreement in the review negotiations 
was the rule of decision-making. As explained above, disagreement over the rule of decision-
making was one of the reasons why the agreement over the rule of access was postponed until 
the third session of the Preparatory Committee. Why was the rule of decision-making a big 
challenge in the Review Conference?  
As mentioned, consensus was a top British priority.209 After the first session of the 
Preparatory Committee, the United Kingdom had come to the conclusion that if the non-
aligned states resisted a consensus decision in the Review Conference to make use of their 
potential voting power, the depositaries might consider giving up every other procedural point 
for this one.210 The British were concerned that a vote on substantial issues could serve to 
highlight the division among the members of the Treaty, and in turn weaken the non-
proliferation regime. If a majority happened to succeed in deciding Treaty amendments or 
protocols, this would be even more harmful for the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.  
However, during the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the nuclear 
weapon states were made aware that their objective of consensus was possibly unobtainable. 
Sweden and Australia had tabled a proposal that allowed for voting if consensus was not 
obtainable, based on the formulation from the procedural rules for the Conference on the Law 
of the Sea in 1958.211 Sweden argued that the prospect of voting could increase the chances of 
consensus. This was a fair argument; if a qualified majority of 2/3 existed, states that were on 
the fence would probably feel hesitant about being held responsible for causing a division that 
would be damaging, but would not change the outcome of the vote. Sweden warned that if 
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consensus could not be achieved on this rule, it would be widely seen as proof that the 
Review Conference was also unlikely to achieve very much by consensus.  
The Swedish-Australian draft acquired many co-sponsors during the second session of 
the Preparatory Committee.212 After the session, the nuclear weapon states were prepared that 
they would have to give up their insistence on consensus and accept the Swedish-Australian 
draft for decision-making. In order to make such a concession as advantageous as possible, 
the nuclear weapon states put great efforts between the second and third session of the 
Preparatory Committee into lobbying for the bureau of the Review Conference. If they were 
going to agree to partial vote-operation, the nuclear weapon states considered it essential that 
the conference president would carry out a strict interpretation of “not obtainable”, and not 
jump to a vote.213 In other words, the choice of the conference president would be crucial for 
flexibility on decision-making procedures.  
 
3.4.1	  The	  President	  
The nuclear weapon states first began to seriously consider names for the position of 
president during the second session of the Preparatory Committee, where the subject was 
raised in the corridors with some interest. According to the British CCD Ambassador, Henry 
Hainworth, there seemed to be a strong sentiment that the president should be the head of a 
national delegation, rather than a somebody selected “out of international life”, and preferably 
an African or an Asian.214 The incentive to choose an African or Asian candidate was strong 
and it would not attract criticism from the non-aligned states which any given candidate from 
either the Western or the Eastern block would do. Several states and individuals were 
suggested, although none of them were African or Asian.  
The Soviet Union advocated in favor of Ireland because of Ireland’s role as the 
initiator of the non-proliferation negotiations. It was the Irish Resolution, presented in, and 
approved by, the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 that set up the ad hoc Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated. Also 
Austria and Finland were suggested, as were the names of Alva Myrdal and Garcia Robles. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
213 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
214 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
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Alva Myrdal, however, was quickly eliminated on the grounds that she was retired.215 The 
British suggestion that Garcia Robles could be president, because an honorary position might 
serve to mollify him, was also turned down.216 The idea of neutralization was touched on by 
the Americans; however, the Soviet Union opposed the idea entirely.  
The depositaries finally decided to favor the Swedish CCD Ambassador Inga 
Thorsson, who had succeeded Alva Myrdal after the United Nations General Assembly in 
1973. Although Inga Thorsson did not have the status of Foreign Minister, she was a 
Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister, with great ambitions for the post.217 There were 
several reasons why the nuclear weapon states decided to nominate Thorsson for the 
presidential position. First, as a Swede, she would not attract criticism from the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Second, the British considered Thorsson both highly qualified and someone with 
whom they could cooperate. When Thorsson was introduced to the British delegation in 
Geneva in January 1974, the British made the following observation:  
 
Mrs. Thorsson who has excellent English gives the impression of being thoroughly competent and 
likely to be someone with whom it will be easier to do business than with Mrs. Myrdal because she 
seems less emotional about the whole matter.218 
 
Thus, it is possible that the British believed that they would be able to influence Inga 
Thorsson. Recalling Sweden’s position among the non-aligned states, if the depositaries 
succeeded in influencing the Swedish position, they would be in a good position to influence 
the position of the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole.  
Several other personal traits may have served to make Thorsson favorable for the 
position as president of the Review Conference. Though never explicitly stated on the British 
record, the fact that Inga Thorsson was female may have contributed to her nomination in two 
ways. During the 1970s, feminism was a considerable force in Western domestic politics; 
however, in international politics women were in the minority. Thus, by electing Thorsson, 
the Conference could possibly muster some good will from the feminists. However, it is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Alva Myrdal was quickly eliminated as a candidate because she was retired, see FCO 66/598: Letter from H. 
Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 1974. Thus, although she had a 
record of raising controversial issues, there is nothing to suggest that the nuclear weapon states would oppose her 
candidacy if she were still the Swedish representative in Geneva. While personality may have been of some 
importance to the nuclear weapon states, it should not be exaggerated; just like Inga Thorsson, Myrdal was 
representing the Swedish government in disarmament negotiations.  
216 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
217 FCO 66/598: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to D. Summerhayes, ACDD, FCO, 9 September 
1974. 
218 FCO 66/590: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to A. White and I. C. Sloane, 25 January 1974. 
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possible that the depositaries believed they would be able to influence Thorsson because she 
was a woman in a male dominated arena.219  
Second, Inga Thorsson’s background as a Swedish head negotiator in respect of 
population, technical and scientific cooperation and environmental issues may also have made 
her attractive as a candidate for the presidency. Because of Thorsson’s previous focus on third 
world development, selecting Thorsson as president could signal sympathy with the non-
aligned states that demanded technical assistance for nuclear energy to fuel their developing 
industries. Nor should it be ruled out that Thorsson’s background as the Swedish Ambassador 
to Israel may have played in her favor in some way or another, for instance because Israel was 
not a member of the NPT.   
Yet there was a final strategic reason why the depositaries settled on a Swedish 
president instead of an African or an Asian, as initially intended. If a Swede was nominated 
and accepted as the president of the Review Conference, the nuclear weapon states were in a 
position to argue in favor of a continuation of the bureau for the Preparatory Committee.220 
The bureau for the Preparatory Committee consisted of the three chairs for each session, 
William Barton from Canada who chaired the first session, Eugeniuez Wyzner from Poland 
who chaired the second, and the Swedish diplomat Carl Lennart Eckerberg who was going to 
chair the third session. If Thorsson was chosen as president, the choice would imply that 
Canada and Poland should be assigned the chairmanship of the main sub-committees in the 
Review Conference. From a depositary perspective, it was considered highly advantageous 
that the Review Conference main committees should be headed by a Western and an Eastern 
representative, in order restrict contentious political debate in the Review Conference.  
 
3.4.2	  The	  North	  South	  Dimension	  	  	  	  
When the Preparatory Committee convened for its third session in February 1975, the 
nuclear weapon states agreed to adopt a concerted hard line during the first week in order to 
resist alternatives to consensus and keep the Swedish-Australian draft as a fallback, 
depending on the president.221 In contrast to the two previous sessions, most of the activites 
took place at informal meetings between delegations, and decisions were only reached on the 
final day of the meeting after an exchange on the composition of the bureau.222  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 For a description of gender in multilateral disarmament negotiations, see for instance Sondra R. Herman 
(1998) The Woman Inside the Negotiations: Alva Myrdal’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1961-1982.  
220 FCO 66/599: Minute from A. E. Montgomery, ACDD, FCO, to Mr. Martin, UNE, FCO, 11 November 1974. 
221 FCO 66/599: Taylor, ”Record on a meeting with the ACDA,” 25 November 1974. 
222 FCO 66/730: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to J. C. Edmonds, ACDD, FCO, 25 February 1975. 
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The problem concerning the bureau was relatively simple. The nomination of the 
Swedish Ambassador Inga Thorsson as president of the Review Conference was only met 
with negligible opposition; lobbying of the depositaries in favor of her candidacy in both New 
York and Geneva following the second preparatory session thereby proved highly 
successful.223 However, Mexico demanded that the South be given a greater role in the bureau 
because the South was not represented in neither the Preparatory Committee Bureau, nor by 
Thorsson’s presidency.  
Therefore, during the debate on the bureau, Mexico’s Garcia Robles suggested that the 
heads of the main committees should be from the South rather than from Europe or North 
America. As a compromise, it was decided that William H. Barton from Canada, who had 
chaired the first session of the Preparatory Committee, would chair Main Committee II, while 
the chairmanship of Main Committee I would be designated to B. Akporode Clark from 
Nigeria.224 Eugeniuez Wyzner from Poland, who had chaired the second session of the 
Preparatory Committee, was instead appointed Chairman of the Drafting Committee, while 
the chairmanship of the Credentials Committee was also given to the South, to Hortencio J. 
Brillantes from the Philippines. Finally, it was decided to increase the number of vice-chairs, 
and thereby the size of the General Committee, in order to accommodate more representatives 
from the South.225  
After the composition of the bureau was decided, the nuclear weapon states agreed to 
the Swedish-Australian proposal. Thus, the final rule of decision-making for the Review 
Conference read that “[d]ecisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a 
majority of representatives present and voting.”226 However, in issues of substance “…every 
effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by a means of consensus. 
There should be no voting in such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been 
exhausted.”227 
Thus, just like Mexico, Australia and Sweden were able to influence the Review 
Conference Rule of Procedure. The latter was in an especially influential position, having 
been given the presidency of the Review Conference. The reason why the depositaries agreed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 FCO 66/730: Letter from H. Hainworth, UKDIS Geneva, to J. C. Edmonds, ACDD, FCO, 25 February 1975. 
224 NPT/CONF/35/I, p. 4.   
225 Vice-presidents were elected from the following states: Australia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, 
German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Ireland, Honduras, Hungary, Lebanon, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See 
NPT/CONF/35/I, p. 4. 
226 Shaker 1980: 877 
227 Shaker 1980: 877-878 
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to the Swedish-Australian formulation was perhaps due to their conviction that the majority of 
non-nuclear weapon states shared their interest in not exposing the Treaty to criticism that 
could undermine its validity. As explained in the previous chapter, the nuclear weapon states 
considered the NPT to be of greater value to the non-nuclear weapon states than to 
themselves.  
 
3.5	  Summary	  	  
This chapter has presented an analysis of how the NPT parties resolved the conflicts of 
interest regarding the formal organization of the Review Conference, the Review Conference 
Rule of Procedure. There were particularly two conflicting issues regarding the Rule of 
Procedure, the rule of access and the rule of decision-making. Because both of these issues 
were settled before the Review Conference began, by a Preparatory Committee, the chapter 
commences with a short analysis of how the Preparatory Committee was set up. The analysis 
shows how the Preparatory Committee was generally an American product. The United States 
disregarded British warnings that the arbitrary membership formula could cause non-nuclear 
weapon states to accuse the depositaries of harboring Machiavellian intentions. However, 
these British concerns, regardless of whether they were honest or strategic, proved unfounded. 
The non-nuclear weapon states had no substantial complaints about the Preparatory 
Committee.   
The rule of access was made an issue already during the first session of the 
Preparatory Committee, when Mexico’s CCD Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, warned 
that the non-aligned parties would opt for the widest possible participation to the Review 
Conference, to include both non-parties and NGOs. The nuclear weapon states were firmly 
opposed to the idea, arguing that the review of the NPT was only the concern of its parties. 
Thus, when the Preparatory Committee reconvened for its second session, Garcia Robles had 
largely moderated his proposal, no longer suggesting that non-parties or NGOs should be 
allowed to enter the floor in the review negotiations, nor to take part in decision-making. 
Garcia Robles’ proposal received much support from both non-aligned states and Western 
allies, and even the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were tempted to agree to the 
proposal. However, in response to an American suggestion, a decision on the issue was 
postponed until the last session of the Preparatory Committee. 
The American suggestion to postpone agreement on the issue of access was 
strategically motivated and only made possible by close cooperation between the nuclear 
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weapon states, in stark contrast to how the Preparatory Committee was set up, and possibly 
the Mexican acceptance of the postponement, because particularly the Soviet Union 
considered access an unnecessary conflict to bring into the UN General Assembly. The 
nuclear weapon states agreed that a decision on the rule of access was a valuable bargaining 
chip in regards to other procedural issues and did therefore not wish to comply with the 
Mexican proposal until the very end of the procedural negotiations. Thus, agreement on the 
rule of access was made conditional on agreement on another contentious issue, the rule of 
decision-making.  
During the second preparatory session, Sweden and Australia had forwarded a 
proposal for decision-making that would allow a vote on substantial issues in the Review 
Conference if all efforts for consensus had been exhausted. The nuclear weapon states 
strongly opposed the proposal, claiming that consensus was the only appropriate rule of 
decision-making. However, because the proposal received much support in the Preparatory 
Committee, the nuclear weapon states set out to select and lobby for a Conference President, 
who they trusted not to “jump to a vote”. Their decision fell on Inga Thorsson, the Swedish 
CCD Ambassador. There were several factors that favored the nomination of Thorsson, but 
most importantly, Thorsson was chosen because Sweden was aligned with the neutrals. 
Thorsson’s nomination meet no substantial protests in the third session of the Preparatory 
Committee, and after her election, the committee reached an agreement on both the Mexican 
proposal for the rule of access, and the Swedish-Australian proposal for the rule of decision-
making. 
The next chapter presents an analysis of how the NPT parties resolved their conflicts 
of interest in the Review Conference, with particular focus on the role of the Conference 
President, Inga Thorsson.  
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CHAPTER	  4:	  
Turning	  Confrontation	  into	  Consensus	  
Roles	  and	  Rationales	  in	  the	  Negotiations	  of	  the	  Final	  Declaration	  
 
 
I would sum this [the Review Conference] up as a serial melodrama, directed by Inga 
Thorsson, with a script by anonymous writers, based on a book by HMG [Her Majesty’s 
Government of the United Kingdom]. Since not all the cast knew their parts, there were 
passages of farce and others of near-tragedy. But a happy ending came with the Final Act.228   
John Christopher Edmonds, Arms Control and Disarmament Department, 2 June 1975.  
 
4.1	  Introduction	  	  
The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was convened at the Palais 
des Nations in Geneva on May 5, 1975, for a period of four weeks.229 As its first task, the 
conference elected Inga Thorsson as its president by acclamation. In her opening address to 
the conference, Thorsson emphasized the importance and uniqueness of the event: “For the 
first time in the modern era,” Thorsson proclaimed, “…a treaty regulating conditions relating 
to armaments and the performance of parties to that treaty would be the subject of a thorough 
scrutiny.”230 According to Thorsson, it was a historic moment: “The Conference was 
embarking on a momentous task, the results of which might well extend far into the 
future.”231  
The British delegation shared Thorsson’s excitement about the Review Conference. 
According to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s assessment, the conference was 
a “day of reckoning”232; either it could strengthen the NPT, or reveal dissension among its 
parties and weaken it, perhaps fatally. And as the negotiations commenced, it was the latter 
alternative that seemed most likely. Just as Mexico’s Ambassador, Alfonso Garcia Robles, 
had promised in the Preparatory Committee, the nuclear weapon states came under instant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 FCO 66/740: Letter from J. C. Edmonds, FCO Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Mr. Coles, 2 
June 1975.  
229 The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty came to a close on May 30, 1975. 
230 NPT/CONF/SR.I, p. 2. 
231 NPT/CONF/SR.I, p. 2. 
232 FCO 66/740: “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing” by Mark Allen, FCO, 
p. 3, 17 June 1975.  
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attack from the non-aligned states for having neglected their Treaty obligations. However, the 
non-aligned states were forced to see all of their disarmament proposals rejected by the 
nuclear weapon states and their allies.233 Consequently, by the third week of negotiation, the 
conference was at a complete deadlock over Article VI, the issue of disarmament.  
The purpose of this final chapter of analysis is to explain how the stalemate in the 
Review Conference was overcome. Despite the apparent conflict of interests, the parties to the 
NPT agreed on a Final Declaration two hours into overtime on the last day of the Review 
Conference.234 While the Final Declaration was in itself not a groundbreaking document, it 
did reaffirm the commitment of the parties to nuclear non-proliferation.  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. Part one analyzes the role of the 
Conference President, Inga Thorsson, in seeing the Review Conference through. This 
particular focus was chosen because the biographical accounts of William Epstein and 
Mohammed Shaker both portrays Thorsson as the sole driving force behind the Final 
Declaration, but without properly explaining how Thorsson was able to resolve the apparent 
conflicts of interest.235 The premise of this research is that this type of methodological 
individualism is reductionist; in order to fully explain how Inga Thorsson was able to secure a 
consensus for the Final Declaration, historians must examine how the structure present 
occasions for human behavior. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to discredit Inga 
Thorsson successes with the Review Conference. However, the findings from the previous 
chapter give reason to expect that there were in fact multiple actors that assisted Thorsson, 
because it was not in the interests of the NPT parties to put the NPT under additional pressure 
after the Indian nuclear test. The opening quote of this chapter suggests that the United 
Kingdom was one state which did act as a driving force behind the Final Declaration, thus 
part two presents an analysis of how the United Kingdom contributed to the outcome of the 
Review Conference. The chapter is concluded with a short summary of the chapter findings.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 The Group of 77 put forth a number of specific demands for action by the nuclear weapons states to live up to 
their commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. William Epstein (1976) lists them accordingly: 1) An end 
to underground nuclear tests (these were the only once that were allowed by the Partial Test Ban Treat), 2) a 
substantial reduction in nuclear arsenal, 3) a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 4) concrete measures of substantial aid to the developing 
countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy 5) creation of special international regime for conducting 
peaceful nuclear explosions 6) an undertaking to respect all nuclear-free zones.  
234 FCO 66/740: “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing” by Mark Allen, FCO, 
p. 11, 17 June 1975. 
235 See the accounts of William Epstein (1976) and Mohammed Shaker (1980).  
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4.2	  The	  Role	  of	  Inga	  Thorsson	  	  
 The biographical accounts of the first Review Conference present Inga Thorsson as the 
sole driving force behind the Final Declaration. According to William Epstein the conference 
nearly collapsed because the nuclear weapon states approached the review with a 
“stonewalling” strategy.236 In other words, they were committed to making as few concessions 
as possible. It was only the efforts and character of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson, 
which prevented the conference from breaking down, according to both Shaker and Epstein. 
Thorsson presented the participating states with a Final Declaration and two options: to sign, 
or to take the blame for the failed negotiations. According to Epstein, her Final Declaration 
succeeded in attaining a consensus, but a great number of participants issued interpretive 
statements revealed that a consensus was in reality non-existent.237 In order for this chapter to 
examine the roles and rationale that secured an agreement regarding a Final Declaration, this 
section first presents a critical analysis of why Inga Thorsson has been portrayed as the savior 
of the NPT review. The chapter thereafter continues by discussing alternative interpretations 
of Inga Thorsson’s role in the review, made possible by the British official record. 
 
4.2.1	  A	  Political	  Portrait	  	  
The portrayal of Inga Thorsson as the savior of the first Review Conference, and in 
effect the savoir of the NPT, derives from the narrative of lost opportunities that has 
dominated in the history on nuclear arms control for a long period of time. As explained in the 
introductory chapter, one of the reasons for this is that historians made little effort to explain 
change during the Cold War. Their primary concern regarding nuclear arms control was to 
explain which superpowers were responsible for the arms race. Thus, participants account for 
the main contributions to the literature on the origin and implementation of the non-
proliferation regime.238 There may be several reasons why their contributions to the literature 
have fueled the narrative of lost opportunities, instead of challenged the narrative. For 
instance, practitioners have put great emphasis on agency in explaining the evolution of 
nuclear diplomacy; structure is presented as a constraint that in the case of the Review 
Conference, Inga Thorsson was been able to overcome. This model of methodological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Epstein 1976: 246 
237 Epstein 1976: 254 
238 E.g. William Epstein (1976) The Last Chance, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control; Alva Myrdal (1977) 
The Game of Disarmament, How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race; Mohammed I. Shaker (1980) 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979; Glenn Seaborg (1987) Stemming 
the Tide, Arms Control in the Johnson Years; Victor Israelyan (2003) On the Battlefields of the Cold War, a 
Soviet Ambassador’s Confession. 
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individualism that is currently used to explain the outcome of the first Review Conference of 
the NPT is challenged in this thesis. 
Biographical accounts call for critical reading; attention should be paid to the premise, 
past experiences and intentions of each author. For instance, the majority of practitioners did 
not have any professional training in the field of history. This may explain why biographical 
accounts base their explanations on methodological individualism. Because of their lack of 
professional training, they have not been taught to identify historical processes or the 
significance of structure, and consequently they may be more inclined to emphasis actors. 
This may particularly be true in the case of practitioners, in comparison to other non-
historians. Having taken close part in the negotiations, they may have been especially exposed 
to the individuals and therefore identified differences in style and personal commitment as 
decisive explanatory factors. This is for instance the case of Glenn Seaborg, who was 
appointed Chairman of the American Energy Commission from 1961-1971 by John F. 
Kennedy,  “…significant arms control achievements can be brought about only when the 
[American] president takes a personal and an affirmative interest.”239  
However, a lack of professional training does not explain why biographical accounts 
have contributed to the narrative of lost opportunities alone. Another important factor is the 
limited availability of appropriate sources. Both Epstein and Shaker largely base their 
analyses of the Review Conference on its Final Documents, which were made public after the 
review. However, these documents are of limited value for explaining the outcome of the 
review negotiations. This is illustrated by the nuclear jurist Carlton Stoiber’s analysis of the 
evolution of the NPT Review Conference Final Documents from 1975 to 2000. Stoiber 
explains how a Final Declaration does not necessarily indicate what issues those issues that 
where of great importance during a Review Conference. Final Declarations are considered to 
carry some legal implications,240 thus only language that has been agreed on is included in a 
Final Declaration and disagreements remain hidden. Equally, in the case when a Final 
Declaration has not proven obtainable, agreement remains hidden. According to Stoiber, the 
failure to recognize that Review Conferences that failed to reach consensus on a Final 
Declaration, “…negotiations in the main committees produced texts with many paragraphs 
that were ‘unbrackeded’ – meaning that the language was generally acceptable to all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Seaborg 1987: 450 
240 According to Carlton Stoiber, there are generally two interpretations of the status of the final documents of 
the Review Conference. One view is that the consensus documents are nonbinding political statements that 
indicate desirable, but not compulsory, interpretations of the treaty. The second view, which finds support in the 
1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that the consensus documents have a legally binding effect.  
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parties”,241 has contributed to criticism of the NPT regime as having failed to develop truly 
global non-proliferation norms. 
While Final Declarations hide disagreements because of their legal status, other 
documents included in the first Review Conference Final Documents may have exaggerated 
disagreements. During the first Review Conference, parties that had reservations about the 
Final Declaration were allowed to register them for inclusion in the Final Documents. The 
current portrayal of Inga Thorsson as the conference savior may have been inspired by some 
of these reservations. In the interpretive statement of Mexico, the Mexican delegation stated 
that they had only “…agreed not to oppose the consensus (…) as a token of their great 
appreciation for the praiseworthy and unceasing endeavors of the President of the Conference, 
to whom we owe the preparation of the draft declaration”242. It is on this statement that 
Epstein bases his conclusion that consensus in the Review Conference was non-existent,243 
without even discussing the discussing Mexico’s motives for making this reservation.   
 The Mexican delegation’s motives for including this particular formulation in their 
interpretive statement were unquestionably political. In my opinion, the statement must be 
considered partly as an attempt on Mexico’s part to save face, as each of the Mexican 
proposals for nuclear disarmament were dismissed by the majority in the Review Conference 
negotiations, and partly as a strategic move in the continuous debate on nuclear disarmament. 
Instead of admitting to a compromise, which could be regarded as accepting the rationale of 
the nuclear weapon states, Mexico only accredited the outcome of the Review Conference to 
its President.  
The Mexican interpretative statement is an excellent source to the political 
disagreement in the first Review Conference, which was unquestionably an important aspect 
of the NPT review. However, it is not a sufficient source to explain the outcome of the review 
negotiations. This leads me to a third possibility as to why the biographical literature fuels the 
narrative of lost opportunities. It may be that practitioners have intentionally overlooked the 
Mexican motive because of personal political motives. Alva Myrdal, for instance, who has not 
written in detail about the Review Conference, but about nuclear arms control in general, was 
a vocal critique of the nuclear weapon states in her role as Swedish CCD Ambassador, and 
her book, The Game of Disarmament, was clearly intended to blame the lack of nuclear 
disarmament on superpower arrogance in the contemporary political debate on nuclear 	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disarmament. This may for instance also have applied to William Epstein, who worked as a 
United Nations disarmament official during the review process.  
The above account of the political portrayal of Inga Thorsson confirms why 
biographical accounts, and especially biographical accounts written shortly after the event that 
is described, serve best as a source to a historical phenomenon. This is additionally confirmed 
by the following analysis of how Inga Thorsson was able to turn the Review Conference from 
confrontation to consensus. The analysis suggests that the narrative of lost opportunities is not 
appropriate to explain the first Review Conference. The establishment of a model for a 
periodic review system of the NPT was not simply a lucky coincidence; multiple actors 
contributed to the outcome of the Review Conference. A short presentation of the participants 
in the Review Conference will pave the way for the analysis. 
 
4.2.2	  Size	  and	  Structure	  	  
The Review Conference was large in scale. When the Review Conference was opened 
on 5 May 1975, there were 95 parties to the NPT,244 and 58 of these parties decided to 
participate in the conference to review the Treaty.245 This group included the five Euratom-
states, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, who deposited their 
ratification of the Treaty in London on May 2, just in time for the conference.246 Japan 
however, did not ratify the Treaty in time, but was as a signatory state allowed to participate 
in the deliberations of the Conference, but without the right to take part in decisions. In 
addition to Japan, 6 other signatory states of a total of 15 sent delegations to the Review 
Conference.247 On average, each delegation was composed of between four and eight 
diplomats.248 However, some of the delegations were stronger in number, among them the 
delegations of the three nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty. The Soviet Union 
participated with 17 diplomats, while the United States and the United Kingdom each sent 12 
diplomats. Of the non-aligned states, Sweden had the largest delegation of 16 delegates.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Shaker 1980: 875. The number of adherents rose during the conference, see NPT/CONF/SR I.  
245 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Holy 
See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq (attended as observer upon its own request), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, 
Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See NPT/CONF/35/I p.4. 
246 FCO 66/740: “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing” by Mark Allen, FCO, 
p. 4, 17 June 1975. 
247 Egypt, Japan, Panama, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Venezuela. 
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There were several profiled states that did not take any part in the Review Conference. 
The three nuclear weapon states, China, France and India, were absent, as was Pakistan, 
which was considered a near-nuclear weapon state. Also Taiwan was not present. Taiwan 
happened to be a party to the NPT, but had not been invited to the Review Conference on the 
account of the fact that it was neither a member of the United Nation nor of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. In 1971, the People’s Republic of China had replaced Taiwan in the 
United Nations. This acknowledgement of Communist China was part of the foreign policy of 
the American administration under President Richard Nixon.249 In order not to put the 
newfound Sino-American relationship at risk, the Americans had successfully persuaded 
Taiwan not to participate.250 However, 7 of the 40 states that had not signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty did send delegations to the Review Conference. In accordance with the 
rule of access, paragraph II of Rule 44, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Israel, South Africa 
and Spain were granted observer status, which allowed them to attend the public meetings of 
the main committees and the plenary sessions, and to receive Conference documents and to 
submit documents to the other participants in the Conference.  
Finally, several international agencies and non-governmental organizations were 
present in Geneva for the Review Conference, as provided for by paragraph III, IV and V of 
Rule 44, among them the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
League of Arab States and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). 29 non-governmental organizations were also 
granted access to the Conference,251 including several profiled nuclear disarmament 
organizations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Pugwash 
Conference on Science and World Affairs and the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI).252 However, according to the attendance list, the European Community was 
not represented by any of its agencies: neither the European Commission nor Euratom sent 
delegates to the Conference. 
As described in the previous chapter, the work of the Review Conference was divided 
into a total of five committees. After the conclusion of the opening week of general debate, on 
12 May, the review was moved into two main committees. Disarmament and security issues 
were negotiated in Main Committee I, under the chairmanship of B. Akporode Clark from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Dallek 2007: 617 
250 The issue of Chinese participation was discussed between the second and third session of the Preparatory 
Committee, as illustrated for instance by FCO 66/599: Letter to Mr. White, FCO, from Mark Allen, UKDIS 
Geneva, 13 December 1974.  
251 For the detailed list of all the participants, see NPT/CONF/35/I Annex VI.  
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Nigeria; safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy was negotiated in Main Committee 
II, under the chairmanship of William H. Barton from Canada.253 However, during the 
negotiations in the main committees, there was extensive activity in the corridors. The content 
of the final declarations was discussed in private meetings both within and between 
representatives from the major caucuses, the Western group, the Easter group and the Non-
Aligned Movement. Thus, both official and unofficial channels were used in order to exercise 
influence on the final outcome of the Conference.  
 
4.2.3	  Confrontation	  and	  Presidential	  Intervention	  
The non-aligned aim for the Review Conference was to put the nuclear weapon states 
in a “straight-jacket”254 by setting a timeframe for the completion of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. They launched their strategy early into the review. During the first days of plenary 
debate, the non-aligned states presented three additional protocols addressing the issues of 
nuclear disarmament and security assurances, and three resolutions addressing aspects of 
technical nuclear assistance for peaceful purposes. Both the protocols and resolutions 
acquired multiple non-aligned sponsors, however, neither the nuclear weapon states nor their 
developed non-nuclear weapon states allies accepted any of the proposals.255 The United 
States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, took a very hard line against the non-aligned 
states.256 Thus, when the work of the main committees was concluded on 26 May, Inga 
Thorsson commented in the plenary session that, “[j]udging from the reports of the main 
committees, (…) it would appear that the bulk of the work of the Conference still lay ahead 
and the prospect of an optimum result was not bright.”257 
Thorsson saw her gloomy prediction confirmed three days later when the Drafting 
Committee completed its work. The Drafting Committee had held numerous meetings during 
the Conference proceedings in order to draft a Final Declaration, but was unable to reach any 
conclusion following the procedural objections of non-aligned minority groups.258 These 
objections were Mexican demands for Conference endorsement of the “aims pursued by” the 
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254 Formulation by the Mexican representative in Geneva, Miguel Marin, see FCO 66/737: Letter from J. G. 
Taylor, UKDIS Geneva, to A. White, FCO, 4 April 1975. 
255 All of these proposals, including list of co-sponsors, are included in NPT/CONF/35II, 30 May 1975. 
256 FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 
June 1975. 
257 NPT/CONF/SR/12, p. 128. 
258 FCO 66/737: Immediate FCO Telegram no. 108 of 29 May 1975 info immediate UKDEL NATO (for 
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sponsored draft protocols.259 On the day that the Drafting Committee completed its work, on 
29 May, Thorsson expressed her grave concerns about the situation in a meeting of the 
General Committee. In the meeting, Thorsson explained that she did not believe the text 
produced would enable the Conference to reach agreement in the time available. For technical 
reasons, only one more plenary meeting was possible, and it would be held on the afternoon 
of the following day, on 30 May. A new initiative was required, Thorsson told the General 
Committee, and only she could take it. Thus, in the plenary meeting later that afternoon, she 
submitted her own draft of a Final Declaration to the Conference.260  
What enabled Inga Thorsson to intervene as she did, and what made her intervention 
successful? The following sections discuss possible answers to these two questions. 
According to the head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department, John Christopher Edmonds, Inga Thorsson received much 
assistance in preparing the draft Final Declaration that she introduced to the Review 
Conference that afternoon.  
 
4.2.4	  A	  Horse	  Race	  	  	  
The deadlock in the Review Conference forced the head of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department, John Christopher 
Edmonds, to leave London and join the British delegation in Geneva for the last ten days of 
the Review Conference.261 Upon his return to London, Edmonds wrote a report in which he 
made an effort to explain the emergence of the Final Declaration.262 According to Edmonds, 
during the weekend of 24 and 25 May, only days before the conclusions of the main 
committees, Thorsson called upon the two Chairmen of the main committees and the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and asked each of them to produce some text for her in 
confidence. According to Edmonds, the three Chairmen responded very differently to the 
President’s request.  
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The Chairman of Main Committee I, B. Akporode Clark from Nigeria, was according 
to Edmonds reported to have responded with only three lines. Why did the Nigerian Chairman 
not offer Inga Thorsson more concrete text? First, it is evident that the negotiations in Main 
Committee I made it difficult for Clark to offer Thorsson anything. It was in this committee 
that the battle over Article VI, the disarmament article, was fought. However, it is also 
possible that Clark intentionally chose not to contribute to a concluding document, as part of 
the Nigerian strategy in the Review Conference. In another summary report of the Review 
Conference, written by Mark Allen, the British Ambassador in Geneva, some of the non-
aligned states, among them Nigeria “…were out to pillory the NWS [nuclear weapon states] 
and commit them to specific measures of disarmament within fixed timetables.”263 It is thus 
possible that Clark, as Chairman, welcomed criticism instead of encouraging compromises, 
and that he as such only added to the difficulties of his committee. Edmonds’ description of 
the Nigerian performance in the Review Conference, which he formulated in a brief summary 
of the conference intended for the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, David Ennals, confirms the uncompromising attitude of the Nigerians at the Review 
Conference. According to Edmonds, the Nigerian performance in the Review Conference was 
“grotesque”, and the conference did not do much for Anglo-Nigerian relations, meaning it did 
not strengthen the relationship between the two states in any way.264 It should not be ruled out 
that the uncompromising Nigerian behavior was influenced by the recent OPEC-crisis, which 
had created an economic boom in oil-exporting Nigeria, or the political anxiety that arose in 
the wake of this boom. 
According to Edmonds, the Polish Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Eugeniuez 
Wyzner, did a little bit better. Wyzner handed Thorsson a draft, which he had received from 
the delegation of the Soviet Union. This, Edmonds knew, was because the Russians had also 
given the draft to the delegations of the United Kingdom and to the United States, “in 
confidence”265.  
The third Chairman however, “did much better”266, Edmonds remarked. According to 
Edmonds, William Barton from Canada, who chaired Main Committee II, set to work with a 
couple of Canadians, a couple of Australians and probably one Swede, and produced a very 
suitable draft, which was thereafter delivered to Inga Thorsson. According to Edmonds, 	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Barton and his “fellow-conspirators”267 were able to contribute constructively for the 
following reasons: first, Barton had all the language he needed for the technical articles from 
his own committee’s work.268 Contrary to Main Committee I, Main Committee II conducted 
its work in an efficient and businesslike manner.269 The material proved not to be particularly 
contentious and the negotiations were therefore not marked by much difficulty. According to 
the British representative in the committee, Fredrick Jackson, who was sent to Geneva 
because of his knowledge of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguard system from his work 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, by the end of its work, Main 
Committee II had reached a large measure of agreement on a number of texts. According to 
Jackson, the only reason why it was not able to send anything forward by consensus to the 
plenary session was because of last-minute objections by Mexico and Alfonso Garcia 
Robles.270  
Secondly, Edmonds explains, William Barton knew about the draft language that the 
United Kingdom had worked out with the Canadians regarding Article VII and security 
assurances, and on which NATO, Australia and Japan had agreed. Thus, the only “stumbling 
block”271 was articles VI, the contentious disarmament article. According to Edmonds, the 
group kept their option for this Article open until they had a clear understanding of what the 
nuclear weapon states would accept of non-aligned language.  
Edmonds’ account of the emergence of the president’s draft is confirmed by Robert 
Furlonger, the Australian Ambassador to Vienna and head of the Australian delegation to the 
Review Conference. After his return to Vienna, Furlonger met with Fredrick Jackson, the 
British representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose headquarters were, 
and still are, in the Austrian capital. In conversation with Jackson, Furlonger revealed that the 
Australians, together with the Canadians, had settled down and done a draft.272 Furlonger 
however, suggested that the draft was an Australian/Canadian initiative, and that they had 
gotten hold of the Swedes after the draft was prepared, and in a formed body told Inga 	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Thorsson that the only way of saving the conference was for her to put forward the draft on 
her own authority. Edmonds, however, who was told of the conversation by Jackson, rejected 
that the initiative for the presidential draft was Australian and Canadian. How did Furlonger 
explain the activities of Clark and Wyzner, Edmonds asked in his response to Jackson.273 
According to Edmonds’, it was clear that several “horses ran in the race”274 to help Inga 
Thorsson “lead the conference by the nose”275, but the starter was Inga Thorsson herself. 
Inga Thorsson presented her draft Final Declaration to the Review Conference in the 
plenary session on 29 May. According to Edmonds’ account of the emergence of the draft, 
Thorsson probably received some final assistance from the Conference Secretary General, 
Ilka Patinen, a United Nations official, in order to polish the text.276 In Edmonds’ opinion, the 
final draft was contained “…practically no trace of Nigerian and Polish offerings and [was] 
largely based on Barton’s work”277. Recalling Edmonds’ poetic comparison of the Review 
Conference with a serial melodrama, used to introduce this chapter, it seems valid to suggest 
that Edmonds, by accrediting the final Declaration to Barton and Canada, at least in part 
implies that the final document was by and large a British product. According to Edmonds, it 
was Barton’s knowledge of the Anglo-Canadian work to draft appropriate language that 
enabled Barton to produce the draft, which in turn was adopted by Thorsson. Is it possible that 
the United Kingdom acted as a major driving force behind the successful outcome of the 
Review Conference, or is this simply an expression of British officials exaggerating the role 
of the United Kingdom in their internal documents? The second part of this chapter is devoted 
to explaining the role of the United Kingdom in the Review Conference.  
 
4.3	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  	  
From a perspective of motive, the United Kingdom was undoubtedly interested in 
playing the role of mediator in order to achieve conference consensus. Recalling the analysis 
in chapter two, the United Kingdom was more vulnerable to criticism than the two other 
nuclear weapon states. Despite being the smallest nuclear power, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Arms Control and Disarmament Department feared that the United 
Kingdom would come under attack for not having participated in any negotiations on nuclear 	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disarmament. The nuclear disarmament negotiations that had been conducted after the NPT 
entered into force were of a bilateral character only, between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Nor was the United Kingdom in a position to simply disregard the demands of their 
non-nuclear weapon state partners in the European Community. The following analysis of the 
British record of the conference negotiations confirms that this was the case, and that British 
efforts to this effect were of great significance for the final outcome.  	  
4.3.1	  “Holding	  Out	  the	  Olive	  Branch”278	  
Going into the Review Conference, the strategy of the three nuclear weapon states, 
including the United Kingdom was to secure an appropriate conference outcome by mustering 
approval for the draft declaration they had produced in preparation for the Conference. The 
strategy was to get together a few “sympathizers” who could circulate their draft and thus 
function as a contact group between the nuclear weapon states and other delegations.279 The 
depositaries probably considered it useful to lie low to prevent that non-aligned states from 
dismissing their draft simply because of its origin. According to a British description of the 
strategy, the sympathizers were neither bound to accept the drafts themselves, nor authorized 
to agree to amendments; they would simply be asked to encourage other delegations to go 
along with the general tenor of the draft, without suggesting that the three depositaries, whose 
authorship of the draft would not be explicitly stated, would be prepared to amend it. 
However, the depositary strategy to make use of a small group of sympathizer to ease 
in their preferred language for a Final Declaration failed already during the first week of 
general debate, when the Soviet delegation attempted to pressure two of the intended 
“sympathizers”, Belgium and Austria, to join Czechoslovakia into sponsoring the depositary 
draft.280 According to the British Ambassador to Geneva Mark Allen’s summary of the event, 
which was instantly telegrammed to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 
London, the Russians had acted “somewhat clumsily” in a vain attempt to get priority for the 
depositary draft declaration over Mexico’s proposed draft additional protocols.281  
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Partly to repair the damage, Mark Allen explains, the United Kingdom arranged a 
meeting with its partners in the European Community the following morning.282 At this 
meeting, the British presented the genesis of the depositary draft, stated their own preferences 
and invited comments from their partners. According to Mark Allen’s assessment of the 
meeting, the European states expressed general agreement that protocols, such as the Mexican 
proposals, should be rejected and that a Final Declaration was the best possible outcome of 
the Review Conference. However, according to the British reporter, there was a “good deal of 
feeling that to table the draft [of the depositary powers] in the near future would risk 
sharpening confrontation”. While the Germans, the Danes and the Belgians seemed to have 
little difficulty with the depositary draft, the Italians, the Dutch and the Irish wanted 
considerable, yet unspecified additions. Thus, at British suggestion, it was agreed to hold a 
meeting of the NATO delegations on 12 May, the final day of general debate, to discuss the 
draft and to concert tactics for the work of the main committees.  
The British proposal to discuss the draft declaration in a NATO setting was motivated 
by British interests to play the role of mediator in the Review Conference. According to Mark 
Allen’s telegram report to London, the delegation considered it desirable to expose the 
Americans to European views; otherwise there was a chance that the Americans would be 
content to let the United Kingdom become “…the filling in a sandwich with the Russians on 
the one side and the European/Canadians/Swedish on the other.”283 In other words, the United 
Kingdom did not wish to play the part of the sole Western advocate for the depositary draft. 
Such a role would be hugely disadvantageous for the United Kingdom, whose primary 
interest was to appear accommodating towards its European partners. This interest was best 
served if they negotiated alongside the Americans, because the interests of the United 
Kingdom were closer to those of the European states than those of the United States.  
The British had good reason to believe that the Americans would be content to leave 
them with the undesired task of convincing the Europeans. As explained in chapter two, one 
of the main interests of the United States in the review was to preserve bilateral relationships 
of détente. Thus, by leaving it to the British to talk the European states, Canada and Sweden 
into the depositary draft, the United States would be able to avoid negotiations in which it 	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would be cornered into choosing between showing allegiance to its European allies or the 
Soviet-American détente.  
The NATO members in the Review Conference met on 12 May. A number of 
representatives, among them Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey, expressed the need 
for a draft that was closer to the centre, and in response to a German suggestion, it was 
decided that an open-ended Western drafting group be set up.284 Consequently, in the meeting 
of the Western Group285 the following day, a small group was established, composed of a 
German chair, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. The United Kingdom 
decided not to be represented in the group, “…leaving that task to the United States”, 
remarking that several Western delegations had said that the declaration should contain much 
more “meat”, and that the United States thus would have a hard time trying to contain this 
movement.286  
Not only did the United Kingdom succeed in playing a responsive and cooperative 
role towards her European partners and her partners in the Commonwealth; the United 
Kingdom also succeeded in adopting a cooperative role towards the non-aligned states.287 
According to John Christopher Edmonds’ report on the cooperation between the depositaries 
at the Review Conference, written upon his return to London after the conclusion of the 
Review Conference, the relatively mild British attitude towards the non-aligned states at first 
frustrated the Soviet Union, who complained that the British were not backing them and 
required that the United Kingdom “shout as loudly as themselves”.288 According to Edmonds, 
the United Kingdom responded to the Russian criticism by emphasizing that the obvious 
requirement was to break the developing deadlock between the nuclear weapon states and the 
non-aligned states, and that the British believed they had a role to play in this, without any 
disloyalty to the other two depositaries, if they took a position of some “individuality”.289 
According to Edmonds, the Americans at once accepted the United Kingdom in this 
role, but the Russians took their time. However, eventually, Edmonds explained, the Soviet 	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Union agreed to an arrangement where they played the “super-heavy”290, the Americans 
played the points more briefly and moderately, and the United Kingdom was seen to be 
bridging the gap between the three nuclear weapon states one the one hand, and NATO, 
Australia, Japan, Sweden and even Romania and Mexico on the other, “so far as the ‘market’ 
would stretch.”291  
Thus, according to Edmonds’ account, the United Kingdom succeeded in playing its 
preferred role as consolidator and mediator, a role that Edmonds suggests contributed towards 
breaking the deadlock between the nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states. He 
equally accredits the Soviet Union with the favorable outcome of the negotiations. In 
Edmonds’ words, “[o]nce the three depositaries had agreed on their respective roles, Russian 
‘villainy’ was an essential complement to our holding out the olive branch”.292 The following 
section examines how the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom worked together to ensure 
that the Final Declaration was in a language that was considered acceptable by both the 
nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states.  
 
4.3.2	  “A	  Troupe	  of	  Actors”293	  
When she presented the Review Conference with her allegedly self-produced draft 
Final Declaration, Inga Thorsson also asked the Conference to cut its plenary session short in 
order for the delegations to study and reflect on the document.294 Meanwhile, she would hold 
a meeting with the representatives of a selected group of states to consider possible changes to 
the draft. The states that Thorsson invited to this meeting were: Canada, Mexico, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America, as well as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, the Pole Eugeniuez Wyzner.  
The President’s negotiating committee met later that day in an attempt to negotiate the 
final wording of the document. At the meeting, neither the United Kingdom nor the United 
States made any reservation. Shortly after the conclusion of the plenary session they had met 
with their NATO colleagues, Australia and Japan, and agreed that Thorsson’s document was 
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reasonable and that the fewer changes that were made to it, the better.295 This was perhaps not 
surprising, seeing that the draft was by and large Western. The Soviet Union, however, was 
not equally pleased with the presidential draft. According to Mark Allen’s report on the 
committee meeting, included in his summary report on the entire Review Conference, the 
Soviet Union was infuriated by the final paragraph of the draft, which would have the 
conference “commend to the attention of all States and of the UN General Assembly the text 
of this declaration and the appended resolutions adopted by the conference”.296  
The phrase was inspired by a Mexican procedural resolution, presented during the 
final week of the conference, which would have the conference endorse the “aims pursued 
by” the draft protocols which had sponsors. According to Allen, the Russians exploded over 
the proposal, and “…hit the roof, refusing to contemplate the possibility that the conference 
should adopt the Mexican resolutions or commend them to the world.” Allen recalls that 
“[a]fter a tight-lipped exchange between a tired Mrs. Thorsson and an over-tense Mr. 
Isrealyan [head of the Soviet delegation], the group adjourned to sleep on the situation.”297 
Before she suspended the meeting, Inga Thorsson agreed to delete the final paragraph 
in her draft declaration, and invited the concerned delegations to consider how to deal with 
the Mexican additional protocols and other documents on which there was no consensus, 
overnight.298 Thus, the next day, the United Kingdom met with the United States and the 
Soviet Union to discuss possible solutions to the remaining unsettled point. According to 
Mark Allen’s report on the morning meeting, the Russians were, in a dramatic contrast to the 
prior evening, “all sweetness”. The previous “evening of vigorous haggling, with a great show 
of Soviet intransigence”299, was simply a performance. This was explicitly revealed by the 
head of the Soviet Delegation himself, Viktor L. Israelyan. According to John Christopher 
Edmonds’ recollection of the tripartite morning meeting, “…a smiling Israelyan said ‘Let me 
perform just once more’”300. However, there was never a need for a second Soviet 
performance. The Russians had themselves prepared a simple draft resolution to replace the 
crucial final paragraph, which accordingly was brought to the conference general-secretary, 	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Ilka Pastinen, and presented as a British resolution that was believed to be acceptable to the 
Russians.301 Pastinen, however, had just completed the declaration on the President’s 
instructions, and this final draft went even further to meet the Russians than their own 
proposal. In the final draft, Inga Thorsson had settled on a procedural arrangement whereby 
“…the Mexican resolutions, and a number of other unadopted drafts, would be appended to 
the final report of the conference and go forwards, unendorsed”302. The Russian proposal was 
accordingly dropped. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the Soviet “performance” effectively secured a 
procedural resolution which was more acceptable to the nuclear weapon states than what the 
British had dared hope for. An appropriate follow-up question is: to what extent was the 
Soviet performance directed by the United Kingdom? The British record suggests, perhaps 
not surprisingly, that the United Kingdom was largely to thank for the tactics of the nuclear 
weapon states. According to John Christopher Edmonds, once the Soviet Union accepted that 
the United States and the United Kingdom had to use different tactics to secure the sympathy 
of their NATO allies and others, the Soviet delegation actively helped the United Kingdom to 
play the part of mediator, “…for instance by letting us [the United Kingdom] stage a shouting 
match with them [the Soviet Union] when the president suspended her limited meeting on the 
night of 29 May.”303 In Edmonds’ words, the Soviet delegation was a “troupe of actors – each 
playing his appointed role for all it was worth”304, to the advantage of both themselves and the 
United Kingdom.  
Victor L. Israelyan’s songs of praise for the British delegation after the conclusion of 
the Review Conference partly confirms that the United Kingdom was the major strategist 
among the nuclear weapon states. These compliments were conveyed partly in Geneva, and 
partly upon Israelyan’s return to Moscow, to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Terence 
Garvey. According to Gravey, who forwarded the Russian compliments to John A. Thomson, 
the British Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Viktor L. 
Israelyan had expressed that what pleased him most about the Review Conference was the full 
understanding and grasp of the subject shown by the British.305 Israelyan was particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 FCO 66/737: Immediate Telegram no. 112 of 30 May 1975, to FCO, UKDEL NATO (for Thomson), info 
Washington and Moscow, from UKDIS Geneva, by Mark Allen. 
302 FCO 66/740: “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – A Close-Run Thing” by Mark Allen, FCO, 
p. 11, 17 June 1975. 
303 FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 
June 1975. 
304 FCO 66/740: “NPT Review Conference – The Depositary Powers and the Last 10 Days” by J. C. Edmonds, 4 
June 1975. 
305 FCO 66/470: Letter from T. Gravey, British Embassy in Moscow, to J. A. Thomson, FCO, 3 June 1975. 
 	   84	  
content with the tripartite meeting in London prior to the Review Conference, which he 
recalled as being a British idea. According to Israelyan, “…experience had shown what an 
excellent idea it was, enabling the three depositaries to proceed in complete harmony.”306 The 
Soviet diplomat believed it was John A. Thomson who was the architect behind the meeting, 
and he therefore implicitly accredited the conference outcome to Thomson.  
Was John A. Thomson the British strategist in the Review Conference? On the one 
hand, it is possible that Israelyan simply directed these compliments to Thomson out of 
politeness, because of Thomson’s superior position as a junior minister. One the other hand, 
in his position as British Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
Thomson was in charge of the British diplomatic service and had the authority to shape the 
British foreign policy. There are also sources from within the British delegation that confirm 
Thomson’s impact on the delegation’s work. According to John Taylor, a Geneva-based 
representative with the British Review Conference delegation, the idea to expose the United 
States to European views in order to take some heat off themselves originated from Thomson: 
“We considered that it was very much in the spirit of John Thomson’s advice to us that we 
contrived not to be represented on this group [the Western drafting group].”307 
The United Kingdom did not only end the Review Conference on good terms with the 
other two nuclear weapon states; several other delegations also expressed their satisfaction 
with the efforts of the British delegation, thus additionally confirming the influential role of 
the United Kingdom. According to John Christopher Edmonds, the British delegation was 
warmly thanked for its contribution to the Review Conference by “…the NATO-allies, Japan 
and – perhaps most significant of all – Mrs. Thorsson herself and the Swedish delegation.”308 
According to Edmonds, the British even finished on friendly terms with “…Mexico, 
Romania, and some of the less extreme non-aligned.”309 The praise enabled Thomson to 
conclude that the tactics pursued by the British delegation to the Conference had broadly 
“…enhanced British standings.”310 Thomson had three good reasons to base his final 
conclusion on. Firstly, large parts of the Final Declaration were based on British drafting.311 
Secondly, according to Thomson, the United Kingdom had succeed in raising general 	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acceptance that while they “…stood with the US and USSR on some major questions of 
substance,” they were “…notably nearer than either of the superpowers the views of the 
Western Europeans, Australians, Canadians and sensible non-aligned.”312 Thirdly, while 
Anglo-Soviet relations have been strengthened by the exercise, they had not weakened Anglo-
American relations.313  
In sum, the argument presented in the section above supports the idea that the United 
Kingdom greatly influenced the outcome of the first Review Conference of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty by playing the part of mediator. The United Kingdom was able to play 
this part with great success, partly because it managed to convince the superpowers of this 
role. However, the United Kingdom’s success was also dependent on other factors, one of 
which was the limited leverage of the non-aligned states in the Review Conference, for which 
the United Kingdom was partly responsible.  
 
4.3.3	  The	  Limited	  Leverage	  of	  the	  Non-­Aligned	  States	  
There were several factors that enabled the United Kingdom to influence the outcome 
of the first Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One important factor that 
contributed to the British success was the weak negotiating position of the non-aligned states. 
Recalling the analysis in chapter two, both the United Kingdom and the United States were 
convinced that the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty would not inflict any 
considerable damage on it, because the Treaty was of great value to the non-nuclear weapon 
states. The British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Ennals, 
hinted at this when he expressed: “…it surely goes without saying that the spread of nuclear 
weapons in the world poses an even greater threat, if anything, to non-nuclear weapon states, 
than to those, like ourselves, which already have nuclear weapons.”314 However, it was not 
simply the lack of an effective bargaining chip that weakened the negotiating position of the 
non-aligned states in the Review Conference. The non-aligned states did not succeed in 
extracting even the vaguest sort of apology from the nuclear weapon states in the Final 
Declaration because they were effectively neutralized in the Review Conference. How were 
the non-aligned states neutralized? 
The neutralization of the non-aligned states in the Review Conference was to a large 
extent a tactical victory for the nuclear weapon states and the Conference President, Inga 	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Thorsson. Each contributed towards the neutralization in different ways. As previously 
discussed, the policy of the nuclear weapon states going into the Review Conference was to 
emphasize the technical aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was partly motivated by 
an aim not to draw attention to disarmament, and partly an aim to divide the non-aligned 
states. The majority of the non-aligned states were developing countries, and their main 
motive for signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not nuclear disarmament, or to contribute 
to the establishment of an international non-proliferation norm, but technical assistant to 
improve their developing industries. According to the United Kingdom, these states were the 
most likely to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but at the same time the states 
whose demands it was easiest for the nuclear weapon states to accommodate.  
The United Kingdom had this assessment confirmed in a meeting between the British 
and the Mexican delegations in Geneva, one month in advance of the Review Conference. At 
this meeting, the Mexican representative, Miguel Marin, let the difficult negotiating position 
of the non-aligned states slip to the British representative, John Taylor. Marin told the British 
representative that it was becoming practically impossible to coordinate action within the non-
aligned group, and that this was both because it had become too large, and because there were 
too many heterogeneous interests.315 
The nuclear weapon states’ strategy to divide the non-aligned states proved a to be a 
success. According Mark Allen’s summary report of the Review Conference, the non-aligned 
states did not act as a monolithic group in the Review Conference.316 While some of its 
members, particularly Mexico, Nigeria and Romania took a political view, others, led by the 
Philippines, saw the conference in economic terms, as an opportunity to get more nuclear 
technical assistance.  
The maneuverability of the non-aligned states was additionally limited by the 
President of the conference, Inga Thorsson. Thorsson’s decision to negotiate her draft Final 
Declaration with representatives from Canada, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, effectively kept the non-aligned 
states from mobilizing against her draft. The selection put much pressure on Mexico, Nigeria, 
the Philippines and Romania, who constituted a minority in the negotiating committee. Unless 
they were able to find an agreement with the remaining representatives in the committee, they 
would be fully exposed as the wreckers of the Review Conference, Mark Allen explained in a 	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telegram report to London from the committee meeting.317 Thus, while the Soviet Union was 
most uncompromising with the non-aligned states, the non-aligned states showed surprising 
flexibility.318  
For much the same reason, it was a great tactical maneuver by Thorsson not to include 
Yugoslavia in her Presidential negotiating committee. Recalling the previous chapters, 
Yugoslavia was along with Mexico and Sweden, one of the most profiled critiques of the 
nuclear weapon states at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; 
however, in the Review Conference, Yugoslavia was not allowed to play a major part. 
Evidently, Thorsson believed that it would be easier to reach agreement by excluding 
Yugoslavia from her negotiating committee. Instead, she tackled the Yugoslavs privately and 
persuaded them grudgingly to allow the consensus on the Final Declaration.319 When 
summarizing the Review Conference for the British Government, the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,320 James Callaghan, concluded that the Final 
Declaration was “…above all due to the determination of the President (…) and her skills 
behind the scenes”, because the Final Declaration was drafted under her direct supervision, 
and she “…carefully controlled the opportunities for argument about it.”321  
Thus, in the end, the non-aligned states were not in a position to demand any concrete 
commitments by the nuclear weapon states, and they gave into the mediating efforts of the 
United Kingdom. This was partly because of the neutralizing efforts of the industrialized 
states. However, the tactics deployed by the non-aligned states may also be of some 
explanatory value. According to Fredrick Jackson, the British representative on Main 
Committee II, British readiness to get down to the solid work of drafting was invaluable to the 
British influence on the final outcome of the Review Conference. In his attempt to list what 
lessons should be learned from the Conference, Jackson particularly stressed that “…you 
cannot exercise influence without getting down into the mêlée.”322 Mêlée is French, for either 
conflict or batter, thus Jackson suggested that the only way to influence was by actually 
dealing with the substance, which in this particular case was the draft language. The non-	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aligned states, however, generally spoiled their chances of contributing draft language. When 
requested to produce some text for the Final Declaration, the single non-aligned Chairman, B. 
Akporode Clark from Nigeria, was reported to only have handed Thorsson three sentences.  
It is hard to say whether this was non-aligned tactics, or the result of deficient 
cooperation among the non-aligned states. According to Mark Allen’s summary report of the 
Review Conference, Alfonso Garcia Robles, who was the self-appointed leader of the non-
aligned, was not renowned for biddability or suppleness of tactics;323 thus it seems reasonable 
to suggest that this was imply a bad tactical call. However, the fact that Mexico contributed 
with the majority of the non-aligned language to the Final Declaration suggests that Mexico 
recognized the value of drafting. However, that does not necessarily make Clark’s actions a 
sign of non-aligned division; the Mexican language in the Final Declaration may simply be 
explained by Mexico’s role as the leader of the non-aligned. Yet, the United Kingdom’s 
negative experience with the Nigerian delegation, and surprisingly positive experience with 
the Mexican delegation, seems to finally suggest that the two non-aligned states were not in 
perfect harmony.  With Clark spoiling his opportunity to submit drafts on behalf of the non-
aligned, the non-aligned were worse off attempting to influence the final outcome of the 
Review Conference. As long as Inga Thorsson relied on the Committee Chairmen when she 
set out to draft the Final Declaration, the numerous non-aligned vice-chairmen in the General 
Committee, which non-aligned states had pressed for in the preparation of the Review 
Conference Committee, hardly made a difference.  
In addition to the limited leverage of the non-aligned states there were two more 
factors that enabled the United Kingdom to succeed in the role of mediator. The first one, 
which has been described to some extent, was the active role taken by the industrialized non-
nuclear weapon states, particularity Canada, Australia and Sweden. These states had remained 
relatively mute in the Preparatory Committee, and on occasion sided with the non-aligned 
states in their demands for nuclear disarmament. Sweden in particular was known to side with 
the non-aligned in matters of nuclear disarmament, as Alva Myrdal’s confrontational 
statements at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, recounted in chapter 
two, illustrated. However, in the Review Conference, the Swedish role was dramatically 
moderated, because like the non-aligned, Sweden and other non-nuclear weapon states were 
not served with by a conference failure. The United Kingdom was right to partly take credit 
for this, because recalling the previous analysis of the origin of the Review Conference Rules 	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of Procedure, it was partly the British who launched the candidature of Inga Thorsson towards 
the end of 1974.324 . 
The final factor that enabled the United Kingdom to play the role of mediator was, 
according to Jackson’s lessons from the Review Conference, personal relations. In Jackson’s 
opinion, the successes in Main Committee II, which discussed safeguards and peaceful 
nuclear technology, were largely achieved because many of the actors were so well known to 
each other, remarking that, “…in a conference of this magnitude, personal relations, and trust, 
count for much.”325 Thus, Jackson’s lessons from the conference serve as an important 
reminder not to underestimate the significance of individuals. This reminder brings me back 
to this chapter’s starting point: the role of the Conference President, Inga Thorsson. 
Regardless of the assistance that she received, it is very evident that Inga Thorsson’s style of 
leadership contributed towards secure the successful outcome of the Review Conference. The 
British Ambassador to Geneva, Mark Allen, leaves no doubt about this in his analysis of the 
final outcome of the negotiations: “It was largely because of Mrs. Thorsson’s determination 
and strength of character that the Conference reached any conclusion.”326  
 
4.4	  Summary	   	  
This chapter has presented an analysis of how the NPT parties managed to come to an 
agreement regarding a Final Declaration, despite the deadlock between the nuclear weapon 
states and the non-aligned states over the issue of nuclear disarmament. The chapter first 
analyzed the role of Inga Thorsson in the Review Conference, because Thorsson is portrayed 
as the conference savior in the existing literature. This analysis demonstrated that although 
Inga Thorsson’s qualities as Conference President were, undoubtedly, of great significance, 
she did also receive much assistance in seeing the conference through, which enabled her to 
secure a consensus for the Final Declaration. In sum, the factors that contributed to the 
success of the first Review Conference of the NPT are characterized by both state 
constellations and individual initiative.  
In the analysis, Canada and Australia stand out as two states that offered Thorsson 
invaluable assistance in drafting the Final Declaration. In his role as Chairman of Main 	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Committee II, Canadian William Barton was called upon by Inga Thorsson to draft text for a 
presidential draft of the Final Declaration, and he made much use of this opportunity. The 
second part of the analysis, which examines the role of the United Kingdom, suggests that the 
British played an instrumental role in securing a consensus for the draft, not only because the 
United Kingdom took on the role of mediator during the Review Conference, but also because 
of British efforts to concert the strategy of the three depositary powers prior to the Review 
Conference. According to the Soviet head negotiator, Viktor L. Israelyan, the initiative behind 
the preparatory tripartite meeting derived from the British Assistant-Under Secretary for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, John Thomson. Thomson consequently appears as the 
invaluable strategist behind the successful outcome of the Review Conference.  
While Sweden, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom exercised much influence 
during the Review Conference, this chapter has explained how the leverage of the developing 
countries, the Group of 77, was more limited. Their limited negotiating position is explained, 
partly a result of the strategy of the nuclear weapon states to feed into the opposing interests 
within the non-aligned constellation. They eventually found themselves forced to yield to 
Inga Thorsson’s ultimatum, to approve the Final Declaration instead of carrying the 
responsibility for a conference failure which could draw the validity of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty further into question.  
However, despite their limited leverage, the non-aligned states did succeed in slightly 
moving the nuclear weapon states. They gained acceptance for their additional protocols and 
resolutions to be appended to the final report of the Conference and were allowed to include 
interpretative statements of the Final Declaration. By drawing attention to such achievements, 
this analysis has demonstrated that the narrative of lost opportunities, which presents the non-
aligned states as being completely powerless when faced with the arrogance of the 
superpowers, is in fact unfitting. The non-aligned states’ role as victims must be understood 
as a self-imposed political maneuver; the Review Conference Final Document was in large a 
multilateral compromise. 
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CHAPTER	  5:	  
Conclusion	  
“A	  Peaceful	  Diplomatic	  Revolution”	  
 
 
 
That experience [the midnight negotiations in the Presidential Committee] gave rise to some 
valuable friendships – with several US officials, with Madame Thorrson (sic.) who had great 
influence among the neutrals and told me afterwards that the conference had been a great 
lesson in “realpolitik”, and with Victor Israelyan the de facto Soviet leader. 
John Christopher Edmonds, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 2009.327 
5.1	  Introduction	  
The post-war period has been characterized by both national and international efforts 
to restrict nuclear technology to peaceful purposes. When the nuclear bombs were dropped 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the world entered a new era in which the 
survival of humanity can no longer be assumed.328 The ambition of this thesis has been to 
expand knowledge of the institutionalization of an international nuclear non-proliferation 
norm by examining the first Review Conference of the NPT. Despite its obvious historical 
relevance as both the first conference to review the operation of an arms regulating treaty, and 
as the model for the periodic review system, an unprecedented enforcement mechanism for 
international law that is of great current importance, the first Review Conference of the NPT, 
has not been subjected to historical research.  
I hereunder present the conclusions of this research. My main objective has been to 
explain what roles and rationales of the NPT-parties that were decisive for the conduct and 
the outcome of the review. The research question was designed in order to account for the 
mutual causality of agency and structure to explain what ideational and material factors that 
enabled Inga Thorsson to keep the conference from collapsing. The recollection of the British 
diplomat John Christopher Edmonds’, used to introduces this chapter, expressed in an 
interview Edmonds gave about his diplomatic career nearly 35 years after the review took 
place, suggests that both political conflict and friendship are appropriate for explaining the 
outcome of the first NPT review. The conclusion of this research is that particularly the roles 	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played by Sweden and the United Kingdom were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the 
review negotiations. Two factors presented these two states with the opportunity to play 
pivotal roles in bringing about the conference compromise. Both Sweden and the United 
Kingdom had a special incentive to act as mediators in the review negotiations. However, a 
precondition for their maneuverability was the character of the conflict between the 
superpowers, the détente.  
 
5.2	  The	  Achilles’	  Heel	  
First, this research concludes that, paradoxically, conflict was a precondition for the 
cooperation and compromises in the review negotiations. The two superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, had the definite upper hand going into the review negotiations, 
not from strength in numbers, but due to their economic and military superiority, and the 
simple fact that neither of them wanted to change the status quo. According to his 
biographers, the Republican Administration under President Richard Nixon did not believe 
that state behavior was steered by international norms and therefore showed little interest in 
the NPT. From the perspective of both superpowers, there was no need for a review 
conference; they only agreed to organize one because it was mandatory by the NPT.  
However, in spite of their apparent superiority, the superpowers had an Achilles’ heel. 
As the analysis has demonstrated, the superpowers were throughout the negotiations primarily 
concerned with their position vis-à-vis one another, which was in turn affected by their 
positions vis-à-vis China. While attempting to remain friendly, the adversaries were 
constantly challenging each other in fear that the other would seek to take advantage of the 
détente. Advantage was of course the aim of both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the carefully orchestrated realpolitik of the United States and the US-Soviet détente 
largely restricted the maneuverability of the superpowers in the review negotiations and 
contributed to increase the maneuverability of the United Kingdom and Sweden.   
In order not to “upset the détente”, both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
hesitant about going into situations in which they could not foresee the outcome. For instance, 
the United States was initially skeptical about tripartite meetings that included the Soviet 
Union, while the Soviet Union was hesitant about approaching the United Nations General 
Assembly with unresolved conflicts with the non-aligned states. As discussed in the analysis, 
it is possible that this Soviet behavior was motivated by an interest to put pressure on the 
United States in the review negotiations, however, regardless of motive, it demonstrates how 
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the United Nations, the institutionalization of a world community, was an actor that put 
pressure on the superpowers. Throughout the negotiations, there was a general tendency 
among the nuclear weapon states not to engage in any battles in the United Nations; attempts 
were made to settle all conflicting issues beforehand. This was evident in setting up the 
Preparatory Committee, when Swedish threats to present an independent resolution to call on 
an International Disarmament Organization caused the nuclear weapon states to remove the 
reference to the depositaries in their draft resolution.  
The lack of superpower interest and self-confidence in the NPT review was a 
precondition for the influential roles of Sweden and the United Kingdom in the review. The 
major triggering factor, however, apart from the United Nations General Assembly, was the 
conflict between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states in the first 
session of the Preparatory Committee. The antagonism that was directed towards the nuclear 
weapon states prompted the Soviet Union to agree to British proposals for a concerted 
depositary approach to the review. With the mediation of the United Kingdom, the Cold War 
adversaries, the Soviet Union and the United States were able to align their strategies for the 
Review Conference. The cooperation between the three nuclear weapon states, made possible 
by the political atmosphere of détente, was essential to the final outcome of the review. The 
close cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union was a significant change 
from the negotiations that had produced the Non-Proliferation Treaty, less than a decade 
before. Equally, the inclusion of the United Kingdom was a remarkable change from the 
SALT negotiations. 
Though the Soviet Union reached out to the United Kingdom prior to the Indian 
nuclear test explosion, it should not be ruled out that the nuclear proliferation to India 
increased the favorability for concerted depositary action. The Indian nuclear test put much 
pressure on the infant non-proliferation regime, and it is apparent from the British record that 
there were deep concerns about how to respond to the Indian test. However, the United 
Kingdom decided that admitting to these concerns could further undermine the non-
proliferation regime, and it was therefore decided not to act on them. Equally, the mild 
response of the United States and the Soviet Union does not necessarily reflect a lack of 
concern.  
According to this research, it is also apparent that the Indian nuclear test had a 
conciliatory effect on the non-nuclear weapon states. This is, for instance, suggested by the 
Mexican moderation in the second session of the Preparatory Committee. It was also in the 
interests of the non-nuclear weapon states to preserve the credibility of the frail regime. By 
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moderating its proposal for a rule of access, and as the front figure of the Non-Aligned 
Movement in the Review Conference, Mexico was able to exercise a great deal of influence in 
the review negotiations. However, the two states that really stand apart from the other actors 
are Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
 
5.3	  The	  Road	  is	  the	  Goal	  
The second conclusion of this research is that roles of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom were decisive for the conduct and outcome of the review negotiations. As described 
above, the United Kingdom played a pivotal role in organizing consultations between the 
nuclear weapon states, while Sweden influenced the review negotiations as a vocal 
representative of the non-aligned states and eventually in the capacity as president of the 
Review Conference. The underlying reason why it was Sweden and the United Kingdom that 
happened to possess such roles in the review negotiations was their shared interest in being 
actors.  
As explained in chapter two, and clearly confirmed by the initiative of the United 
Kingdom throughout the review negotiations, the British had a strong interest in the 
negotiation process. Contrary to the United States, the United Kingdom emphasized the 
necessity of negotiations. This position was motivated by the British interest in both 
appearing to be accommodating to their partners in the European Community, and to 
contributing to the position of the United Kingdom in order to reaffirm the British position as 
a depositary power. Assured that revision was considered unacceptable by the two 
superpowers, the United Kingdom was free to focus on its appearance in the negotiations 
process.  
Motivated by concerns regarding its position vis-à-vis the United States and its 
partners in the European Community, the United Kingdom contributed to the special role of 
Sweden. Throughout the review, the United Kingdom put much emphasis on close 
consultations with the frontrunners of the non-aligned states, one of which was Sweden. 
Similarly to the United Kingdom, Sweden had strong incentives to play an influential role in 
the review negotiations. As a Western state opting for neutrality in a military conflict of the 
Cold War, Sweden had an interest in reaffirming its position as non-aligned. Nuclear 
diplomacy was a pivotal component in Sweden’s neutrality strategy. Sweden’s appearance as 
a frontrunner for the Non-Aligned Movement in nuclear diplomacy served to reaffirm 
Swedish neutrality. This was the primary interest of Sweden in the review negotiations; 
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interests regarding technical assistance and nuclear disarmament must be considered 
secondary. Correcting the discriminatory features of the NPT was of great interest to Sweden 
primarily to gain the confidence of the non-aligned states. However, as an industrialized 
nuclear supplier, Sweden did not have any national interests in technical assistance. This 
priority of interests is illustrated by Sweden’s behavior in the review negotiations. While the 
confrontational tone of Alva Myrdal during the preparations for the review negotiations 
served to secure non-aligned confidence in Sweden, the conciliatory and business-like 
appearance of Inga Thorsson served to convince the depositary powers that Sweden was an 
appropriate candidate for the conference presidency. In contrast, Mexico’s Alfonso Garcia 
Robles was considered to be too unpredictable for the position.  
The combination of interest and position, the first being a direct consequence of the 
second, motivated and enabled the United Kingdom and Sweden to seek compromise 
solutions in the review negotiations. They contributed to the compromises of the review 
conference both directly and indirectly. As the research has demonstrated, a significant 
component of how Sweden and the United Kingdom exercised influence during the review 
negotiations was what states they decided to be responsive to, and what states they decided to 
exclude from informal negotiations during the Review Conference. Especially Canada, 
Australia and Mexico were allowed to contribute to the final outcome. In drafting a Final 
Declaration, Sweden relied on Canadian and Australian assistance, while Swedish 
responsiveness to Mexican pressure resulted in the inclusion of proposed additional protocols 
in the Final Documents.  
The United Kingdom also contributed to the Final Declaration of the Review 
Conference. First, the United Kingdom prepared extensive amounts of language for the Final 
Declaration, which was used by the Canadians and the Australians, and thereby contributed 
directly to the concrete wording of the Final Declaration. Indirectly, the British contributed to 
a solution in part because of calls for wide Western consultations to coordinate the Western 
position during the Review Conference. These consultations served to expose the United 
States to the demands of the Western non-nuclear weapon states. Yugoslavia, however, which 
both Sweden and the United Kingdom paid much attention to prior to the first session of the 
Preparatory Committee, was completely sidelined.  
Combined, the two conclusions presented above suggest that the first Review 
Conference and the institutionalization of a periodic review system for the NPT was a result 
of both the superpowers’ sensitivity to the United Nations and Sweden and the United 
Kingdom’s interests in using nuclear diplomacy as a means to affirm their positions in this 
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world community. Consequently, the existence of a world community constitutes an 
important component in my explanation model. This may be an important step in an epoch-
making development. As presented in short in the introductory chapter, during previous 
disarmament negotiations the United Nations had largely been an instrument of the 
superpowers. In the 1950’s, the United Nations General Assembly was used as an arena for 
ideological competition. The superpowers attempted to outshine each other by advancing 
nuclear disarmament proposal that they knew were unacceptable to their opponent.329 The 
bipolar conflict reduced nuclear disarmament initiative to propaganda, and the United Nations 
to a passive observer. Although the United Nations introduced resolutions and set up ad hoc 
organizations with an aim to pursue nuclear arms control measures, such as the Eighteen 
Nations Disarmament Committee, their success was conditioned on superpower commitment. 
The negotiation in the ENDC for a non-proliferation treaty only commenced after the Chinese 
nuclear test, although it had been running for two years already. However, during the review 
negotiations, Soviet-American and Sino-American détente limited the maneuverability of the 
superpowers. Consequently, the United Nation became an instrument for the non-nuclear 
weapon states, although the non-nuclear weapon states only succeeded in moving the position 
of the superpowers slightly. 
	  
5.4	  “A	  Peaceful	  Diplomatic	  Revolution” 
The findings presented above support the introduction of a new narrative of nuclear 
diplomacy that combines both the political conflicts and the diplomatic accomplishments. 
According to the historian Martin J. Sherwin, the Manhattan Project scientists who built the 
first nuclear weapons expected that the revolution in weapons technology could lead “…either 
to a peaceful diplomatic revolution or a nuclear-armed world.”330 Partly to justify their own 
contribution to the nuclear attack on Japan, they claimed that the bombing was intended as a 
warning shot, a deterrence that could bring other states, especially the Soviet Union, to accept 
the international control of nuclear weapons. In the short term these noble intentions failed. 
The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fueled the emerging Cold War conflict between 
the two ideological adversaries and instigated a nuclear arms race that eventually included 
multiple states. It also provided the basis for the historical narrative of lost opportunities. In 
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the long term however, the nuclear technology did unarguably give rise to a diplomatic 
revolution, though perhaps not entirely in the way that the nuclear scientists had envisioned.  
Nuclear weapons did to some extent instigate a diplomatic revolution. In the wake of 
inconvincible destruction and faced with potential nuclear annihilation, the architects of the 
post-war world order institutionalized global governance as an international norm. This norm 
increased the significance of soft power, understood as the ability to steer the behavior of 
others through persuasion instead of coercion. Profit-warfare is no longer considered 
legitimate state behavior. This research has clearly demonstrated how consideration of 
appearance in the United Nations affected the actions of the superpowers, and how the United 
Kingdom and Sweden attempted to reaffirm their position, not through the acquisition of 
material resources, but by mediation. Multilateral conferences have in a sense become the 
modern battlefield. According G. John Ikenberry, “[i]n the age of nuclear deterrence, great-
power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has 
been abolished as a historical process.”331 Thus, a narrative of a peaceful diplomatic 
revolution is perhaps more appropriate than that of lost opportunities.  
The appropriateness of a narrative of a peaceful diplomatic revolution is additionally 
strengthened by the longevity of the non-proliferation regime. In accordance with the NPT, 
the parties to the Treaty met in May 1995, 25 years after the Treaty entered into force, to 
decide if the NPT should be extended for a longer period, or indefinitely. The decision fell on 
the latter. Paradoxically, the 1995 Extension and Review Conference was not able to agree on 
a Final Declaration. This confirms how political conflict in review negotiations is not 
necessarily a sign that there is no consensus for non-proliferation, but instead used as a 
channel to direct protests regarding other issues. Another solid symbol of the international 
character of the non-proliferation norm is adherence to the NPT, which today is nearly 
universal. Only Pakistan, India, North Korea and Israel are not members of the NPT.332  
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5.5	  Final	  Reflections	  and	  Future	  Research	  
The recent availability of the extensive official British records from the review 
negotiations has presented me with the opportunity to describe the first Review Conference 
very differently from how it has been portrayed in biographical accounts. According to the 
findings presented in this thesis, the review negotiations were characterized by a large degree 
of consultations, cooperation and compromise, not only within, but also across the caucuses. 
Thus, contrary to William Epstein’s account of the first NPT review, the nuclear weapon 
states did not “stonewall” all the demands of the non-nuclear weapon states. This research has 
thereby contributed towards broadening knowledge of a largely understudied phenomenon in 
modern history. However, this thesis only represents a first step in addressing the lacunas in 
the nuclear historiography; multiple issues remain unattended and ought to be subjected to 
future research. To conclude this research, I wish to draw attention to two subjects that have 
been made particularly relevant by the findings of this research.  
When analyzing a subject that had not previously been analyzed by historians, it was 
natural to give priority to analyzing the dynamics between the actors, instead of producing an 
in depth analysis of each actor. However, a more in depth analysis of each actor is of course 
called for, and in the light of the conclusion presented here, the official records of Sweden 
could prove particularly interesting. In this thesis, the motives of Sweden have been analyzed 
on the basis of Sweden’s behavior in the review and knowledge of Sweden’s general interests 
regarding nuclear weapons. An analysis of the Swedish official records could add to the 
analysis presented here, by expanding knowledge of Swedish strategy in the first review. 
Second, it could be of great interest to further examine the effects of the Indian nuclear 
test explosion on American-European relations. This thesis has revealed how the Indian 
nuclear test put great pressure on the United Kingdom, because the European non-nuclear 
weapon states expected the nuclear weapon states to condemn the Indian actions. However, 
the British sources do not explain how the news of the Indian test was received in 
Washington, or whether the European states put direct pressure on the United States as well, 
and if so, how this was received. Both of these perspectives may serve to additionally expand 
knowledge of the first Review Conference of the NPT that set the precedence for a periodic 
review system of great current value.   
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The	  Treaty	  of	  Non-­Proliferation	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons,	  July	  1,	  1968	  
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war 
and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the 
danger of nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable 
materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear 
technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-
weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for 
peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon 
States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, 
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning 
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek 
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to 
continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the 
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of 
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds 
human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
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Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 
 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from 
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or 
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. 
 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set 
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its 
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy 
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the 
safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear 
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied 
to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State 
for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the 
safeguards required by this article. 
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed 
to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for 
the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with 
the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the 
Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days 
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of 
ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not 
later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties 
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to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate 
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so 
shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international 
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with 
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 
 
Article V 
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance 
with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear 
explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a 
nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will 
be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special 
international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with 
adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall 
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control. 
 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in 
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all 
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to 
the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite 
all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all 
the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter 
into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the 
deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the 
instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other 
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for 
any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the 
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Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty 
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may 
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening 
of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. 
 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to 
it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments 
of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a 
nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent 
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding 
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests 
for convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority 
of the Parties to the Treaty. 
 
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments 
of the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of 
July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.	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Signatories	  and	  Parties	  as	  of	  January	  2010	  
Country	  
Date	  of	  
Signature	  
Date	  of	  Deposit	  
of	  Ratification	  
Date	  of	  Deposit	  of	  Accession	  
(A)	  or	  Succession	  (S)	  
Afghanistan 1/7/68 4/2/70  
Albania   12/9/90(A) 
Algeria   12/1/95(A) 
Andorra   7/6/96(A) 
Angola   14/10/96(A) 
Antigua and Barbuda   17/6/85(S) 
Argentina   10/2/95(A) 
Armenia   21/7/93(A) 
Australia 27/2/70 23/1/73  
Austria 1/7/68 27/6/69  
Azerbaijan   22/9/92(A) 
Bahamas, The   11/8/76(S) 
Bahrain   3/11/88(A) 
Bangladesh   31/8/79(A) 
Barbados 1/7/68 02/21/80  
Belarus   9/2/93(A) 
Belgium 20/8/68 2/5/75  
Belize   9/8/85(S) 
Benin 1/7/68 31/10/72  
Bhutan   23/5/85(A) 
Bolivia 1/7/68 26/5/70  
Bosnia & Herzegovina   15/8/94(S) 
Botswana 1/7/68 28/4/69  
Brazil   18/9/98(A) 
Brunei   26/3/85(A) 
Bulgaria 1/7/68 5/9/69  
Burkina Faso 25/11/68 3/3/70  
Burundi   19/3/71(A) 
Cambodia   2/6/72(A) 
Cameroon 17/7/68 8/1/69  
Canada 23/7/68 8/1/69  
Cape Verde   24/10/79(A) 
Central African Republic   25/10/70(A) 
Chad 1/7/68 10/3/71  
Chile   25/5/95(A) 
China*   9/3/92(A) 
Colombia 1/7/68 8/4/86  
Comoros   04/10/95(A) 
Congo   23/10/78(A) 
Costa Rica 1/7/68 3/3/70  
Cote d'Ivoire 1/7/68 6/3/73  
Croatia   29/6/92(S) 
Cuba   4/11/2002(A) 
Cyprus 1/7/68 10/2/70  
Czech Republic   1/1/93(S) 
Democratic Peoples 
Republic of Korea**   12/12/85(A) 
Denmark 1/7/68 3/1/69  
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Djibouti   16/10/96(A) 
Dominica   10/8/84(S) 
Dominican Republic 1/7/68 24/7/71  
Ecuador 9/7/68 7/3/69  
Egypt 1/7/68 26/2/81  
El Salvador 1/7/68 11/7/72  
Equatorial Guinea   1/11/84(A) 
Eritrea   16/3/95(A) 
Estonia   7/1/92(A) 
Ethiopia 5/968 5/2/70  
Fiji   14/7/72(S) 
Finland 1/7/68 5/2/69  
France   2/8/92(A) 
Gabon   19/2/74(A) 
Gambia 4/9/68 12/5/75  
Georgia   7/3/94(A) 
Germany*** 28/11/69 2/5/75  
Ghana 1/7/68 4/5/70  
Greece 1/7/68 11/3/70  
Grenada   2/9/75(S) 
Guatemala 26/7/68 22/9/70  
Guinea   29/4/85(A) 
Guinea-Bissau   20/8/76(A) 
Guyana   19/10/93(A) 
Haiti 1/7/68 2/6/70  
Holy See   25/2/71(A) 
Honduras 1/7/68 16/5/73  
Hungary 1/7/68 27/5/69  
Iceland 1/7/68 18/7/69   
Indonesia 2/3/70 12/7/79  
Iran 1/7/68 2/2/70  
Iraq 1/7/68 29/10/69  
Ireland 1/7/68 1/7/68  
Italy 28/1/69 2/5/75  
Jamaica 14/4/69 5/3/70  
Japan 3/2/70 8/6/76  
Jordan 10/7/68 11/2/70  
Kazakhstan   14/2/94(A) 
Kenya 1/7/68 11/6/79  
Kiribati   18/4/85(S) 
Kuwait   01/31/92(A) 
Kyrgyzstan   5/7/94(A) 
Laos 1/7/68 20/2/70  
Latvia   23/1/92(A) 
Lebanon 1/7/68 15/7/70  
Lesotho 9/7/68 20/5/70  
Liberia 1/7/68 5/3/70  
Libya 18/7/68 26/5/75  
Liechtenstein   20/4/78(A) 
Lithuania   23/9/91(A) 
Luxembourg 14/8/68 2/5/75  
Madagascar 22/8/68 8/10/70  
Malawi   18/2/86(A) 
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Malaysia 1/7/68 5/3/70  
Maldives 11/9/68 7/4/70  
Mali 14/7/69 10/2/70  
Malta 17/4/69 6/2/70  
Marshall Islands   30/1/95(A) 
Mauritania   26/10/93(A) 
Mauritius 1/7/68 8/4/69  
Mexico 26/7/68 21/1/69  
Micronesia   14/3/95(A) 
Monaco   13/3/95(A) 
Mongolia 1/7/68 14/5/69  
Montenegro   3/6/2006 
Morocco 1/7/68 27/11/70  
Mozambique   4/9/90(A) 
Myanmar (Burma)   2/12/92(A) 
Namibia   2/10/92(A) 
Nauru   7/6/82(A) 
Nepal 1/7/68 5/1/70  
Netherlands 20/8/68 2/5/75  
New Zealand 1/7/68 10/9/69  
Nicaragua 1/7/68 6/3/73  
Niger   9/10/92(A) 
Nigeria 1/7/68 27/9/68  
Norway 1/7/68 5/2/69  
Oman   23/1/97(A) 
Palau   14/4/95(A) 
Panama 1/7/68 13/1/77  
Papua New Guinea   16/2/82(A) 
Paraguay 1/7/68 4/2/70  
Peru 1/7/68 3/3/70  
Philippines 1/7/68 5/10/72  
Poland 1/7/68 12/7/69  
Portugal   15/12/77(A) 
Qatar   3/4/89(A) 
Republic of Korea 1/7/68 23/4/75  
Republic of Moldova   11/10/94(A) 
Romania 1/7/68 4/2/70  
Russian Federation 1/7/68 5/3/70  
Rwanda   20/5/75(A) 
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Saudi Arabia   3/10/88(A) 
Senegal 1/7/68 17/12/70  
Serbia   1/1/93(A) 
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Singapore 5/2/70 10/3/76  
Slovakia   1/1/93(S) 
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Thailand   7/12/72(A) 
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia   30/3/95(S) 
Timor-Leste   5/5/2003(A) 
Togo 1/7/68 26/2/70  
Tonga   7/7/71(S) 
Trinidad & Tobago 20/7/68 30/10/86  
Tunisia 1/7/68 26/2/70  
Turkey 28/1/69 17/4/80  
Turkmenistan   29/9/94(A) 
Tuvalu   19/1/79(S) 
Uganda   20/10/82(A) 
Ukraine   5/12/94(A) 
United Arab Emirates   26/9/95(A) 
United Kingdom 1/7/58 29/11/68  
United Republic of 
Tanzania   31/5/91(A) 
United States 1/7/68 5/3/70  
Uruguay 1/7/68 31/8/70  
Uzbekistan   7/5/92(A) 
Vanuatu   24/8/95(A) 
Venezuela 1/7/68 25/9/75  
Vietnam   14/6/82(A) 
Yemen  14/11/68 1/6/79  
Zambia   15/5/91(A) 
Zimbabwe   26/9/91(A) 	  
Dates given are the earliest on which a country signed the Treaty or deposited its instrument of ratification or 
accession – whether in Washington, London or Moscow. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory 
which became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice it would 
continue to be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Data from the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. 
*China – On 27/1/70, an instrument of ratification was deposited in the name of the Republic of China. Effective 
1/1/79, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The 
authorities on Taiwan have stated that they will continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United 
States regards them as bound by the obligations imposed by the Treaty. 
**Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea – On 10/1/2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. On 9/10/2006, 
North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device.   
***Germany – The former German Democratic Republic, which was united with the Federal Republic of 
Germany on 3/10/90, had signed the NPT on 1/7/68 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 10/31/69. 
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Norsk	  Abstrakt	  
 
	  
Denne masteroppgaven er et bidrag til å øke kunnskapen om institusjonaliseringen av 
en internasjonal ikkespredningsnorm. Atomteknologi gjør utslettelse av alt menneskeliv 
mulig. Det internasjonale samfunn har derfor bygget et regelverk som i størst mulig grad 
begrenser atomteknologien til fredelig bruk. Regelverket er basert på flere traktater, deriblant 
ikkespredningstraktaten, Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) som trådde i 
kraft i 1970. NPT forbyr alle land som per 1. januar 1967 hadde atomvåpen å bidra til 
spredningen av atomvåpenet, mens alle land som ikke har atomvåpen, forplikter seg til å avstå 
fra å tilegne seg eller utvikle atomvåpen eller andre kjernefysiske eksplosiver.  
Ikkespredningsregimet er et understudert tema i moderne historie. Fremforhandlingene 
av internasjonal atomvåpenregulering er hovedsakelig beskrevet av politikere og diplomater 
som har deltatt i prosessen. Deres bidrag setter i liten grad forhandlingsforløpene inn i en 
historisk prosess, og fremstiller diplomatiet som preget av konflikt og nederlag. Spesielt er 
dette tilfellet for den første tilsynskonferansen for ikkespredningstraktaten. Fem år etter at 
NPT trådde i kraft ble det avholdt en tilsynskonferanse for traktaten i Genève. Konferansen 
var angitt i traktaten, men utover konferansens generelle formål inkluderte NPT ingen 
veiledning til hvordan tilsynet skulle avholdes. Denne masteroppgaven har derfor hatt som 
formål å forklare hvilke aktører og interesses som var avgjørende for utformingen og 
gjennomføringen av denne konferansen 
Ved å analysere aktørenes tilnærming til, og oppførsel under fremforhandlingene av 
både tilsynskonferansens prosedyre i forkant av konferansen, og forhandlingene  under 
konferansene, bidrar denne masteroppgaven til å nyanse fremstillingen av den første 
tilsynskonferansen for ikkespredningstraktaten. Oppgaven viser hvordan forhandlingene var 
preget av en stor grad av samarbeid og kompromiss, ikke bare internt, men også på tvers av  
grupperingene. Mangfoldet av konflikt var forutsetning for dette samarbeidet. Politiske 
motsetninger i forhandlingene, détente mellom USA og Sovjet Unionen, samt Kinas 
gjenintegrering i verdenssamfunnet og den første indiske atomvåpenprøvesprengningen i 
forkant av konferansen bidro til å skape et handlingsrom som spesielt Storbritannia og 
Sverige maktet å utnytte.  
Den første tilsynskonferansen satt presedensen for et periodisk tilsyn av 
ikkespredningstraktaten. I dag fungerer dette tilsynet som et internasjonalt styringsorgan for 
ikkespredingsregimet, og funnene presentert her har derfor stor aktualitet.   
